

Cuk: 1105092-11-1001092.



Vol. XIV Nos. 1 & 2 1974

Israeli Influence in Africa

Dr Farouk A. Sankari

Economic History of the Kilindi Kingdom

Q. Ekemode

O. A. Akinyemi's Perception of Neo-Colonialism

Dr A. B. Akinyemi

Christian Moralism and Apartheid

Samuel Omo Asein

India and Africa

Dr Vijaya Gupta

Africa Through Indian Eyes

Pakeeza Sultan

34 5.14

AFRICA QUARTERLY

Volume XIV

NUMBER : ONE & TWO

916.05
AP 83



Combined Issue for
No. 1 & 2 of Vol XIV
Covering April-June and
July - September 1974

INDIAN CENTRE FOR AFRICA
ICCR, Azad Bhavan, Indraprastha Estate,
New Delhi

AFRICA QUARTERLY

PUBLISHER

Smt. SOONU KOCHAR

EDITOR

DR. VIJAYA GUPTA

Editorial Advisory Board

Dr. Anirudha Gupta, *Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi.*

Prof. Daleep Singh, *University of Delhi, Delhi.*

Prof (Miss) A.J. Dastoor, *University of Bombay, Bombay.*

Prof. C.P. Bhambhri, *Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.*

Shri B.H. Zaidi, *National Herald, Delhi.*

Africa Quarterly is published Quarterly every January, April, July and October by The *Indian Centre for Africa ICCR Azad Bhavan, New Delhi-110001.*

The views expressed in the articles are the author's and not necessarily those of the *Indian Centre for Africa.*

Contributions

Africa quarterly welcomes contributions on African Affairs from scholars for publication in the Journal. The objective of these contributions should be promotion of knowledge about Africa and better understanding between the peoples of India and Africa.

Manuscript should be type-written with double spacing and be in the form in which the authors wish them to appear in print. The right of editing the articles is vested with the Editorial Board. The original, as well as a carbon copy of the article, along with a summary of not more than 300 words should be submitted to the Editor. Contributors are, in their own interest, advised to retain a copy of their article as unpublished works will not be returned.

The authors are advised to include footnote material wherever possible. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively throughout the article. Bibliographical references should give the author's last name, date and place of publication and specific pages. Articles may be illustrated with line drawings and maps, classified as figures, to be submitted in final form (except size). Tables, if included in the text, should replace it and not duplicate it.

All editorial correspondence and manuscripts, including book reviews, should be addressed to the Editor, *Africa Quarterly, Indian Centre for Africa, I.C.C.R., Azad Bhavan, New Delhi 110001.*

Subscriptions

All cheques and bank drafts for subscription and payment of *Africa Quarterly* should be drawn in the name of *Editor, Africa Quarterly, ICCR, Azad Bhavan, New Delhi.*

Subscription (India) Rs. 20 per annum
Single Copy Rs. 6

Subscription (Foreign)

By Sea Mail \$ 7 or £3

By Air Mail \$ 14.5 or £5.10

© Contents Copyright

P/1092

AFRICA QUARTERLY

- 5 The Cost and Gains of Israeli Influence in Africa
Dr Farouk A. Sankari
- 20 Economic Basis of the Kilindi Kingdom of
Vugha in the 18th and 19th Centuries
Dr G.O. Ekemode
- 32 The Organisation of African Unity—Perception of
Neo-Colonialism
Dr A. B. Akinyemi
- 53 Christain Moralism and Apartheid : Paton's Cry the
Beloved Country Reassessed
Samuel Omo Asein
- 64 India and Africa Quarterly Chronicle
(July—December 1973)
Dr Vijaya Gupta
- 74 Book Reviews
- 79 Africa Through Indian Eyes — A Documentation List
(July—December 1973)
Pakeeza Sultan
- 114 Publications Indexed
- Documentation List — Contents

Our Contributors

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| Dr. Farouk A. Sankari, | Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, University of Wisconsin, Oshkosh, Wisconsin-54901. |
| Dr. G.O. Ekemode, | Department of History, University of Ife, Ife, Nigeria. |
| Dr. A.B. Akinyemi, | Department of Political Science, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. |
| Dr. Samuel Ome Ascin, | Department of English, University of Ife, Nigeria. |
| Dr. Vijaya Gupta, | Editor, Africa Quaterly, Indian Centre for Africa, New Delhi. |
| Pakeeza Sultan | Incharge, Africa Library, Indian Centre for Africa, New Delhi. |
| Mrs. V. Ayyar | former student of the University of Nairobi, Kenya. |
| T.G. Ramamurty | Senior Research Officer, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi. |

Dr. Farouk A. Sankari

The Cost and Gains of Israeli Influence in Africa

THE purpose of this essay is to demonstrate the dynamics and workings of Israeli aid to Africa with reference to three areas of Israel's foreign policy objectives : (1) containment of Arab influence; (2) strengthening economic ties ; and (3) gaining political support against the Arabs within the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. The author's primary concern is to assess the cost and gains of the pursuit of influence by Israel in Africa.

In the mid-1950s, most developing countries had very little contact with Israel. They identified the Zionist-movement with the West and saw Israel as another colonialist venture directed against the Arabs. Certainly, the Arabs lost no opportunity at world conferences to portray Israel as a tool of imperialism and made every effort to enlist Afro-Asian support for the rights of the Palestinian Arabs to return to their homeland.

The Anglo-French-Israeli attack against Egypt in 1956 made Israel appear to be part of the colonial tradition. Consequently, Israel was in danger of political and economic isolation from many developing countries.

After the Suez War, Israel's biggest challenge, therefore, was to end its isolation in the Afro-Asian world, to normalize its position in the international system, and to counteract Arab opposition and propaganda. Israel's development of the Port of the Elath on the Red Sea gave it an outlet to Asia and Africa that bypassed the Suez Canal and enhanced its contacts with the countries of these regions.

To this end Israel sought relations with several of the African countries on the verge of independence. Up to 1956, Israel's only presence in Africa was an embassy in South Africa and a Consulate-

General in Kenya. The situation changed radically in the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s. By the end of 1969 thirty-two African countries had diplomatic ties with Israel and about twenty had cooperative treaties with it.

The means a state uses to influence another is determined by the power at its disposal. In an attempt to achieve its foreign policy objectives in Africa, Israel resorted to economic and military cooperation primarily in the form of technical assistance.¹ The emphasis on technical assistance was determined by Israel's limited capital funds. Hence, Israeli officials ruled out competition with the big powers or Arab oil-producing countries in extending loans or making capital grants.² Funds for Israeli technical assistance are usually provided by the Israeli government, host governments, international organizations, and to a lesser extent, by private banks.³

Israeli technical assistance to Africa took three basic forms : (1) sending technical experts ; (2) training civilian personnel in Israel ; and (3) providing military aid. From 1958 to 1969 Israel sent 1,525 experts to Africa. Of these, 255 were in agriculture, 665 in youth organization, 124 in medicine and health, 93 in education, 61 in construction, 146 in management and public service, 25 in social work, 13 in cooperation, and 143 in miscellaneous.⁴

A major part of the Israeli technical assistance programme in Africa consisted of aid in land settlement projects. These projects were patterned after Israel's models of the kibbutz (where property and work are collective), the Lachish plan (where a region is an economic and social unit with three component parts : settlements, a rural centre, and an urban centre, with the rural centre being the key factor in the aim of merging immigrants from various places into one nation), and the Moshav (a smallholder's cooperative settlement). Several African countries were attracted to these models and have tried to copy them with Israeli aid. Two of the most challenging aid projects in Africa were the Mwanza scheme near Lake Victoria in Tanzania and the Luanshya scheme in the copperbelt region in Zambia.

The Mwanza project which began in 1962-63 in Tanzania aimed at changing the structure of the country's agricultural patterns by resettling farmers in newly established village settlements and at

improving the production capacity of the region. The government of Tanzania and Agridev—Agricultural Development Company (International), Ltd., an Israeli government sponsored company—undertook this project in the Mwanza region, Tanzania's major cotton producer.

The backbone of the technical organization for the project was made up of Israeli experts. Some of the patterns of the Moshav and the Lachish in Israel were followed. Three cooperative farms in Mwanza were set up and were managed separately, but the equipment was jointly owned and need determined its allocation. The Israelis introduced modern methods of agriculture and, while concentrating on cotton, they tried to experiment with other crops such as groundnuts, onions and maize.

The Israelis viewed the project as a business venture and their goal was to maximize profits. In 1965 the Tanzanian government undertook a reappraisal of the entire project and approach. Two conclusions were reached: first, the project was too expensive; second, the settler farmers in the cooperatives showed less enthusiasm than the settlers in the unassisted schemes. Consequently, the Tanzanian government decided to modernize the existing traditional villages instead of establishing highly capitalized scheme and moving people to them.

The Mwanza project was viewed as a failure in an area in which the Israelis believed they had a unique ability. The Mwanza cooperatives did not become Moshavim and the region did not become like the Lachish region. The project was pregnant with risks from the beginning. The Tanzanian government's aim was to accomplish a social, economic and political revolution by changing part of Tanzania's agricultural structure. The Israeli aim was to introduce a techno-economic change while the Tanzanians were in charge of the social and political mobilization. The success of the project would have required an integrated effort from the national level down and an equal emphasis on technological investment as well as social services. Perhaps the cultural barriers were too great to allow for the Israelis to be integrated with local structures to bring about the desired change.⁵

The copperbelt region project was more successful than the Mwanza. In its attempt to implement the "back to land" policy,

the Zambian government invited Israel to plan the project. The scheme which started in the summer of 1967 involved settlements based on small family farming. In the spring of 1972 there were 460 family farms, organized into six cooperatives, three in Kabfubu and three in Kafulafuta. The plan was patterned on the Lachish model and included a regional centre school, a clinic and a cultural centre.⁶ The plan also involved extensive production of field crops, and extensive production of poultry, beef cattle, pigs, vegetables and fruits.

Israel's role in the project was to demonstrate that Zambia can diversify its economy and production by becoming less dependent on the sale of copper, and by producing its own food, thereby saving foreign exchange on imports. Israeli experts also planned to create a rural society in which production of the family farms would sell in national markets.

For the first two years the cooperatives in the copperbelt region suffered from the same disappointments that affected the Mwanza project in Tanzania, namely, high cost, marketing problems cultural barriers and low individual incentives. A joint reappraisal of the project by the Israelis and the Zambian government led to some adjustment in the application of the Israeli models. Necessary changes were made to transform some settlements to the Moshav model which allows for individual achievement and reward within a cooperative framework. Viewing the copperbelt project as a prototype which might meet the socio-economic needs of Zambia, the Israelis have been asked to restructure three cooperatives near Lusaka on similar patterns: Zambia Independence, Buchetekelo and Tubalange.

Partly because of the scarcity of capital, the emphasis of Israel's aid programme has been on training. From 1958 to 1970 African trainees in Israel numbered 6,272. In 1969, for example, the 475 African trainees in Israel were distributed by profession as follows: 113 agriculture, 120 cooperation, 67 community development, 35 academic studies, 39 health and medicine, 34 management and public service, eight vocational training and twelve miscellaneous.⁷

Israel's training programme included small conference studies, and involved courses in subjects which ranged from three to ten months in which exchange students studied the topics of agriculture,

youth organization, community development, cooperatives, trade unionism, public and police administration and vocations, courses for nurses and teachers, and special courses covering the professions. Programmes in training of vocational and managerial types were set up in schools in many African nations. Training and management programmes for maritime officials and executives were in effect with Ghana's Black Star Line under the guidance of Zim, the Israeli shipping line ; similar training programmes for bank officials were sponsored by the Bank of Israel with participants from Madagascar and Ghana and other African states. Furthermore, many of the African trainees in Israel attended Israeli's major educational institutions : The Medical Faculty, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, the Veterinary Institute, the Institute of Forestry Products, the Atomic Energy Commission, the Haifa Technion and the Cooperative Institute of the Histadrut.

While Israel has guarded the bilateral character of its training programmes, it has also expanded its cooperation with international organizations. These relations are politically significant for Israel, and have also served to bring more financial support for Israel's programmes. Among the organizations which participate in technical assistance programmes and give support to Israel are the International Labour Organization (ILO), the World Health Organization (WHO), United Nations Special Fund, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO), The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Israeli experts abroad for the United Nations and its specialized agencies in 1969 were distributed : 14 (UNDP), nine (FAO), eight (ILO), six (WHO), and one (UNESCO).⁸

Israel, in turn, has participated in multi-lateral technical assistance activities of United Nations agencies. An outstanding example of this kind of cooperation is Israel's participation in the multi-purpose agricultural Centre in the Upper Volta, financed jointly by the United Nations Special Fund, Upper Volta and Israel. This was operated in 1966 by an international team consisting largely of Israeli agricultural experts. The centre trained students and farmers, and produces quality seed and livestock.

Along with Israeli's technical assistance to African countries,

the Israeli government and business organizations have extended their activities to many of these countries in recent years. This type of cooperation ordinarily takes one of the following forms. (1) An Israeli firm works in the developing country as contractor for the local government, or for the Israeli government when it has been requested to assist in the implementation of a development project. (2) An Israeli firm sets up a local subsidiary, in partnership with the developing country's government. (3) An Israeli company sets up a local partnership with a similar firm in the developing country in order to undertake a specific joint venture for the local government. (4) An Israeli firm sells the developing country an industrial project.⁹

Israeli firms are active in the agricultural, industrial and infra-structural sectors of developing nation's economics. The four largest Israeli organizations involved in these areas are Tahal Consulting Engineers, Ltd., Water Resources Development (International, Ltd.), Solel Boneh's Overseas and Harbour Works, Ltd., and the Institute for Planning and Development.¹⁰

The Water Resources Development Company undertook railway and highway projects in Ethiopia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast. Solel Boneh (owned by the Histadrut) and the Nigerian government set up the Nigersol Construction Company. Solel also undertook construction work in Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. The Institute had undertaken urban and development projects in Nigeria and Sierra Leone.

The Israeli volume of trade with Africa, though increased over the years, has not been very substantial. For example, total Israeli imports from Africa in the years 1963, 1964 and 1965 were \$22,015 million, \$27,440 million, and \$27,192 million, respectively. Israel's exports during the same years were \$11,564 million, \$12,739 million and \$21,490 million.¹¹

As in previous years, in 1969 and 1970 Israeli exports were mainly to Uganda, Nigeria, Liberia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Ghana, Gabon the Republic of South Africa, the Ivory Coast, Central African Republic, Tanzania and Zambia. Imports from Africa were mainly from the Republic of South Africa, Liberia, Gabon, Ethiopia and Kenya (See Table 1). In 1972 Israeli exports to Africa were \$37.7 million and its imports were \$20.2 million.¹²

Israel's primary trade partners are Europe, the United States, Canada and Asia. Africa is a minor area for Israeli trade. Geographical distribution of African imports and exports indicates that most African foreign trade is with France, Britain, other EEC countries, the United States and Japan. Israel is very minor trading country in comparison.¹⁸

TABLE 1
Israel's Trade with Africa—1970
(In thousands of U.S. dollars)

| Country | Imports (1970) | Exports (1970) |
|--------------------------|----------------|----------------|
| Liberia | 19 | 234 |
| Ghana | 2,174 | 720 |
| Nigeria | 4,164 | 72 |
| Mali | 206 | 75 |
| Tanzania | 1,896 | 377 |
| Uganda | 2,193 | 2,280 |
| Kenya | 3,034 | 725 |
| Ethiopia | 3,258 | 2,204 |
| Zambia | 2,778 | |
| Ivory Coast | 1,141 | 476 |
| Guinea | 11 | 27 |
| Central African Republic | 6 | 3,617 |
| Gabon | 31 | 3,357 |
| Mozambique | 520 | 280 |
| Angola | 46 | 25 |

Source : Adapted from *Trade Statistics for Africa Trade Commodity A and B*, United Nations, No. 19 and 22, New York, 1972.

Israel is yet to publish the entire story of its military assistance to Africa. This assistance is dictated at least by the following factors : the Israeli belief that if it did not aid the African countries, Egypt would ; the Israeli desire to gain influence in East Africa, an area considered of vital interest to Israel ; and the Israeli realization of the increasing political importance of the African armed forces.

Israeli military aid to Africa falls into two categories : first, training of Africans in the navy, army, air force and police ; second, training of African para-military personnel, either in Israel or Africa.

Under the first category, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Zaire, Dahomey, Malagasy Republic, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda and Upper Volta received some form of direct military aid from Israel. Specifically, Israel provided military advisers to train the Ethiopian and Ugandan air force. Israel trained the Ghanaian army and naval forces and soldiers and police in Malagasy, Tanzania and Sierra Leone. Tanzanian and Zairian parachute units were trained in Israel. Israel sold tanks to Uganda and equipped the Ethiopian imperial guard and a number of West African presidential guards with UZI submachine guns.¹⁴

Under the second category, the Israeli organizations, Nahal and Gadna, have organized and conducted aid to at least seventeen African countries : Cameroun, Chad, the Central African Republic, Zaire, Dahomey, Gabon, Ghana, the Ivory Coast, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Niger, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Upper Volta and Zambia.

The major recipients of Israeli aid were Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. The size of the Israeli military mission to Ethiopia was second only to the American aid programme. Next to Ethiopia, the largest Israeli aid was given to Uganda. By 1965 Israel had replaced the British by becoming the most important foreign military mission there. The training of youth movements on the Nahal in Tanzania and Kenya was substantial.¹⁵ Israel believed that its presence in East Africa, particularly in Ethiopia, will, in some way, deter Egypt and contain Arab influence.

Contrary to the belief of many, Israel has never been a major donor to Africa. Nor has its aid programme been successful in terms of overall development of the African economies. Undoubtedly the programme has affected thousands of Africans in a variety of ways and this has enhanced Israel's relations with African countries.

Though Israel's primary objective in extending foreign aid to Africa was to limit Arab influence, it has failed to translate its popularity among some African countries into political support during serious confrontation with the Arabs. This is evidenced, among several things, by the behaviour of the African countries in the Organization of African Unity, their voting pattern in the United Nations and their severance of diplomatic relations with Israel before and after the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.

Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the Organization of African

Unity has passed several resolutions expressing total solidarity and support to the Arabs, demanding the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Arab occupied territories occupied since June 5, 1967, "deploring Israel's negative and obstructive attitude and asking all United Nations members to refrain from supporting Israel with weapons, military equipment or moral support," giving Egypt every assistance in her conflict with Israel and supporting the Arab countries in using oil sanctions. Only once in November, 1971 did the Organization of African Unity decide to send a peace mission, comprised four African leaders, to the Middle East. The mission failed to make any progress towards a final settlement between the Arab countries and Israel. Of course, the degree of willingness of all members of the Organization to strongly support or acquiesce in Arab demands varied at Organization's conferences.¹⁶

African government distinguished between ties based on foreign aid and policies adopted at the United Nations. Several African leaders saw no dichotomy between their foreign policy statements condemning Israel and their acceptance of technical assistance from it.

An analysis of the voting pattern of African countries in the United Nations on Palestine question and the problems related to it indicates that the major recipients of Israeli aid (Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Malawi) have consistently been less helpful to Israel diplomatically than have the minor recipients. The one group of African countries which could be regarded as favourably disposed towards Israel unit 1967 was the Francophonic bloc. It includes Cameroun, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo Brazzaville, Dahomey Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal and Upper Volta. It was this group which supported in the early 1960s the move in the United Nations towards direct negotiations between the Arabs and Israelis with the view of finding a solution for all the questions in dispute between them.¹⁷

Several factors have worked against Israeli gains in Africa since the 1967 war. These factors demonstrate the restriction which certain realities placed on Israeli functional strength in Africa :

(1) Israel's military victory over the Arabs. Israel's success in the war changed its "underdog" status. Thereafter, Israel did

not appear to many Africans to be the menaced victim of strong Arab neighbours. It seemed to many African countries unrealistic to believe that the Arabs would throw the Israelis into the sea.

(2) Israel's refusal to withdraw from Arab lands is gained during the war. More African countries condemned Israel for not returning these lands to the Arabs. Though they agreed that Israel should have secure and recognized boundaries, they criticized Israel for not saying what its frontiers should be. The Arabs, some African countries believed, ran the risk of losing more of their land. Furthermore, the possibility of U.S.-Soviet confrontation made the Africans more insistent on Israeli withdrawal.

(3) The notion propagated by the Arab states that the Middle East conflict is a confrontation between imperialist and anti-imperialist forces. This had gained increasingly widespread support in Africa.

(4) Muslim solidarity. Recent efforts to increase Islamic solidarity (notably the Rabat Summit of Islamic States in 1969) and Saudi Arabian King's visit to five Muslim non-Arab African countries tended to work against Israel. Some countries in Africa have Muslim majorities: Mauritania 98%, Niger 85%, Guinea 62%, Senegal 76%, Mali 65%, Chad 52%; and others have important minorities: Nigeria 43%, Ethiopia 35%, Ivory Coast 23%, Upper Volta 22%, Cameroun 19% and Dahomey 13%.¹⁸

(5) France's attitude. Perhaps the French anti-Israeli attitude immediately following the 1967 war created a measure of confusion among African French former colonies the (the Francophonic bloc) whose neo-colonial relationship with France might have had something to do with their previous failure to support the Arabs.

(6) The use of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) by the Arab states to secure their interests. The Arab members of the Organization use it as a mechanism to bring pressure on the Israelis. This policy has achieved some results. In the past three years, the OAU voted several resolutions hostile to Israel.

(7) Suspicions of Israeli motives in Africa. Many Africans believe that Israel interferes in the internal affairs of African countries. Biafra and the Southern Sudan are most often quoted examples.

(8) Arab economic aid. As early as 1954 the Arab League

states resolved to strengthen their diplomatic representation with Afro-Asian states and to promote political, cultural and economic cooperation. To this end, Egypt assumed leadership, particularly in the 1950s and 1960s. Currently several Arab countries, such as Libya, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrein and others, are playing a significant role in this endeavour.

Like other Arab countries, Egypt considered Israel's involvement in Africa an attempt to undermine Arab aspirations and an alliance with Western powers to "strike at the Arab revolution from the back." Egypt has consistently taken the position that Western imperialism is behind Israel's penetration in Africa.

Partly in responses to Israeli activity in Africa, President Nasser attempted to increase and strengthen Egypt's economic involvement in Africa. Thus in the late 1950s and 1960s, Egypt's export and import companies established branches in most African states. These companies also conducted the marketing of African products in Europe.

Further attempts to reduce foreign competition in Africa and to isolate Israel were made by Egypt. Throughout the 1960s Egypt took the lead in signing economic agreements that provide for the establishment of the African Common Market, the African Development Bank, the Arab-African Bank, the African Payments Union, the African Aviation Organization, the Navigation Transport Pact, and the African Economic Unity Council.

Egypt had also sponsored numerous economic conferences aimed at improving African and Afro-Asian economic cooperation to the exclusion of Israel. Among these conferences were the Afro-Asian Economic Conference in 1958, the Conference on Economic Development Problems in 1962, and the First Industrial Conference for African States in 1966.

Along with Egypt's efforts to expand its volume of trade with African countries and to isolate Israel at international conferences, Egypt has also given technical and cultural aid to at least twenty-six African states. Among these are Somalia, Tanzania, Guinea, Kenya, Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda, Zambia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Togo, Cameroun, Burundi, Liberia, the Ivory Coast, Upper Volta, Chad and Mali. Such aid takes the form of sending experts in agriculture, civil aviation and meteorology, hygiene, transportation,

electricity and irrigation; providing teachers; granting scholarships for the study of agriculture, health, chemical technology, radioisotopes and radiation biology; granting loans for the financing of several economic projects ranging from projects for the cultivation of corn to the construction of housing, schools and hotels.

In recent years more Arab states have joined Egypt's economic campaign to counter Israeli assistance in Africa. Libya, for example, since Israel's refusal to agree to Uganda's demands for more economic aid and to influence a military buildup against Tanzania in March, 1972, offered to train Ugandan military and air force personnel and to build and maintain hospitals and medical training in Uganda. Libya has also agreed to give Uganda grants and loans for industrial and commercial development. Both governments have also agreed that the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank would set up a subsidiary in Kampala to be 49 percent owned by the Ugandan government.

The shift in Chad's foreign policy toward Israel made Tombalbaye's regime acceptable to the Arabs and Libya offered financial aid to Chad. In January, 1973, the two countries discussed joint oil prospecting in the extreme north of Chad, the construction of a metalled road to link their capitals and the construction of a free port on Libyan shores for Chadian imports and exports, which at present are transported by rail, river and road from Brazzaville. In addition to Chad, Mauritania, Somalia, Niger and Uganda are recipients of Libyan aid.¹⁹

Saudi Arabia has also joined the economic Arab offensive in Africa. Saudi Arabian King's visit to five African countries—Uganda, Chad, Senegal, Mauritania and Niger—in November, 1972, resulted in its pledge to strengthen political, economic and social ties. Saudi Arabia has offered these countries development loans.

A further example of Arab aid to Africa was the decision of the Afro-Arab Bank to increase its investments in certain African countries and also to increase its development loans to them after they have severed relations with Israeli. The bank has contributed to the execution of various projects in African countries. These include a housing project in the Ivory Coast and hotels in Kenya. The bank also contributed to the establishment of a sugar plant

and the expansion of a textile factory in Ethiopia, copper extraction and processing in Mauritania and a fertilizer plant in Senegal.²⁰

In the light of all these factors, Israeli influence in Africa has gradually decreased and its gains diminished. It was not until April of 1972, when Uganda expelled the Israelis, that African relationships with Israel generally began to seriously deteriorate. Since then, all but four African countries have severed diplomatic relations with Israel. These four include South Africa, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland. Three of these are completely surrounded by South Africa. At least twenty African countries severed relations with Israel since fighting erupted in the Middle East on October 6, 1973.

During the past nineteen months the Israeli Keneset's Ministerial Committee for Economic Affairs responded to African defection by cutting down Israel's investments in much of East Africa and West Africa and concentrated its aid efforts on a few African countries including Ethiopia and Kenya. Under the new Israeli guidelines, the Finance Ministry will neither encourage nor assure guarantees for work and investment in some African countries which previously had such assurances. Meanwhile, the realities of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the dynamics of a fluid competition by the Arabs cuts down the effective functional strength of Israel in Africa.

Though the cost of Israel's influence in Africa has not been high in dollar value, its diplomatic gains were viewed by Israeli officials as important. Now that Israel's influence has diminished, it would have to further reappraise its objectives and means in Africa. Certainly in no way will Israel's loss in Africa be a blow to its economy or military power. The West, particularly the United States, is Israel's major supplier of aid and arms. Israel's loss of influence in Africa is essentially a diplomatic defeat which Israel could survive as long as it remains recipient of aid from the United States and other Western sources.

Should a final settlement be reached between the Arabs and Israel, in all probability Israeli-African diplomatic ties will improve. What Israel's foreign policy objectives in Africa would be and what means Israel would use to achieve these objectives in a post Arab-Israeli final settlement remains to be seen.

FOOTNOTES

¹For a detailed study on Israeli economic cooperation with the developing countries, see Leopold Laufer, *Israel and the Developing Countries: New Approaches to Cooperation*, The Twentieth Century Fund, Inc., 1967.

²Israel's grants programme in Africa is very modest. It includes little financial assistance and the granting of some equipment. One of the largest grants, reportedly \$250,000, was given to Upper Volta. The volume of loans is also modest. Between 1958 and 1966 the total value of loans given to all African countries was \$25 million. The recipients of these loans were Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Liberia, Tanzania, Kenya, Malagasy Republic and the Ivory Coast.

³Israel's 1972 total investments in Africa reached \$50 million. *African Research Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 5 (May 15-June 14, 1973), p. 2742.

⁴Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Israel's Programme of International Cooperation*, Jerusalem, 1970, p. 57.

⁵For further information on the Mwanza project, see *Agridov Report on the Cooperative Farming Schemes at Mbarika, Kalamera and Nietwali in the Lake Victoria Territory of Tanzania* (Tel-Aviv, February, 1966), and Stuart H. Schaar, "Patterns of Israeli Aid and Trade in East Africa, Part II: East Africans in Israel and Israelis in East Africa," *American University Field Staff, East Africa Series*, Vol. VII, No. 2 (June, 1968).

⁶For more details, see Nora Levin, "Cooperation Brings a Grassroots Revolution," *African Report*, Vol. 17, No. 4 (April, 1972), pp. 15-18.

⁷Ministry for Foreign Affairs, *Israel's Programme of International Cooperation*, Jerusalem, 1971, p. 59.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 58.

⁹Aldor Rafael, "Israel's Economic Programme in Developing Countries," reprint from the *Columbia Journal of World Business*, Vol. VI, No. 3 (May-June, 1971), p. 2.

¹⁰For a detailed description of the goals, projects and achievements of these and other companies, see Abel Jacob, "The Political Outcomes of Foreign Aid: Israel's Foreign Aid Programme to Africa," Ph. D. dissertation, University of California, Los Angeles, pp. 362-389.

¹¹*Statistical Abstract of Israel*, Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 1966, p. 253.

¹²*African Research Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 5 (May 15-June 15, 1973), p. 2742.

¹³For further details, see U.S. Department of Commerce, Market Profile for Africa, *Overseas Business Reports*, December, 1972, and *United Nations Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa*, 1971 (Part I), New York, 1972, pp. 156-164.

¹⁴Philippe Decraene, "Africa and the Middle East Crisis: Is the Romance With Israel Over?" *Africa Report* (May-June, 1973), pp. 20-24.

¹⁵For more details, see Abel Jacob, "Israel's Military Aid to Africa, 1960-66," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (1971), pp. 165-187.

¹⁶For more details on the text of these resolutions and the efforts of the African mission, see *New York Times*, September 18, 1968, p. 3; March 1, 1970, p. 8; December 10, 1970, p. 13; November 8, 1971, p. 3; November 16, 1971, p. 11; December 4, 1971, p. 3; November 26, 1971, p. 16; June 16, 1972, p. 11; June 29, 1972, p. 17; May 26, 1973, p. 9; November 21, 1973, p. 16.

¹⁷The principle of direct negotiations became Israel's main diplomatic position in the United Nations. Israeli officials viewed the support of some African states for this position as a gain for Israel in Africa.

¹⁸See *Africa South of the Sahara, 1972*, Europa Publications, Ltd., London, 1971.

¹⁹For amount of aid to these countries, see *African Confidential*, October, p. 5.

²⁰*Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 5 (June 30, 1973), p. 2750.

Dr. G.O. Ekemode

The Economic Basis of the Kilindi Kingdom of Vugha in the 18th and 19th Centuries

THE Kilindi kingdom of Vugha, which was established in Usambara in about the first quarter of the eighteenth century by Mbegha of Nguu,¹ the founder of the Kilindi dynasty, had by the third decade of the nineteenth century developed into an extensive multi-tribal state in the north-eastern region of pre-colonial Tanzania (mainland). Under Kimweri the Great, its fifth king, who reigned from about 1803 to 1869, the kingdom included the Pare in the north-west, all the districts of Usambara and Bondei, a greater part of the Zigua country and the coastal strip from the island of Wasin in the north to the region south of Pangani inhabited by the Segeju, Digo the Swahili and the Arabs.² In a rather conservative estimate, the German missionary, Dr. J.L. Krapf who visited the kingdom in 1848 says that its population was about half a million and that its extent was approximately 60 miles from north to south and 140 miles from east to west.³

This kingdom was unique not only because it was the first successful experiment in the creation of multi-tribal state in pre-colonial Tanzania, but also because it was the first successful attempt at centralization in an area largely characterized by loose political organization. For in pre-Kilindi times, Usambara, the nucleus of the Kilindi state, like the other tribes of the Zigula cluster,⁴ the Zigua, the Nguu and the Bondei, had been loosely organized into clans which settled on different parts of the Usambara mountains and were ruled by their councils of elders. According to the *Habari za Waeilindi*, the Swahili history of the royal Kilindi clan,

it was these councils of elders that invited Mbega, the progenitor of the Kilindi to rule in Usambara.⁵ For although there was no centralized political organization of a dynastic kind in pre-Kilindi Usambara, there was the tradition of accepting the leadership of one of the several Shambala clans in periods of emergency. According to tradition, this leadership was first exercised by the Wanango,⁶ the first warrior clan in Usambara, and in the immediate pre-Kilindi period by the Tuli clan⁷ of Vugha.

The political pre-eminence of these warrior clans was generally recognized apparently because of their possession of superior military skill and of iron technology. This was particularly true of the Tuli clan, a clan of blacksmiths,⁸ who kept the knowledge of iron-working and smelting a close secret, and on whom other Shambala clans came to depend for their supply of weapons and agricultural implements. But in spite of the enormous economic and political influence wielded by these warrior clans over Usambara, they did not make any efforts to establish the kind of institutionalized chieftainship which the Kilindi later introduced into the country. For they simply contended themselves with a vague kind of pre-eminence, a kind of *primus inter pares* position among all other Shambala clans.

With the Kilindi the case was different. Although he had originally been summoned to Vugha and invested with supreme political and military power to deal with the emergency created by the threat of the Pare invasion⁹ of 1725, Mbegha did not become inactive after he had successfully led the Shambala to beat back the Pare invaders, but had immediately taken advantage of the situation to establish himself as king. For he clearly recognized that there was a power vacuum in Usambara and that Shambala peasants were willing to accept the leadership of anyone strong enough to guarantee their physical security. He therefore transformed Usambara into a united state under the leadership of his Kilindi clan.

The transformation was largely successful because the advantage which the people derived from the existence of a strong and centralized leadership instead of the previous makeshift arrangements were such as to make a return to the older order impossible after Mbegha's death. For instance, according to Shambala traditions,

there was relative peace in the country during the reigns of Mbegha and Buge the second Kilindi king, and Mbegha's eldest son and successor.¹⁰ Although it was the unity of the kingdom that served as the insurance against indiscriminate attacks from the neighbouring tribes, the Shambala strongly believed that it was the magical powers and charms¹¹ of the Kilindi that gave them protection and ensured the prosperity of their country.

To the Shambala, therefore, the Kilindi monarchy was essentially utilitarian because it served vital political and economic purposes; it protected the country from internal disorder and external aggression; it was believed to have provided rain through the use of the Kilindi's 'rain charms',¹² and it protected the peasants crops from the ravages of wild beasts (particularly wild pigs) by organizing large hunting expeditions on the Usambara mountains. Although the Kilindi encouraged the Shambala to believe in their magical powers,¹³ they nevertheless clearly recognized the necessity of giving their political domination a legitimate basis of authority and an effective administration. This was achieved, first, by making Kilindi princes, born of local Shambala women, governors of their mothers' districts,¹⁴ and then, by associating the leading commoner Shambala clans closely with the Kilindi monarchy by appointing from their ranks royal officials like the *Wadoe*, who acted as regents for the Kilindi princes in their minority and advised them as chief councillors in their maturity.¹⁵ The commoner clans also provided a class of royal messengers called the *Walau*¹⁶ who served as the link between the districts and the central administration in Vugha, by communicating royal instructions to the district governors and ensuring their execution. It was this simple but effective administrative system that ensured the continued existence of Usambara as united country in the crucial, formative years, when the various districts could have developed into separate chiefdoms, each under its own 'indigenous' Kilindi ruler.

After the successful establishment of Kilindi rule in Usambara, the need to support royal administration and protect the country from the incursions of the neighbouring tribes led the Kilindi to embark upon a policy of expansion which had as its chief motive, the extension of their political and economic domination outside Usambara. The connexion between Kilindi imperial expansion

and their economic interests is well-illustrated by the fact that Kilindi expansion was more to the south—into Uzigua and the coastal region¹⁷ inhabited by the Digo, the Segeju, the Swahili and the Arabs—than to the north—into the countries of the Pare, the Teita and the Kamba.

Shebuge Kinyashi 1778-1803, the fourth king of Vugha, who initiated this Kilindi policy of southward expansion had as one of his objectives the desire to control the trade between Usambara and the Arab-controlled coastal region so as to eliminate the services of the Zigua middlemen who were making fantastic profits from the trade between the coast and the interior of Usambara. In fact, Shebuge Kinyashi's policy was very similar to that of nineteenth century Ashanti kings, who in order to eliminate the services of Fanti middlemen who controlled the trade between the Ashantis and the European merchants on the coast, began to conquer the states which stood between them and the European forts on the Gold Coast.¹⁸

It was however, during the reign of Kimweri za Nyumbdi who was known as Kimweri the Great c.1803-1869, that the desire to come into direct contact with the Arab and Swahili traders on the East African Coast became one of the most important motives of Kilindi southward expansion. Apart from grain and tobacco, Usambara's main export commodities which were in great demand on the coast were ivory and slaves. Hunting for ivory on a large scale required the acquisition of firearms which could only be obtained on the coast. And as there were no elephants on the Usambara mountains but in the neighbouring plains, especially in the Zigua country it also became necessary to control these areas before a regular supply of Ivory could therefore assume the character of a military expedition for the annexation of more districts to the kingdom. The regular supply of slaves to the Arab and Swahili traders who supplied the firearms was also maintained through the sale of prisoners captured during such expeditions.

The importance of trade in the process of states expansion is well borne out by the strict royal monopoly of the kingdom's external trade.¹⁹ Although Arab and Swahili traders were encouraged to come into Usambara, their freedom of movement and operation was greatly restricted, as they were expected to reside in

the visitors' huts in the royal capital under the supervision of a royal official called the *Mashina*.²⁰ Since they could not trade directly with the Shambala except through royal officials,²¹ and as any foreign trader who entered the country without permission or tried to break the royal monopoly had all his goods confiscated,²² the Arab and Swahili traders had no other choice but to operate within the bounds fixed by royal regulation. It was this effective Kilindi control of the interior trade that prevented the Pangani—Usambara—Kilimanjaro caravan route²³ from becoming as important as the Arab-controlled Bagamoyo-Tabora route. But in spite of the limited traffic on the route, the Kilindi made handsome profits from the sale of Usambara's export products and increased their income with the toll they collected from the passing caravans.²⁴ This toll was not only expected from Arab and Swahili caravans but was also collected from the Zigua and the Pare.

However, the Kilindi control of this caravan route did not always go unchallenged. For the Zigua, who had powerful Arab patrons in Pangani and Zanzibar from whom they could easily obtain firearms, sometimes contested the right of the Kilindi to control the traffic passing through their country to Usambara. In one particular instance towards the closing years of Kimweri the Great's reign, the Zigua took advantage of the king's weakness and old age to inflict a crushing defeat on the Kilindi army,²⁵ and it was only after the intervention of Seyyid Said, the Sutan of Zanzibar, that peace was again restored to the area by the construction of a fort on Mount Tongwe,²⁶ manned by twenty-five Baluchi sent by the Sultan. It was also because of the need to protect the Kilindi's economic interests that fortified camps were built along the caravan route to regulate traffic and ensure that tolls due to the king were promptly paid. One of such fortified camps was at Masinde,²⁷ a caravan centre, which later developed into a prosperous village under the control of Chief Semboja, one of the many sons of Kimweri the Great.

The Kilindi not only traded with the Arab and Swahili traders in the interior, but also had agents on the coast between Vanga and Pangani who traded on their behalf with Arab and Indian traders from Zanzibar. These agents were the *Majumbe*, the coastal headmen appointed by Kimweri the Great after his conquest of the coast in

the third and fourth decades of the nineteenth century to help administer the mixed coastal communities.²⁸ Because they were traders themselves, these headmen, who were as a rule appointed from the ranks of the coastal commercial elite, always made huge profits from this coastal trade. Although the Kilindi knew that they were being cheated by these coastal agents, they could not do anything to remedy the situation because they needed to secure the loyalty of these headmen if they were to continue to maintain their control of the Coastal region. But when the German missionary, Dr. J.L. Krapf visited Vugha for the second time in 1852, Kimweri the Great expressed the desire to trade directly with the European merchants in Zanzibar.²⁹ This was why he sent an economic mission under the leadership of the *Mbeleko*, his war minister, to accompany Dr. Krapf to Zanzibar in order to make contacts with the European merchants stationed there. But because of the opposition of Seyyid Said to European penetration into the East African mainland, an area which he regarded as his exclusive preserve, this mission did not achieve any success. If it achieved anything at all, it only aroused the Sultan's anger and forced him to become somehow hostile to the missionaries;³⁰ for it was Dr. Krapf who had brought the Kilindi mission to Zanzibar that had also told the French consul that 'the portion of the coast between Vanga and Pangani did not belong to the Imam (Seyyid Said) but to Kimweri the Great'.³¹ Seyyid Said was even for a time hostile to the British consular mission led by Colonel Hamerton on the same account.³² But when nothing came of this economic mission and of the projected French colonial venture on the East African mainland, the Sultan resumed his former friendship with the missionaries and the British mission, and the Kilindi continued to depend on the services of their Arab and Swahili agents on the coast.

Depended as it was upon the services of Arab/Swahili middlemen, the external trade of the Kilindi was founded on successful Shambala peasant agriculture. For the Shambala who were predominantly a community of peasant cultivators not only grew crops for local consumption but also produced for the market. According to Burton, who visited Usambara in 1857, the Shambala produced large quantities of grain which were usually exported to Zanzibar from the ports of Tanga and Pangani.³⁴ There was also

an extensive cultivation of banana and vegetables in the valleys of the Usambara Mountains where there was sufficient water to sustain their growth. But perhaps the most important cash crop of the Kilindi kingdom in the nineteenth century was tobacco. Burton says the flavour of Usambara's tobacco was considered superior to that of any other grown elsewhere on the East African mainland, and that it was exported to Zanzibar.³⁵ Towards the end of the reign of Kimweri the Great, the export trade in Sorghum had also become important, for practically all the Kilindi Chiefs or governors of the districts participated very actively in its cultivation.³⁶

These cash crops were grown by the Shambala peasants or small private landholdings, and by the Kilindi kings and then provincial or district governors on very large plantations³⁷ worked mostly with slave labour and sometimes with public labour. In the royal capital at Vugha, an official called the *Zumbe ya bwene*, the Chief of the young bachelors, was put in charge of recruiting labour for these and other public works.³⁸ Besides working on royal plantations, the Shambala peasants were also expected, as the mark of their subjection to their Kilindi rulers, to cultivate a certain portion of their land for their Chiefs³⁹ as a kind of land tax. For the exaction of taxes and tribute was a major right of the Kilindi king and provided much of the revenue which supported the whole chiefly hierarchy.

In Usambara proper, what can be called 'occupational taxes' were paid by the Shambala. According to Burton who saw the system in operation, cattle-breeders contributed the first fruits of their flocks and herds, elephant hunters offered to the king every second tusk; local traders gave away a portion of their wares and peasant cultivators annually supplied ten measures of grain.⁴⁰ These taxes were collected through the Kilindi governors in the various districts of Usambara and then dispatched to Vugha. Royal messengers, called the *Walau*, also played a prominent part in tax collection by transmitting tax orders from the capital to the districts and by 'auditing' the accounts of the district heads before they delivered their tax quota to the king in the Kitala Kikuu (the palace).⁴¹

Outside Usambara, especially on the coast where the Kilindi's subjects were not Shambala but Arab Swahili, Digo and Segeju,

this system worked somewhat differently. Instead of relying on the services of the *Walau* and the local chiefs, the king usually sent out his officials, especially the War Minister, the Mbeleko, with his troops, to collect tribute.⁴² Krapf who was on the coast in 1852 when a Kilindi military delegation came to collect tribute records that tribute was collected in the coastal region once in every two years, and that on that particular occasion, the tribute, collected from the trading community of Pangani consisted only of '200 yards of Americano, Lowel calico, of the value of from fifty to sixty dollars'.⁴³ He also remarked that the collection of tribute along the coast, which was the token of the Kilindi's sovereignty in the coastal region, was accompanied with much violence which always made the exercise extremely unpopular with the coastal communities.⁴⁴

Apart from profits made from external trade and revenue collected from the royal estates, taxes, and tributes, the Kilindi kings had other important sources of income. One of these was their large stockholdings, primarily in cattle, which they distributed among their Shambala clients.⁴⁵ This cattle clientage formed a vital economic and political basis of the Kilindi monarchy, as the cattle clients of the Kilindi were expected to be the most loyal supporters of Kilindi rule, since their economic interests were closely bound by with the fortunes of their Kilindi patrons.

The income of the Kilindi king was also augmented by the fines imposed by royal courts and by gifts given to the king by litigants seeking royal favour or by new chiefs thanking the king for approving their installation.⁴⁶ For although the Kilindi king had no constitutional right to appoint the members of his council of advisers, who were elected from the commoner Shambala lineages, he reserved the right to prevent a 'hostile' candidate from assuming office by exercising his right of veto.⁴⁷

The bulk of the royal revenue was expended on the maintenance of the Court, the payment (in kind) of the courtiers and the upkeep of the royal harem. The king also had to provide for the payment of his bodyguard which formed the nucleus of the Kilindi army. Burton says that this corps of royal guards consisted of 400 musketeers whom Kimweri the Great called his '*Waengrezi* or Englishmen',⁴⁸ probably because they used English firearms imported

from Zanzibar. In peacetime, this corps performed strictly police duties, but in war, they formed the vanguard of the people's militia. Although all able-bodied men were expected to take up arms in defence of their country in times of war, the king at time recruited mercenaries for some of his campaigns,⁴⁹ and these had got to be paid from royal resources. However, the absence of a standing army greatly reduced the cost of administration, and meant the complete subordination of the military to the civil authority. This made for order and stability in the kingdom unlike what happened during the civil war that broke out after the death of Kimweri the Great in 1869, when professional Arab and Swahili soldiers in the service of the warring Kilindi factions began to interfere in the politics of the kingdom.⁵⁰

The vital connexion between the royal control of the kingdom's economic life and the preservation of the authority of the king and the unity of the kingdom was clearly dramatized by this civil war. For one of the remote causes of the war was the gradual decline of the authority of the Kilindi king over the provincial governors, who had become virtually independent towards the end of the reign of Kimweri the Great.⁵¹ This decline was due to the inability of the aged Kimweri to carry out the customary inspection tours of all the various parts of the Kilindi kingdom to control and supervise the administration of the provincial governors or chiefs.

Freed from strict royal control the chiefs, who headed the provincial administrations, began to enrich themselves at the expense of their king by diverting a large section of the kingdom's external trade into their own hands. Chief Semboja's case was a typical example of this tendency. For, as the chief of the important caravan centre at Masinde he not only took advantage of his position to engage in illegal but lucrative trade with the Arab and Swahili caravans, but also considerably enriched himself from the tolls he collected from passing Caravans. It was therefore his wealth and important connections with powerful Arab and Swahili patrons on the coast from whom firearms could be obtained, that qualified him for the leadership of the revolt against the new king, Shekulwavu bin Mukande, Kimweri's grandson. Other Kilindi governors, most of whom were the uncles of the young king had quickly supported Samboja because they were opposed to the reassertion of strong royal

authority as they desired the right to be independent in their own chiefdoms. It was this conflict to interests, which were primarily economic, that produce the civil war which led to the disintegration of the kingdom itself.

FOOTNOTES

¹Both the *Hambari za Wakilindi*, a compendium of Shambala traditions written by Abdallah bin Hemedi, a Swahili of Afro-Shirazi extraction, and the records of the European visitors to the Kingdom (Dr. J.L. Krapf and Sir R.E. Burton) show that Mbegha of Nguu was the founder of the kingdom and that the kingdom was founded early in the 18th century because they give a list of four king before the reign of Kunweri at the beginning of the 19th century. See J.L. Krapf, *Travels Researches and Missionary Labours in Eastern Africa*, London, 1860, pp. 382-383 and R.F. Burton, *Zanzibar: City, Island, and Coast*, Vol. 2. London, 1872 pp. 226-227.

²Krapf, *Travels, Researches...* p. 275.

³Ibid.

⁴For the political organization of the Zigula cluster of tribes see G.P. Murdock, *Africa: Its peoples and their culture History*, New York 1959, p. 35.

⁵Abdallah bin Hemedi I'Ajje. *Habari za Wakilindi*, English trans. ed. J.W.F. Allen as *The Kilindi* and published by the East African Literature bureau in 1963, pp. 32-36.

⁶S. Semsanga. 'Historia ya Usambara na Utawala wake' *Maendeleo ya Shambalai*, May 1953, p.3.

⁷Abdallah bin Hemedi, *Habari za Wakilindi*, p. 36.

⁸Ibid.

⁹Abdallah bin Hemedi, *Habari za Wakilindi*, p. 33.

¹⁰Ibid. p. 67.

¹¹Ibid. p. 38.

¹²Ibid.

¹³This was achieved through the development of the cult of royal charms and in the ceremony of ritual initiation of Shambala youths. See Abdallah bin Hemedi, *Habari za Wakilindi*, p. 39 and p. 47, and E.V. Winans, *Shambala: The constitution of a traditional state*, Lond. 1962, p. 94.

¹⁴Ibid. p. 33; pp. 57-58; p. 63.

¹⁵Abdallah bin Hemedi, *Habari za Wakilindi*, pp. 55-56.

¹⁶Ibid. p. 62.

¹⁷It appears the Kilindi were more interested in the coastal region where arms could be obtained. That Shkbughe Kinyashi had asked the coastal communities he first conquered to supply him spears, hoes and bars of iron shows this. See Abdallah bin Hemedi, *Habari za Wakilindi*, p. 78.

¹⁸W.E. Ward, *Short History of Ghana*, Longmans, Lond. 1957. p. 150.

¹⁹J.L. Krapf; *Travels, researches* ... p. 373.

²⁰R.F. Burton, *Zanzibar: City, Island and Coast*. Vol, 2, p. 212.

²¹Since external trade was a royal monopoly, trade transactions between royal representatives and foreign traders were supervised by the royal guards who were expected to protect the economic interests of their royal master. See L.J. Krapf, *Travels, Researches* ... p. 275.

²²Even during the civil war when the central administration had collapsed, Semboja, the leader of the rebel Kilindi faction still exercised the King's right to seizure when a German trader, Dr. Hans Meyer entered Usambara without permission. See O. Baumann, *Usambara and Seine Machbarggebiete* (Berlin : Dietrich Reimer, 1891). p. 190.

²³For reasons why this route was not as heavily used as the Bagamoyo — Taboro route, See Sir John Gray, 'Trading Expeditions from the Coast to Lakes Tanganyika and Victoria Before 1857', Tanganyika Notes and Records No. 49 (1957) p. 242.

²⁴O. Baumann, *Usambara* ... p. 190.

²⁵J.L. Krapf, *Travels, Researches* ... p. 382.

²⁶This fort was constructed between 1853 and 1857 after Seyyid Said and Kimweri the Great had reconciled their conflicting interests along the Coast. See R. Coupland, *East Africa and its Invaders* (Lond. Oxford University Press, 1938) pp. 351-359; and J.H. Speke, *What Led to the Discovery of the Source of the Nile*, (Lond. Wilham Blackwood), p. 174.

²⁷O. Baumann, *Usambara* ... p. 190; and H.H. Johnston, *The Kilimanjaro Expedition*, Lon. 1886, p. 313.

²⁸Krapf : *Travels, Researches* ... p. 385.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰John Gray. *History of Zanzibar*, (Lond. Oxford University Press) 1962, pp. 192-193.

³¹Ibid.

³²Ibid. p. 193.

³³Burton, *Zanzibar* ... p. 228.

³⁴Ibid. p. 223.

³⁵Abdallah bin Hemedi, *Habari* ... p. 110.

³⁶The Kilindi Kings had a large plantation near Vugha, called the *Mng'wushi*. See Abdallah bin Hemedi, *Habari* ... p. 101.

³⁷E.V. Winans. *Shambala* ... p. 141.

³⁸Ibid. p. 140.

³⁹R.F. Burton, *Zanzibar* ... p. 228.

⁴⁰E.V. Winans, *Shambala* ... p. 138.

⁴¹J.L. Krapf, *Travels, Researches* ... p. 375.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³Ibid.

⁴⁴E.V. Winans, *Shambala* ... p. 146.

⁴⁵Ibid. pp. 140-141.

⁴⁶Ibid. p. 123.


⁴⁷Burton, *Zanzibar* ... p. 227.

⁴⁸For example, Semboja who usurped power in the early years of the Usambara civil war hired a number of Zigua, Arab and Swahili mercenaries. See O. Baumann, *Usambara* ... pp. 192-193.

⁴⁹The European missionaries who attempted to stop the civil war complained about the involvement of these professional Arab and Swahili 'provocateurs' in Usambara politics. See *Universities Mission to Central Africa, Report of Events, 1875-1199*, p. 24.

⁵⁰R.F. Burton, *Zanzibar* ... pp. 192-193.

⁵¹O. Baumann, *Usambara* ... p. 189.



Dr. A. B. Akinyemi

The Organisation African Unity-Perception of Neo-Colonialism

THE choice of the term as part of the title of this chapter is deliberate. Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the British Foreign Secretary, might have claimed in 1964 that neo-colonialism "has no place in Britain's political dictionary. We quite simply do not know its meaning". Firstly, the earlier part of his statement might have been true. Its truth, however, is of no significance. Political reality is not simply a function of English language or English political dictionary. Victims of a system especially that which the perpetrators of the iniquities of the system are quick to deny, are not likely to wait for others to coin a name for the system before they engage in the baptism. Secondly, the second part of the statement signifies either political ignorance or political arrogance. Political ignorance in the sense that as early as 1961, not only was neo-colonialism defined but a special resolution on it was adopted at the Cairo All-African People's Conference, or political arrogance in the sense that although he was aware of exactly what African nationalists called neo-colonialism, he was simply not prepared to dignify it with the recognition of a name or a meaning. It probably was the latter. In essence then, is it not really an attitude of neo-colonialism to refuse to not only use the term but accord it the serious meaning it deserves? Would the term have become more acceptable and respectable if it has introduced into political dictionary through the agency of Western States rather than African States? After all, no one denies that the phenomenon exists or else we would not be having a volume on "post-colonial imperialism."

As regards the meaning, no more comprehensive one can be found than that used by Kwame Nkrumah :

"The essence of neo colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from outside. The methods and form of this direction can take various shapes. For example, in an extreme case the troops of imperial power may garrison the territory of the neo-colonial state and control the government of it. More often, however, neo-colonialist control is exercised through economic or monetary means. The neo-colonial state may be obliged to take the manufactured products of the imperialist power to the exclusion of competing products from elsewhere. Control over government policy in the neo-colonial state, may be secured by payment towards the cost of running the state, by the provision of civil servants in positions where they can dictate policy, and by monetary control over foreign exchange through the imposition of a banking system controlled by the imperial power.²⁷"

This passage has been quoted extensively because of the central and crucial relevance of Kwame Nkrumah to the theme of this chapter. Starting from 1947 when he returned to the Gold Coast, Nkrumah's role in African politics seems to have been a mixture of a benevolent *agent provocateur* and a catalyst, a radical innovator, whose radical ideas were unacceptable to the overwhelming majority of African leaders, but because of the magnetism of these ideas to the vocal African political activists, could not be ignored and hence had to be met halfway through alternative proposals. This halfway house, considerably less than Nkrumah's positions, was also appreciably more advanced than the conservatism of his opponents through their gradual process would have led them to at that point in time, unprovoked. For example, his role in decolonisation of the Gold Coast (now Ghana) received an unintended compliment from the Watson commission which in the midst of unfavourable comments about Nkrumah remarked the post-World War II nationalist movement in the Gold Coast, the United Gold Coast Convention (U.G.C.C.) did not really get down to business until the arrival of Mr. Kwame Nkrumah . . . and his assumption of the post of Secretary". His anti-colonial strategy

which proved *too* radical for the U.G.G.C. and which led to his forced resignation from that party accelerated the pace of decolonisation in the Gold Coast, it could not be denied to other parts of Black Africa. And once it was actually achieved in the Gold Coast, it became a matter of immediacy (4 to 6 years) rather than as soon as possible (10 to 15 years) to allow other colonies to regain their independence. It was not that there were no African nationalist movements and figures before Nkrumah. It was just their peace-loving and comfort-loving style of life contrasted with the readiness of Nkrumah to be imprisoned, which he in fact was, achieved less and was less of a stimulant to the decolonisation process. Once independence was achieved by African states, it was the militancy of Nkrumah specially and other radicals in general on African and international issues which *frightened* the Francophone African states into establishing their exclusive Brazzaville bloc which in turn led to another exclusive radical Casablanca bloc which also led to a less exclusive conservative Monrovia bloc and finally culminated in the Organisation of African Unity. If we define post-independence Pan-Africanism in terms of institutionalisation of inter-state African relations, then progenitor the O.A.U. is the 1958 Conference of Independent African States held in Accra at the instance of Kwame Nkrumah. If we further define post-independence Pan-Africanism in terms competing sets of principles to govern inter-state African relations (both definitions being parts of the same process), then one can justifiably say that the principle embodied in the O.A.U. charter represented a defeat for Nkrumah. However to the extent that the thesis of the charter of the O.A.U. through the dialectical process sketched above was the radical proposition embeded in the various resolutions of the All-African People Conferences (incidentally it was the 1961 conference which gave a name and definition to the phenomenon which we now call Neo-Colonialism) which were the brainchild of Nkrumah, one's conclusion as regards Nkrumah's role in African politics seems justified.

The purpose of this paper is to trace the development of the idea of neo-colonialism through the various African institutions that pre-dated the O.A.U., analyse the perception of the conception vis-a-vis the O.A.U. charter at the inaugural conference and finally

through the O.A.U. reaction to certain selected African crises which might be encompassed within the definition of the concept, discover how the O.A.U. has perceived its role as an agent or non-agent of de neo-colonisation.

The Third All-African Peoples' Conference held in Cairo from March 25th to the 31st 1961, defined neo-colonialism essentially on the lines of Nkrumah's definition already quoted. To compensate for whatever vagueness might have crept into the definition, it proceeded to identify the manifestations and agents of neo-colonialism.

Manifestations

The conference denounces the following manifestations of neo-colonialism in Africa.

- (a) Puppet governments represented by stooges and even fabricated elections, based on some chiefs, reactionary elements, anti-popular politicians, big bourgeois compradors or corrupted civil or military functionaries.
- (b) Regrouping of States, before or after independence, by an imperial Power in federations or communities linked to that imperial Power.
- (c) Balkanisation as a deliberate political fragmentation of States by creation of artificial entities, such as, for example, the case of Katanga, Mauritania, Buganda etc.
- (d) The economic entrenchment of the colonial Power before independence and the continuity of economic dependence after formal recognition of National sovereignty.
- (e) Integration into colonial economic blocks which maintain the underdeveloped character of African economy.
- (f) Economic infiltration by a foreign Power after independence, through capital investments, loans and monetary aids or technical experts of unequal concessions, particularly those extending for long periods.
- (g) Direct monetary dependence, as in those emergent independent States whose finance remain in the hands of and directly controlled by colonial Powers.
- (h) Military bases sometimes introduced as scientific research stations or training schools, introduced either before

independence or as a condition for independence.

Agents of Neo-Colonialism:

The Conference exposes the following active agents of neo-colonialism:

- (a) Colonial embassies and missions serving as nerve centres of espionage and pressure points on the local African Governments directly or through their civil or military technicians.
- (b) So-called foreign and United Nations technical assistants who illadvise and sabotage national political, economical, educational and social development.
- (c) Military personnel in armed forces and police, as officers or advisers who serve, above all, the colonial interests directly, or through local officers who remain loyal to their former masters.
- (d) The representatives from imperialist and colonial countries under the cover of religion, Moral, Rearmament, cultural, Trade Union and Youth or Philanthropic Organisations.
- (e) The malicious propaganda by radio, Press, literature controlled by imperial and colonial countries, as well as in some independent African countries where Press and radio are still owned by imperialist Power.
- (f) Puppet Governments in Africa being used by imperialist in the furtherance of neo-colonialism, such as the use of their good offices by the neo-colonial Powers to undermine the sovereignty and aspirations of other African States.

In the category manifestations, while some or all the items listed would apply to conservative regimes in Africa, (a), (b), and (e) were directed specifically at the Francophone African States since it was when France embarked on the process of decolonisation that she broke up the two giant political entities (French West Africa and French Equatorial Africa into thirteen independent states, grouped these states together with itself into a French community and negotiated their associate membership of the European Economic community. In spite of this direct attack on the political texture of these Francophone states, they did not directly confront the issue of neo-

colonialism at the conference establishing the Brazzaville bloc held in Brazzaville from December, 15 to 19 1960. The only indirect comment which could be relevant to it was in their resolution on economic relations which while expressing a desire "to bring forward a contribution for the enlargement of inter-African solidarity through reinforcing economic ties which already unite them", insisted on "respecting any other international commitments to which they have subscribed⁴."

If one could dismiss the pronouncements of the All-African Peoples' Conference on neo-colonialism as of being of no practical value in the sense that it did not commit any African Government to any course of action and could not even be thought of as representing any philosophical commitment on the part of any African government, the same cannot be said of the third preamble of the charter of the Casablanca bloc issued on January 7, 1961 which read.

We, the Heads of the African states...proclaim our determination to liquidate colonialism and neo-colonialism in all their forms, to discourage the maintenance of foreign troops and the establishment of bases which endanger the liberation of Africa and to strive equally to rid the African continent of political and economic interventions and pressures.⁵

This really amounted to a declaration of war. The usual thing for an inter-state organisation is commitment to eradicate the evils which its member-states agree are present among and the necessity for the eradication of which brought them together to form that organisation. But when ideology became a factorial phenomenon in international politics, it became the order of the day for regional organisations—regional defined in ideological terms such as NATO or ideological/geographical terms such as the Warsaw Pact—to take for granted their own evils but make their *raison d'être* the liquidation of the real or supposed evils within the systems of their ideological opponents. To the extent that members of the Casablanca bloc prided themselves as possessing real, rather than fictitious, independence, their charter commitment amounted to abrogating to themselves the right to intervene in the internal affairs of African states to "liquidate.....neo-colonists," and as a logical extension,

one should assert that right obviously included the right to subvert existing governments if this was necessary.

This message got through to those at which the subversion was aimed because when Heads of States and Governments of Africa and Malagasy⁶ drew up their Monrovia charter on May 12, 1961, three of the six principles which were adopted to govern the relationship among African states were a direct rebuttal to the right of intervention claimed by the Casablanca bloc. Principle (2) was "non-interference in the internal affairs of states;"; principle (3) was "respect for the sovereignty of each state and its inalienable right to existence and development of its personality; and principle (4) was "qualified condemnation of outside subversive action by neighbouring states." In order to reinforce the message, another whole paragraph was devoted to "urging that all African and Malagasy states shall refrain from encouraging, directly or indirectly, dissident groups or individuals of other states in subversive activities by permitting their own states to be used as bases from which dissidents may operate, or by financing dissidents in other countries or otherwise".

While it is true that it is possible to have three types of subversion : subversion by a non-African State of an African state, subversion by an African state of another African state in justification of anti-neo-colonialism, and finally subversion of an African state by another African state for other reasons. In this paper, we are only concerned with subversion of the second variety. Ostensibly, all African states, on paper, are against subversion of the first types. There the consensus ends. Subversion of the second type is the only type sanctified by the Casablanca charter and there is no doubt that some of the subversion of the third type, would be camouflaged under the second type in order to legitimise it. The Monrovia charter expressly condemns the latter two types of subversion although it became quite evident that some of the member-states of Monrovia were not going to protest any subversion of the militants by either African or non-African States.

As the Brazzaville conference did, so did the Monrovia conference ignore any direct reference to the issue of neo-colonialism. However if we regard Casablanca bloc's position on neo-colonialism as an attempt at laying down very strict guidelines on domestic and

foreign policies for African states and hence denying them a meaningful freedom of action, then the principle (3) of the Monrovia charter referred to above which affirms the "inalienable right to existence and development of its personality if that is what the government of that country wants.

This issue of subversion immediately became a *cause celebre* between states as well as between the existing blocs. As far as between states was concerned, Jaja Wachuku, the Nigerian Foreign Minister, as early as September 1961 accused Ghana of trying to subvert the Nigerian Government :

...we know from practical experience in this country that there are certain African countries that have been trying to interfere in the internal affairs of this country. We know the conflicts existing in the trade unions and we know certain forces in various areas of our own country. There have been attempts to subvert the existing authority.⁷

At the intra-bloc level, Mr. Nnamdi Azikiwa, the then Governor-General of Nigeria crystallised what he regarded as the basic difference between the Casablanca and Monrovia blocs as :

...the conspicuous absence of a specific declaration on the part of the Casablanca states of their inflexible belief in the fundamental rights of African States, as at present constituted, to legal equality...to self-determination...to safety from interference in their internal affairs through subversive activities engineered by supposedly friendly states; the right of African States to be secure in the inviolability of their territories from external aggression.⁸

In a country such as pre-1966 Nigeria where there was a multi-party system operating in an atmosphere of relative freedom, the issue of neo-colonialism proved a thorn in the flesh of the government. Hence the 1960 Anglo-Nigerian Defence Pact which had been ratified by the Nigerian Parliament in the teeth of strong opposition from the country had to be abrogated in 1962 since it was proving to be an effective millstone around the neck of the government.⁹ In other countries where there was no opposition or there was a pretty effective governmental control on the activities of the opposition, it was easy to ignore in consequences of being labelled a neo-colonialist regime.

When all the African states convened in Addis Ababa in 1963, it was only Nigeria which proposed subversion of African states by African States as a separate agenda item¹⁰ although Nigeria, Ivory Coast and Cameroun devoted parts of their speeches to it.¹¹ The working paper tabled by Ethiopia had a preamble which spoke of the determination "to safeguard the hard-won independence, sovereignty territorial integrity of our states and to resist the neo-colonialism in all its forms including political and economic intervention."¹² But, Article II (Principles) of the same paper dealt with non-interference in the internal affairs while another article was even more explicit :

"Each member state has a solemn and sacred duty to respect in accordance with international law. They shall refrain from any subversive activity against neighbouring or other states. The rights of member-states, include inter alia, the right of a state...to freely determine its cultural, economic, and political life without interference and intervention¹³."

To the extent that specific principles represent a more definite legal commitment than statements of aspirations which are present in a preamble, the Ethiopian working paper leaned towards a condemnation of subversion under the guise of anti-neo-colonialism.

This leaning of the O.A.U. inaugural conference was further reinforced by the recommendation of the conference of Foreign Ministers to the inaugural O.A.U. summit which called for "unreserved condemnation of political assassination as a means of gaining power as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other states."¹⁴ However, it is not possible to regard the definition by the Foreign Ministers of "the end of Military occupation of the African continent, in particular the closing of military bases" as "an essential element for African independence and unity"¹⁵ as condoning subversion designed to fulfil that "essential element" — a rewarding of neo-colonialism? One's suspicion that this was the case is confirmed by the fact that the draft charter of the summit conference brought back the original Ethiopian wording on neo-colonialism and made it its third preambular paragraph, although its effect was negated by limiting article II (Purposes) to eradicating colonialism.¹⁶

This draft was adopted unchanged to become the charter of

the O.A.U. Hence the seventh paragraph of the preamble is

Determined to safeguard and consolidate the hardwon independence as well as the sovereignty and territorial integrity of our States, and to resist neo-colonialism in all its forms.

but Article II (d) commits the organisation to only the eradication of all forms of colonialism from Africa. One is at a loss here.

What does "all forms of colonialism" mean? Does the term "forms" refer to the ordinary colonialism of a non-African state ruling and African territory and to the special cases of South Africa (legal independence) and Rhodesia (illegal independence) where white minorities rule over African majorities? Or did the framers of the charter intend to include neo-colonialism among "all forms of neo-colonialism"? It is an intriguing thought but the answer would have to be no. Giving the fact that the term "neo-colonialism" had been used in the preamble, it would only have been the natural thing to do to repeat it in Article II (d) if the intention of the framers was to commit the O.A.U. along that line. It is conceivable that the radical states noticed the omission but had to be satisfied with the explanation that neo-colonialism was subsumed under all forms of colonialism which, of course, was not really the case since if the majority wanted to commit the O.A.U. on the issue, they would have lost nothing by repeating the word "neo-colonialism" after "all forms of colonialism".

This interpretation is confirmed by the fact that Article II, (1) (2) (3) and (5) (Principles) which laid down principles to govern inter-state behaviour left no loopholes :

- Art. III (1) The sovereign equality of all Member States;
- (2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of states;
 - (3) Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its inalienable right to independent existence;
 - (5) Unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring states or any other states;

The import of III (1) is that if all African states are sovereignty equal, then no one state or group of states has the right to dictate to any other state how that state should conduct its domestic or foreign policy above and beyond any limitation (such as the princi-

ples of the O.A.U. charter) which the state voluntarily accepts. In fact, this is the view of one the drafters of the charter, now Chief Justice T.O. Elias of Nigeria when he pointed out that Articles III (1) (2) (3) & (5) are reinforcing links in a value chain which should be interpreted as "the desire to be left alone, to be allowed to choose (one's) particular political, economic and social system and to order the life of (one's) community in (one's) own way."¹⁷

However, if the drafters of the charter thought they had succeeded in burying the issue of neo-colonialism, they were sadly mistaken because not only did it continue to plague inter-state Africa relations, it almost ruined the 1965 Accra Summit Conference of the O.A.U. Basically, the charge which was levelled at Nkrumah by the Francophone states was that the Ghanaian government was behind various assassination and *coup d'etat* attempts directed at them. This was a classic subversion of the neo-colonialist variety in the sense that apart from Togo and Ivory Coast with which there was a border dispute, the point of dispute between the other Francophone states and Ghana was Nkrumah's disapproval of the ideological make-up of the governments of these countries respectively. These accusations came to a head when, alleging that Ghana was the haven for the elements who were carrying out these subversive activities, the Francophone states boycotted the O.A.U. Summit Conference in Accra. The Summit Conference met the issue headlong and issued a document : A Declaration On The Problem of Subversion.¹⁸

The relevant parts of the Declaration are :

1. Not to tolerate in conformity with Article 3, paragraph 5, of the charter, any subversion originating in our countries against another Member state of the Organisation of African Unity;
2. Not to tolerate the use of our territories for any subversive activity directed from outside Africa against any member states of the Organisation of African Unity;
3. To oppose collectively and firmly by every means at our disposal every form of subversion conceived, organized or financed by foreign powers against Africa, O.A.U. or its Member States individually.

It was found necessary to include paragraphs (2) and (3) above in order to close the loopholes of some militants arguing that it was

foreign countries, unnamed but understood to mean the Soviet Union and the Peoples' Republic of China, which trained these elements and all that Ghana did was to accord them the status of refugees.

The effect of this Declaration was to effectively and legally close whatever loopholes might exist on all types of subversion in as far as the O.A.U. was concerned. The overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah in February, 1966 effectively put a political stop to what was widely believed to be a source of subversion. However, although it cannot be documented, it should be noted that at least one country, Guinea, has over the years made many allegations to the effect that Senegal and Ivory Coast are being used as bases to subvert his regime for the purpose of installing another regime which would be more amenable to neo-colonialist machinations.

So far one could argue that so far one has concentrated not so much on whether the O.A.U. perceived there is a phenomenon called neo-colonialism in Africa but on O.A.U. reaction to a specific means which some states wanted to adopt to liquidate it. It could be argued that the O.A.U. while coming out against subversion could also have planned a more peaceful process of de-neo-colonialisation. However, the charter of the O.A.U. is enigmatic on this interpretation. A reference back to the definition of neo-colonialism will reveal specific references to unequal economic agreements and the presence of military bases in Africa. Yet there is nothing in the preamble which refers to control over their own natural resources. Under Article II (Purposes), there was a cryptic reference to "to co-ordinate and intensify their collaboration and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa." Again, there was no further reference to specific economic questions. Article II (2) (b) pledges the O.A.U. member-States to "economic co-operation, including transport and communications" and Article XX (1) set up an Economic and Social Commission as one of its specialized Commissions. The lack of a specific reference to economic issues in Article II was compensated for by a special resolution dealing with economic problems which set out O.A.U. objectives on the economic field :

1. a free trade area between the various African countries;
2. establishment of a common external tariff to protect the

- emergent industries and the setting up of a raw material price stabilisation fund;
3. the restructuralisation of international trade;
 4. the means of developing trade among African countries by the organisation of an participation in African trade fairs and exhibitions, and by granting transport and transit facilities;
 5. The co-ordination of means of transport and the establishment of road, air and maritime companies;
 6. the establishment of an African Payments and clearing Union;
 7. a progressive freeing of national currencies from all non-technical external attachments and the establishment of a Pan-African monetary zone; and
 8. ways and means of effecting the harmonisation of existing and future national development plans.

This is as comprehensive a statement of objectives as you can get in the economic field and their achievement would have meant a realisation of the dreams of the anti-neocolonialists. Objectives (1) and (2) would have negated the Commonwealth economic ties, based as they are on preferential tariff system. They would also have violated the terms of the associate membership of the Francophone states in the European Economic community, another target of the anti-neo-colonialists. Objectives (6) and (7) would also have met the charges of the anti-neo-colonialists as regards control of national currencies by former metropolitan powers. However, just as the taste of the pudding is in the eating, the commitment of the O.A.U. must be judged by its achievements in this field. The most notable success has been the setting up of the African Development Bank established in 1964, although it is probably more accurate to regard it as a success story jointly for the O.A.U. and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa since the articles of agreement establishing the Bank were drawn up in Khartoum in August 1963 under the auspices of the U.N.E.C.A. But it is not to be thought that the ECA was moving into an area the O.A.U. was not interested in. On the contrary, in order to avoid duplication of energy, the O.A.U. has entrusted to the E.C.A. devising means of achieving its economic objectives. To the extent that the Bank makes funds

available for projects in the member-states, it has become an additional source of foreign assistance which it could be argued could save some countries from seeking foreign financial assistance with political strings. Its role is still a minor one because of its resources compared with the needs of its member-states but the potential is there.

However that has been the only success story, and that a moderate one. The proposed West African Economic Community, against which the ECA did most of the groundwork, has still not been achieved, partially as a result of neo-colonialist pressure from France which does not want a dilution of its economic influence in her former territories, and partially out of fear of the dominating role which Nigeria would play because of her size and economic potential. In May 1967, Articles of Association for the establishment of an Economic Community of West Africa were signed in Accra.¹⁹ The Articles proved to be dead letter when the Francophone states, especially Ivory Coast and Senegal, raised several objections. Another conference has just been held in Lomé where on December 13, 1973, the entire fifteen member states of West Africa reached another agreement which they hope to embody in Articles of Association before the end of 1974. Hence ten years after the establishment of the O.A.U. there is no success to record on the establishment of a regional economic community. The various African French-speaking groupings are not only losing their members but the rate at which these groupings are formed under various names and over-night have become a circus,

Strictly the O.A.U. should not be praised or blamed for the performance of any economic grouping which existed before the O.A.U. was established but was not brought under its umbrella or those which were established after its foundation but without its sponsorship either directly through one of its specialised commissions or indirectly through the E.C.A. Mention should be made of the East African Community which links together Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, the 1965 Central African Economic and Customs Union between Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, the Congo (Brazzaville) and Gabon, the 1968 Union of Central African Republic, Zaire Republic (then Congo, Kinshasha) and Chad, and the 1971 West African Economic Community formed by the Ivory

Coast, Senegal, Niger, Upper Volta, Mali and Mauritania.

Of all of these, only the East African Community functions. The others simply exist on paper. The rapidity with which these French-speaking organisations are set up almost overnight without adequate preparations and the fact that it is quite common to find a state belonging to two different economic groupings which if functioning would have resulted in that state as a member of one economic grouping operating tariffs against itself as a member of another economic grouping and against its partners in the latter grouping demonstrate that these organisations were not meant to have more than a propaganda value. An example of this is the French-speaking West African Economic Community which was hurriedly set up in 1971 partly in an attempt to deny that title to the larger grouping which both the French-speaking and English-speaking West African States have been trying to establish since the Articles of Association were signed in 1967. Yet these same six states turned up in Lome in December 1973 to sign another agreement with nine other states whose purpose is to establish a fifteen-nation West African Economic Community before the end of 1974. In the course of the conference the six states, of course, objected to the title of the new grouping on the grounds that theirs is already using the name. The fifteen are now considering alternative titles such as the Economic Community of West African States. The point being made is that none of the French-speaking groupings can be regarded as a success story against neo-colonialism.

The East African Community is more of a complex story. Initially, it was a case study of successful economic cooperation among the three East African States of Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania. The initial vehicle of cooperation was the East Africa High Commission which was established by Britain, as the ruling colonial power, in 1948. When Tanganyika (now Tanzania) became independent in 1961, the name was changed to the East African Common Services Organization. In 1967, a new treaty was signed establishing an East African Community of which an East African Common Market is an integral part according to article (1) of the treaty.²⁰ While this new treaty was comprehensive in nature and demonstrated a desire to raise the level of the economic cooperation to a level of economic integration (if all the articles of the charter

had been implemented), the fact remains that the community is in fact less than what it was when it was just a High Commission to the extent that then at least there was common currency and now each state has its own currency. Beset by conflicts arising out of differentials in industrial development (Kenya versus Tanzania and Uganda), ideological orientations (*Kenya is capitalist society with a mixed economy, Tanzania operates a socialist system and Uganda is too unsettled under General Amin to be categorised*) and personal differences (*Idi Amin versus Kenyatta and Nyerere*) the Community has been stopped dead in its tracks.

The essence of the discussion above is to preclude any allegation that the O.A.U. did not perceive the factors which constitute neo-colonialism as undesirable. The economic objectives which the O.A.U. articulated manifested an awareness of economic circumstances which even if they were not neo-colonialist in themselves could expose a state or states suffering from them to neo-colonialist pressures. The awareness is further buttressed by the demands which a joint meeting of the ECA working party on Intra-African Trade and the OAU Ad Hoc Committee on Trade and Development worked out for presentation at a conference of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development :²⁰

- (A) That commodity agreements should aim to raise export earnings of developing countries and not only to stabilise prices. This rise in export earning should be measured in terms of the purchasing power of exports and not merely in money terms.
- (B) That schemes for the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade and the introduction of a general preference system should contain provisions for safeguarding the trading interests of the African countries among the developed countries.
- (C) That African countries should be able to promote their industrialisation by processing domestically their own primary products through increased aid from developed countries on better terms.
- (D) That developed countries should adopt in their assistance schemes a policy conducive to regional economic integration.

However, to say that the O.A.U. member-states showed an awareness of economic factors which might lead to neo-colonialist venture is a value-assertion. One still needs to prove that the O.A.U. member-states were agreed on what neo-colonialism was. Since they had used the word in the preamble to the charter, they were stopped from arguing that the word existed or that there was a state of affairs which could be labelled neo-colonialist. At this juncture, one could argue two alternative courses: That the word "neo-colonialism" was used in the preamble with the full consciousness of its meaning. This would explain why there was an indirect reference to the issue of military bases in Africa which were present in Ivory Coast, Malagasy and Senegal and which was by definition an element of neo-colonialism. As part of the O.A.U. general position on disarmament, there was a resolution calling for "negotiation" to end the "military occupation of the African continent, the elimination of which constitutes a basic element of African Independence and Unity".

Again, this represents an exact phraseology of the perception of the militants of the connection between military bases and the true state of independence. It comes even as a surprise that twelve out of the thirty-two founding member-states of the O.A.U. who had bilateral military agreements allowing French military intervention for purposes of law and order²¹ would allow military bases negotiated by two independent countries to be labelled "military occupation". That this reference was to these military bases and military agreement and not Portuguese military occupation of her colonies is clear from the use of the word "negotiation" since by setting up an O.A.U. Liberation Committee and Fund, the O.A.U. had just demonstrated its belief that only through military means could that particular problem be solved.

The other alternative, of course, is to regard the use of the word "neo-colonialism" in the preamble as a meaningless concession to the militants. This is not a flight into fancy. Referring to Article XX (4) which established the Defence Commission as one of the specialised commissions of the O.A.U. Dr. T.O. Elias said²² "the last was a concession, albeit in greatly attenuated form, to the Casablanca bloc and their idea of an African High Command". The insinuation being that the Defence Commission was only there

in name and nothing significant was expected of it. In truth, after eleven years, the Defence Commission had done nothing significant. However this interpretation would be negated by what we have discussed in the paragraph above. The questions will then arise ; why was there no specific reference of disapproval of the European Economic Community : And why was the prohibition against neo-colonialism not raised to the level of a principle as non-alignment was raised to the level of a principle Article III (7)? Christian individuals might be expected to go through the process of the self-flagellation of the words of the general confession every Sunday in church. States do not behave that way. Of course there is an assumption that just because the French-speaking African states in 1970 now considered the agreements they signed they signed with France in 1960/61 derogatory to their independence,²³ they had this perception in 1962 at the time the O.A.U. charter was being signed. This assumption would have to be accepted in the light of our discussion on the economic and military spheres. The only rational explanation for the rather low-keyed treatment by the O.A.U. of neo-colonialism would then have to be that at that stage of national development, the majority, of the African states probably accepted these unequal economic and military relationship as a necessary evil. Obviously, even if they had wanted to, they could not have been able to do much about what they inherited at independence—the direction of their export trade, the structure of their internal economies, for most of the Francophone states, an almost empty still officered by men seconded from the metropolitan centres and heavily dependent on these metropolitan centres for the meagre arms supplies to their armies. Faced with these internal environmental factors, and faced also with the cold war situational factors where to break with France or Britain was to be faced with an entire Western boycott—most of them might have felt that the alternative which was a close a close and dependent relationship with the East bloc countries—again, a situation Guinea found herself in—was just as bad if not worse neo-colonialism. So, better the devil you know. Hence the attitude was if you cannot stop the birds of worry and care flying above your head, why rage at them. Furthermore, there was the feeling that they were being pragmatic in their approach—being problem-solvers to use Zartman's classifi-

catory concept²⁴—and that this was the proper role for heads of state.

Even if, as the Chinese proverb goes, the journey of a thousand miles start with the first step away from home, and even if, the founding fathers of the O.A.U. could claim that they took not one but several steps on this issue of neo-colonialism through an elucidation of their economic objectives, how then does one explain why the O.A.U. has not gone more than these several steps in eleven years or is it that neo-colonialism is not amenable to a solution by the O.A.U.? The latter question can be easily answered. The reason for the lack of success in this field lies in the very nature of the regimes themselves. There have been many *coup d'etats* but only one revolution, Uganda, in Black Africa. In other words, the game of political musical chairs has left the overwhelming majority of African regimes unchanged in political character.

For some governments such as Senghor's in Senegal, Houphouët-Boigny in Ivory Coast and Kenyatta in Kenya, the regimes had become so involved in neo-colonial relationships with former metropolitan powers that continuing the relationship in fact poses less immediate dangers to the regime than changing the relationship. For some of the others such as Upper Volta, Niger, and Congo (Brazzaville) the vicious circle of poverty which led them to accept a neo-colonialist relationship in the first place has not proved amenable to solution. And from sheer pride, they would still prefer to be unequal partners in economic and political affairs with France than to be unequal partners in an African grouping with a rich country such as Nigeria. It is only countries such as Nigeria and Cameroun which seem to have succeeded in developing a nationally-controlled economic growth. Sierra Leone, Dahomey, Liberia, Gambia and Togo do not stand a chance of economic prosperity as they are at present constituted. In the light of the above, to have expected the O.A.U. to act as a forceful agent of anti-neo-colonialism is to have asked the majority of the governments to behave as self-liquidating regimes. Only domestic pressure arising from the frustration of a never-ending poverty and weariness of foreign governments, tired of pouring money and personnel into non-viable states—again may be deriving from antiforeign aid domestic pressures—would lead to a level of achievement of economic objectives meaningful enough to

liquidate the circumstances that gave rise to and that perpetuate colonialism.

FOOTNOTES

¹*The Times* (London) March 21, 1964.

²Kwame Nkrumah, *Neo-Colonialism : The Last stage of Imperialism*, (London, Heineman 1965) px.

³Quoted in Vincent Bakpetu Thompson, *Africa and Unity : The evolution of Pan-Africanism* (London, Longmas, Green and Co. Ltd., 1969) p. 92.

⁴See Colin Legun, *Pan-Africanism : A Short Political Guide* (London : Pall Mall Press, 1962) Appendix 13.

⁵*Ibid.* Appendix 15. The member-states were Algeria, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Morocco and the United Arab Republic. Libya attended the inaugural conference but quickly left the bloc when it found its aspirations too radical for it.

⁶The member-states were Liberia, Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Senegal, Malagasy Republic, Togo, Dahomey, Chad, Niger, Upper Volta, Congo (Brazzaville), Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Mauritania, Tunisia, Central African Republic, Gabon, Ethiopia and Libya.

⁷*House of Representatives, Debates*, 4 September 1961, p. 332.

⁸*Daily Times*, 26, January, 1962.

⁹Cf. Claude S. Phillips, Jr. *The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy* (Northwestern Univ. pp. 42-48 press, 1964).

¹⁰*Proceedings of the Summit Conference on Independent African States, CIAS/GEN/INF/31*, Vol. 1, Section 2 (Addis Ababa, May, 1963).

¹¹*Ibid.*, CIAS/GEN/INF 10.../31.../35.

¹²*Ibid.*, Draft Proposal by Ethiopia for the Organisation of African States, Comm. 1/EMPC/1.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴Comm. 1/Dra. Res./16 and CIAS/P/an./2.

¹⁵*Ibid.*

¹⁶CIAS/COMM/REPORT/I. This wording was also repeated in CIAS/SP. COMM/CHARTER submitted by the special committee of Foreign Ministers. In both documents, half of the principles condemned all forms of subversion.

¹⁷T.O. Elias, *Africa and the Development of International Law* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. : Oceana Publications Inc. 1972) p. 127.

¹⁸Cf. Ian Brownlie ed., *Basic Documents On African Affairs* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1971). p. 17.

¹⁹For details of the Articles, see *Ibid.* pp. 58-63.

²⁰See O.A.U. Council of Ministers Resolution, CM/Res. 122 (IX).

²¹For terms of such an agreement See *Documents on International Affairs* 1960, (London, Oxford University Press, 1961) p. 333.

Dr. A Kinyemi

²²T.O. Elias, "The Charter of the OAU", *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 59, 1965, p. 245.

²³Cf. *West Africa*, No. 2942, 29th October, 1973. See the forthright statement of President Ahidjo of Cameroon "We have formally repudiated the agreements signed when we became independent. This was clearly done to demonstrate that as far as we are concerned, there cannot be any question of simply readjusting the existing agreements.", *West Africa*, No. 2948, 10th December, 1973, p. 1747.

²⁴J.W. Zartman, "National Interest and Ideology", in Vernon McKay, *African Diplomacy: Studies in the Determinants of Foreign Policy* (New York: Praeger, 1966), p. 29.

Christian Moralism and Apartheid: Paton's 'Cry the Beloved Country' Reassessed*

Alan Paton's literary reputation rests largely on his first novel *Cry, the Beloved Country*.¹ But that reputation has been somewhat exaggerated. Though a great deal of the critical attention has been given the novel does not focus on any astounding intrinsic literary merits. The novel does present, however a recognizable moral perspective. It knits the action into a coherent statement on the human tragedy of South Africa's apartheid system. Many of Paton's early critics were quick to indentify this as the moving force in the novel which was widely acclaimed in influential Christian journals like *Catholic World*, *Christian Century* and *Christian Science Monitor*. Some of the critics tried to arrive at an overall objective critical evaluation of the novel. "If you are looking for a profound and beautiful book in which humility and love and the power of childlike Christianity are requisites," M.P. Corócoran pontificated in a review of the book in the *Catholic World*, "then *Cry the beloved Country* is the clarion call".²

Paton's liberal outlook and Anglican background are largely responsible for his moral preoccupations and obsessive interest in the theme of regeneration. In the story of the Reverend Stephen Kumalo he attempts to show that love and brotherhood could become operative in South Africa if, and when, all parties accept these Christian ideals³. In other words, Paton suggests, the individual must rededicate himself to these lofty ideals in guaranteeing—the restoration of the crumbled moral fabric of the body politic. It is this belief that Paton himself undertakes to play the vicarious role

*Revised text of a paper presented to the Commonwealth Literature Association Conference held in Kampala, Uganda in January 1974.

of the Christian moralist and rhetorician with a duty which consists in stirring our minds into a moral consciousness of the operation of a monstrous grinding social machine and into a sympathetic awareness of our inadvertent complicity and guilt :

I should like to write books about South Africa which would really stab people in the conscience. I don't see any point in writing provocatively for the sake of being provocative. But I do believe there is a level at which one can write stating an overwhelming truth that a man just cannot deny.

Paton's attempt to realise this goal is illustrated in *Cry, the Beloved Country* which offers the Christian message as taken compensation for a population which has been denied the dignity of selfhood and the joy of living in the present.

All through the first part of the novel, there is sustained colour in Paton's reverberative lament over the disastrous impact of Western value-system on traditional Ndotshen community and the deforation of its landscape. He reinforces his grim account of cultural disinheritance and the "sickness of the communal land of Ndotsheni" by contrastive juxtaposition. On the part we see one green Edenic hills and the tie between the landscape and a people's survival.

Below you is the valley of the Umzimkulu ... It is well tended, and not too many cattle feed upon it; not too many fires burn it, laying bare the soil. Stand unshod upon it, for the ground is holy, being even as it came from the Creator. Keep it, guard it care for it, for it helps men, *guards* men, cares for them. Destroy it and man is destroyed. (p. 7)

And then the listlessness and moral dampness dispossessed half of Ndotsheni of the inhabitants of the desolate lands of Ndotsheni. An agrarian culture has been broken by the crippling force of the urban materialistic culture of Johannesburg. The young have fled to the cities there is everywhere overwhelming evidence of the cataclysmic spoliation of the land which had been left in the hands of an inept generation. The result is shattering disconsolation and frustration.

Where you stand the grass is rich and matted, you cannot see the soil. But the rich green hills break down. For they grow red and bare; they cannot hold the rain and mist, and the streams are dry in the kloofs. Too many cattle feed upon the grass, and too many fires have burned it. Stand shod upon it, for it is coarse and sharp, and the stones cut under the feet. It is not kept, or guarded Titihova does not cry here any more.

The great red hills stand desolate, and the earth has torn away like flesh. The lightning flashes over them, the clouds pour down them, the dead streams come to life, full of the red blood of the earth. Down in the valleys women scratch the solid that is left, and the maize hardly reaches the height of a man. They are the valleys of old men and women, of mothers and children. The men are away, the young men and the girls are away. The soil cannot keep them any more. (p. 7.)

Time and again Paton enlists our sympathy by portraying vignettes of this utterly disconsolate tribal society. On arrival in Johannesburg, Kumalo repeats the story :—

..... The grass had disappeared, and of the dongas that ran from hill to valley, and valley to hill; how it was a land of old men and women, and mothers and children; how the maize grew barely to the height of man; how the tribe was broken, and the house broken and the man broken; how when they went away, many never came back, many never wrote any more ... they all talked of the sickness of the land, of the broken tribe and the broken house of young men and young girls that went away and forget their customs, and lived loose and idle lives. His thoughts turned to the girl, and to the unborn babe that would be his grandchild. Pity that he a priest should have a grandchild born in such a fashion. Yet that could be repaired. If they were married, then he could try to rebuild what had been broken. (p. 15)

For a while, Kumalo's mind is deflected as he meditates on

the nature of evil and on his son's motivation trying to find out "what broken in a men when he could bring himself to thrust down the knife into the warm flesh to bring down the axe on the living head, to cleave down between the seeing eyes, to sheet the gun that would drive death into the beating heart?" (p. 46) Soon afterwards his mind turns again to the crucial subject of disintegration and the need to restore that broken foundations of the tribe :

He turned with relief to the thought of rebuilding, to the home that they would fashion, ...

After seeing Johannesburg he would return with a deeper understanding to Ndotsheni. ... One could go back knowing better the kind of thing that one must build.

Yes. The tribe was broken, and would be mended no more. He bowed his head. It was as though a man borne upward into the air felt suddenly that the wings of miracle dropped away from him, so that he looked down upon the earth, sick with fear and apprehension. The tribe was broken, and would be mended no more. The tribe that had nurtured him and his father and his father's father, was broken. For the men were away, and the young men and the girls were away, and the maize hardly reached to the height of a man. (p. 46)

Alongside Kumalo's moral rejuvenation and gradual spiritual maturation is his own effort to redeem those around him. The first to benefit from Kumalo's evangelical zeal is his sister Gertnude, one of the victims of Johannesburg's degenerate society, a prostitute and brewer of illicit liquor. Mainmagu's portrait of her is sharp precise and illuminating: "She is very sick. But it is not that kind of sickness. It is another, a worse kind of sickness". He goes further to comment on the astonishingly high incidence-rate of crime, habitual drunkenness and the loose, lascivious way of living of women which characterise Claremont, the trouble spot in suburban Johannesburg :

It is one of the worst places in Johannesburg. After the police have been there, you can see the liqueur running in the

streets. You can smell it, you can smell nothing else, wherever you go in that place ... there is bad liqueur ... made strong with all manner of things that our people have never used. And that is her work, she makes and sells it ... These women sleep with any man for their price. A man has been killed at her place. The gamble and drink and stab. She has been in prison more than once. (p. 16)

Appropriately, Paton intensifies this sordid picture of South African underworld in order to provide a moral justification for Kumalo's shift of emphasis from the physical recovery of his sister to an attempt to completely transform her way of life. We know the extent of her degeneracy during the first meeting between Kumalo and Gertrude.

They stand and look at each other, he anxious, she afraid. She turns and looks back into the room. A door closes, and she says, Come in, my brother.

Only then does she reach her hand to him. It is cold and wet, there is no life in it. (p. 18).

After Kumalo's stern rebuke a remorseful, Gertrude looked at her brother "suddenly, like an animal that is tormented". Of course it is for her a traumatic experience; and the instant renunciation of her despicable past marks the beginning of her regeneration and the cleansing of her confessed infectious morbidity: "I am sick here. The child is sick also":

— Do you wish with your heart to come back? She nods her head again, she sobs too. I do not like Johannesburg, she says. She looks at him with eyes of distress, and his heart quickens with hope. I am a bad woman, my brother. I am no woman to go back.

His eyes fill with tears, his deep gentleness returns to him. He goes to her and lifts her from the floor to the chair. Inarticulately he strokes her face, his heart filled with pity. —God forgive us, he says, Who am I not to forgive? Let us pray. They knelt down, and he prayed, quietly so that the

neighbours might not hear, and she punctuated his petitions with amens. And when he had finished, she burst into a torrent of prayer, of self-denunciation, and urgent petition. And thus reconciled, they sat hand in hand. (p. 19).

Gertrude's contrition and subsequent conversion is significant in terms of her own moral rebirth and acceptance to grace. Furthermore, it not only confirms for Kumalo that the goal of his quest is realizable it also foreshadows the restoration of the broken tribe. "One day in Johannesburg," Kumalo reflects with gratification "and already the tribe was being rebuilt the house and the soul restored". Indeed the metaphor is sustained as we watch the salvaged generation of Gertrude's child "playing in the yard, with small pieces of brick and wood that a builder had left", "Kumalo's inner joy and "pleasure in the small boy". He had himself contributed to the sustenance of this joy and the child's symbolic act of reconstruction that enraptured mind of the old priest.

He had bought the child some cheap wooden blocks, and with these the little one played endlessly and intently, with a purpose obscure to the adult mind, but completely absorbing. Kumalo would pick the child up, and put his hand under the shirt to feel the small warm back, and tickle and poke him, till the serious face relaxed into smiles, grew into uncontrollable laughter. Or he would tell him of the great valley where he was born, and the names of hills and river and the school that he would go to, and the mist that shrouded the tops above Ndotsheni. Of this the child understood nothing ; yet something he did understand, for he would listen solemnly to the deep melodious names, and gaze at his uncle out of wide and serious eyes. (p. 31).

Kumalo's relationship with the child provides a major source of that inner peace which springs from an understanding of the complex nature of our existence and of divine benevolence. Here indeed is an affirmation of comfort in desolation and Kumalo, the resigned sufferer rejoiced at this knowledge :

Who indeed knows the secret of the earthly pilgrimage ?

Who indeed knows why there can be comfort in a world of doesolation ? Now God be thanked that there is a beloved one who can lift up the heart in suffering, that one can play with a child in the face of such misery. Now God be thanked that the name of a hill is such music, that the name of a river can heal. Aye, even the name of a river that runs no more. (p. 34).

Kumalo's search for and recovery of his lost sister, as well as his abortive evangelical mission to redeem his brother's soul, form a prelude to the epic journey of 'an old man seeking his son' in the labyrinthine underworld of Johannesburg. By presenting this therapeutic journey Paton is able to portray the spiritual growth of "an old man suffering because he cannot find his son." For it is this crisis which brings out in Kumalo his incredible energy and dedication, as well as the pilgrim's emotional involvement in the well-being of his son. "How can I rest ?" he laments in his loss ; and when Msimagu offers to pay the taxi fare to Alexandra the same paternal devotion leads Kumalo to insist on paying : "No one must pay but me" ; and immediately "Kumalo opened his coat, and took out his purse eagerly. Here is my money, he said." (p. 43).

But Kumalo's discovery of his son Absalom comes too late in the story for him to attempt physical recovery of the prodigal. Thus, instead, Kumalo devotes his energies to ensuring that his estranged son is well prepared spiritually to bear the burden of his crime than employ the services of a lawyer defend Absalom he insists on his moral fortification, and on "the amendment of his life" by Father Vincent who offers "to reform, and to help to uplift" the prodigal. Kumalo's search and suffering, are modelled on the cycle of experience of the pilgrim whose only guidance and consolation lie in the doctrinaire message of the holy scriptures. That faith is rekindled by Father-Vincent when he compares the old priest's suffering to experience of a man whose house has been destroyed in a storm. He is, Father Vincent argues, no longer afraid of the imminence of the catastrophe, but instead he is consoled by the fact that the house must first be broken, if there must be reconstruction. From that point Kumalo's physical search takes on the nature of a symbolic quest for understanding of the mysteries of existence as Father

Vincent gradually leads the humble priest into an entirely new and bewildering domain of metaphysical enquiry :

—My friend, your anxiety turned to fear, and your fear turned to sorrow. But sorrow is better than fear. For fear improves always, while sorrow may enrich. Kumalo looked at him, with an intensity of gaze that was strange in so humane a man, and hard to encounter.—I do not know that I am enriched, he said.—Sorrow is better than fear, said Father Vincent doggedly, Fear is a journey, a terrible journey, but sorrow is at least in arriving.

Kumalo looked at him not bitterly or accusingly or reproachfully.

—It seems that God has turned from me, he said.—That may seem to happen, said Father Vincent. But it does not happen, never, never, does it happen.—I am glad to hear you, said Kumalo humbly. (p. 55)

Like Kumalo, James Jarvis comes to Johannesburg in search of his son who is the victim of Absalom's murderous act. Before that journey Jarvis belonged to the group of snobbish white exploiters whose contempt for the missionary zeal of the Kumalos is obvious. Not surprisingly, his knowledge of the mission in Ndots-heni was necessarily limited : "A dirty old wood-and-iron church, patched and forlorn, and a dirty old parson, in a barren valley where the grass hardly grew (p. 69). But almost imperceptibly, Jarvis's biases begin to wear off. He is stunned by the large groups of Blacks who come up to sympathize with him at his son's funerals. And for the first time James Jarvis, we are told, brings himself to shake hands with Black people. In Johannesburg too in the course of his quest, he comes to realize his son's intense emotional attachment to the Black cause especially after reading his unfinished manuscript on the natives which convinces him of the lofty ideals which Arthur Jarvis had sought to uphold. He reads Lincoln's Second Inaugural Address, and "felt with a sudden lift of the spirit that here was a secret unfolding, a track picked up again." (p. 76). But more important still, he gained from his quest increasing knowledge of "the

stranger that had been his son". This transformation is important and, one might say, necessary because the certainty of Jarvis's spiritual growth makes it easier for Paton to bring him face to face with Kumalo thus merging the two sequences into a single moral statement on the formidable power of love and brotherhood. It is this statement which subsequently forms the core of third and final book in which Paton gives practical demonstration of the new insights which the two men had gained in the course of their "quests" in Johannesburg. In place of the pervasively gloomy scenes that dominate the first book, Paton focuses our attention on new and strictly regenerative forces in the society with "engine steams and whistles over the veld of the Transval" symptomatic of the imminent reactivation of life in the perched and barren wasteland of Ndotsheni. The Kumalo who returns to Ndotsheni is a more dedicated stoic and Christian moralist more willing than ever before to bear the pain of suffering in a vile, indifferent universe:

Kumalo looked at him under the light of the lamp. I believe, he said, but I have learned that it is a secret, pain and suffering, they are a secret, kindness and love, they are a secret. But I have learned the kindness and love can pay for pain and suffering.

— I have never thought that a Christian would be free of suffering. For our Lord suffered. And I come to believe that he suffered, not to save us from suffering, but to teach us how to bear suffering. For he knew that there is no life without suffering. (P. 108).

Kumalo needed this knowledge as part of his spiritual and moral edification. Moreover, it ensures, an appropriate frame of mind in preparation for his next major task which is the restoration of the tribe itself; for more than anything else, "the great city had opened his eyes to something that begun and must now be continued". (p. 100). He returns to find Ndotsheni, albeit desolate, in a mood for changes and Kumalo dances in elation "for no person at all, but for himself", and henceforth prays continually for the redemption of Ndotsheni and for a new generation to be born: "Forgive us all, for our trespasses. And *Tixo* let this girl be welcome

in Ndotsheni and deliver her child safely *in this* place.” (p. 107) He goes to see the chief and finds everywhere a recurring pattern of listlessness. In spite of ceaseless petition for “the restoration of Ndotsheni” the enormity of his task grows increasingly more challenging and his spirit begins to sag “in the lifeless heat”. His visit to the village school is equally disheartening. There, the headmaster “took Kumalo out into the blazing sun, and showed him the school gardens, but this was an academic lecture, for there was no water, and everything was dead ... everything in the valley was dead too; even children were dying. (p. 111) At the end of the conducted tour, Kumalo “went back again to his church and sat there despirited and depressed.” (p. 112) Paton’s constant plea, of course, is that there could be comfort in desolation. And not surprisingly at this crucial moment, Kumalo still on the threshold finds himself in a visionary state with his ears turned to a voice which cried from heaven, “comfort ye, comfort ye, my people, these things will I do upto you, and not forsake you.” (p. 123)

For Kumalo as well as for Jarvis there is a reaffirmation of being and moral regeneration through shared experiences, suffering and expiation. Paton contrives a reconciliation of both fathers under the roof of the village church, and links it, symbolically, with a new burst of life and activity in the valley, “now full of sound, of streams and rivers, all red with the blood of the earth” and hope such as Kumalo had never witnessed before. Although in the end we watch Kumalo’s solemn retreat into the hills on the eve of his son’s execution, the occasion. Celebration of the dawn of rejuvenated nature in Ndotshi. *Cry the Beloved* is not one of bitter reproach of the Immanent Will but one of a *Country* ends on this promissory note of rebirth. It affirms the triumph of life over death and the promise of redemption which is conditional upon our willingness to submit to the spiritual torture and therapeutic experience of suffering and pain.

It is this moral content of *Cry the Beloved Country* which has induced whatever attention has been given to novel. It has also prompted the hostile attack of those who could not bear the naive Christian message which presents an other-worldly view amidst the harsh social realities in South Africa. In the novel itself there is a hint on the sceptical response given to Maimangu’s inspired speech

at Enzenzeleni :

"The people sigh, and Kumalo sighs, as though this is a great word that has been spoken. And indeed this Msimangu is known as a preacher. It is good for the Government, they say in Johannesburg, the Msimangu preaches of a world not made by hands, for he touches people at the hearts, and sends them marching to heaven instead of to Pretoria ...

Yet he is despised by some, for this golden voice that could raise a nation, speaks always thus. They ask what folly it is that can so seize upon a man, what folly is it that seize upon so many of their people, making the hungry patient, the suffering content, the dying at peace? And how fools listen to him, silent, sighing when he is done, feeding their empty bellies on his empty words. (p. 48)

The point, of course, is that Paton in his obsession with the Christian ideals of Love and Brotherhood, loses sight almost completely of the need to reconcile his Christian propositions with contemporary realities in South Africa. That is not to say that we cannot find proponents of non-violent struggle in South Africa. There are indeed servile Christian zealots like Kumalo and his friend Msimangu just as there are white liberals like Arthur Jarvis and Moral Re-orientation Brigade leaders like Father Vincent. The damnable flaw in Paton's conception of the novel is obvious : that in the interplay of politics with religion he deliberately ignores the human factor and the self-assertive principle. The South African dilemma is far too complex a subject for an oversimplified religious sermon. It is denial of individual essence as necessary factors of the human condition.

Notes

¹Alan Paton, *Cry the Beloved Country: A Story of Comfort in Desolation*. First published in 1948 by Charles Scribner's Sons of New York.

References are to the edition *Paton's Cry the Beloved Country: The Novel The Critics, The Setting* ed. Sheridan Baker, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968. pp. 7-132. The pages of this edition are cited in subsequent references.

²*Catholic World* April 1948.

³'Alan Paton' in *The Writer Observed* ed. Harvey Breit, (New York, Collier Books, 1961) p. 67.

Dr. Vijaya Gupta

India and Africa

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE
(July-December 1973)

African nations seek Indian know-how

Several African countries have shown interest in getting the benefit of Indian technological and industrial development.

Talking informally to newsmen after a visit to three East African countries, the Deputy Commerce Minister, Mr. A. C. George, was very happy over the way in which those countries sought Indian know-how for their development activities. Mr. George visited Tanzania, Zambia and Kenya from June 4 to 11, 1973. India bagged the first prize in the Saba Saba international fair at Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania) for the first time and the second prize at the Ndola trade fair in Zambia recently.

Tanzania had sought Indian help in preparing feasibility studies for a variety of industries. The National Industrial Development Corporation was co-operating with the national development corporation of that country in this regard. Two or three studies had already been completed and more were being considered. They included a paper pulp factory, six sugar factories, expanding fertiliser unit from 100 million tonnes to 130 million tonnes.

Tanzania was also interested in obtaining Indian managerial assistance for its cement industry. Other possible fields included petroleum marketing and transport equipment.

Mr. George said the offer of setting up domestic consultancy services had been made to all the three countries he visited. The idea had been well received. Tanzania had already written formally to ask for Indian assistance in this work. (July 1973)

Algeria invitation to PM handed over

Algeria's special envoy, Mr. Mohamed Yazid, met the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, to review issues for the forthcoming non-aligned summit at Algiers and to hand over a personal letter from the Algerian President, Col. Houari Boumedienne.

He also discussed new developments on the sub-continent "at length" and in detail in talks with the Minister for External Affairs, Mr. Swaran Singh.

Mr. Swaran Singh and the Algerian Charge d'Affaires were present at meeting between the Algerian envoy and Mrs. Gandhi. Apart from the talks with Mr. Swaran Singh, Mr. Yazid also met the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Kewal Singh. (July 1973)

Algerian-Indian Health Ministers meet

The Algerian Health Minister, Mr. Omar Boudjellab, called on the Union Health Minister Mr. R.K. Khadilkar, to exchange views on public health matters concerning the two countries.

Mr. Omar Boudjellab evinced keen interest in the way India was tackling its population problem and sought details of the strategy and techniques employed for the Family Planning Programme. (July 1973)

Algerian order for projectors

Indian film projectors will soon be used in cinema houses in Algeria following orders placed by the Algerian Government with a New Delhi firm which displayed these equipment at the Indian pavilion in the Algiers international trade fair.

Indian pavilion, which has been awarded a gold medal for outstanding display, achieved a breakthrough in creating export potential for a large number of Indian products. Negotiations have been started for the supply of hessian cloth, jute bags and plywood. (September 1973)

India to import Egyptian cotton

According to the Chairman of Cotton Corporation of India, R.S. Panj hazari. India will import three lakh bales of cotton from Egypt to meet its internal demands.

India's annual requirement was about 62 lakh bales of cotton

but production this year was expected to be 62 lakh bales. The remaining three lakh bales would be imported. (July 1973)

Egypt's new Envoy to India

Mr. Zakaris El-Adly Imam has been nominated as the next Ambassador of Egypt to India.

Mr. Imam is at present director of cultural relations and technical co-operation in the Egyptian Foreign Office. (November 1973)

India, Ethiopia sign air accord

Air-India and Ethiopian Airlines have agreed to operate their scheduled flights on the India-Ethiopia-India sector in a commercial pool arrangement effective from November 1973. (July 1973)

Ethiopian Indian Law Ministers meet

The Minister of Justice of Ethiopia Mr. Ato Akale Habtewold called on the Law Minister, Mr. H.R. Gokhale.

The Ethiopian Minister evinced keen interest in India's judicial system and wanted to know more about the high courts and the Supreme Court.

Both the Ministers discussed the need for abolishing the death sentence. They also compared the legal systems of their respective countries. (August 1973)

Vice-Mayor of Addis Ababa visits Delhi

Mr. A. Abdurahman, Vice-Mayor of Addis Ababa discussed with the President and members of the New Delhi Municipal Committee the problems facing the municipal bodies in the capital cities of the two countries. He was presented with a brass plate with the Safdarjang flyover engraved.

He said that the trend of having skyscrapers started nearly the same time in his country as in India, about a decade ago. But the character of the old city in Addis Ababa was being retained by not allowing any skyhigh buildings there. In the new areas where the skyline was changing, there was no restriction on height. (November 1973)

India Guinea Bissau Ties

Welcoming the formation of the new Republic of Guinea-Bissau, the Government of India announced its decision to establish relations with it.

In a telegram to the President of the new republic, Mr. Iuiz Cabral, Mrs. Gandhi has conveyed India's greetings and felicitations.

She has added that India was "looking forward to close, friendly and fruitful co-operation between our two Governments in all fields".

Mrs. Gandhi's message was in response to a telegram from Mr. Pereira, Secretary-General of the *Party of Africa for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau*, informing her of the proclamation of the new State and requesting India's fraternal support and recognition.

Mrs. Gandhi has said in her reply to Mr. Pereira that "your sacrifices and success in the liberation struggle have set an inspiring example to peoples in Africa, still struggling under colonialism, racialism and oppression, in whose cause, on this solemn occasion, we pledge our continued support". (October 1973)

India to collaborate in setting up small-scale industries in Guinea

Guinea's Minister for Mines and Geology, Mr. Mohammed Lamine Toure, has indicated that there existed wide scope for bilateral cooperation between India and Guinea in the fields of mining and industries, particularly small-scale industries and raw materials which are available in Guinea. Leading a three-member delegation, Mr. Toure, met Minister of steel and Mines and Commerce Minister Shri D.P. Chattopadhyaya in New Delhi during a seven-day tour of the country.

The delegation invited Indian experts to visit Guinea to pursue these objectives. Mr. Chattopadhyaya assured the delegation that India will be willing to enter into collaboration agreements to develop small-scale industries in Guinea. (November 1973)

Indian Finance Minister in Nairobi

The Finance Minister Mr. Y.B. Chavan, visited Nairobi to lead the Indian delegation to the meetings of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

Speaking to reporters at the airport, Mr. Chavan said that the "link" between Special Drawing Rights and development aid was the most crucial issue for the developing countries at these meetings. "We are trying to see whether a consensus could be arrived at among the developing countries on this issue". (September 1973)

Libyan crude for India

India has secured an assurance for the supply of four million tonnes of crude oil from Libya in the next two years, marking a significant breakthrough in the matter of oil supplies from a non-traditional source.

Libya will supply two million tonnes of crude in 1974 and an equal quantity in 1975 following the visit of an Indian official delegation to that country. Libya has also asked for the services of Indian oil experts for the operation of a three-million-tonnes refinery to be commissioned in that country by the end of 1973.

The Indian delegation was headed by the Deputy Minister for Petroleum & Chemicals, Mr. Dalbir Singh. (August 1973)

Technical aid to Mauritius

The Mauritius Minister of Works Mr. Abool Hak Mahomed Osman, said in New Delhi, he was "very much satisfied" with his talks with the Indian Ministers and officials on technical co-operation between India and his country.

He told reporters at the end of his four-day official visit that he had asked for Indian civil and mechanical engineers, besides architects and surveyors, who would be attached to his Ministry to execute the building programmes in Port Louis as part of current four-year plan.

Mr. Osman called on the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh.

Mr. Osman said he had mainly discussed with the Minister of Works and Housing, Mr. Bhola Paswan, the question of sending technical personnel to Mauritius. He also held talks with the Foreign Secretary, Mr. Kewal Singh on this question.

Indian engineers were already co-operating with his country's Development Works Corporation, Mr. Osman said. Besides, they were engaged in the construction of Mahatma Gandhi Institute, a gift of India to Mauritius.

Mr. Osman visited Parliament House accompanied by the Minister of States for Works and Housing Mr. Om Mehta. (July 1973)

Indian gift to Mauritius

India has sent 25,000 numbers of fish seed to Mauritius as a gift. The seed is of Indian major carp fish, of Cutla, Rohu and marigal varieties, which are known for their quick growth and fine table qualities. (September 1973)

Delhi condemns Mozambique massacre

The Government of India condemned the barbarities committed by the Portuguese army in Mozambique.

A spokesman of the Foreign office said that the Government's attention had been drawn to reports that the Portuguese troops had massacred over 400 civilians, men, women and children, in Mozambique in the course of its policy of brutal suppression of the freedom movement. (July 1973)

India asks South Africa to stop prisoners' torture

India took the initiative in the United Nations Special Political Committee yesterday to sponsor a resolution calling upon the white minority regime in South Africa "to end all forms of physical and mental torture and other acts of terror" against prisoners detained for opposing "apartheid".

The resolution was co-sponsored by three other countries, Ghana, Jamaica and Yugoslavia. Two members of the western group, Ireland and Italy, spoke in full support of the resolution. Italy's support is of significance because it has trade with South Africa.

Mr. C.M. Stephen, leader of the Indian delegation introduced the resolution in the special political committee with a speech strongly criticising the South African regime for resorting to "gruesome and barbarous methods of torture."

The political committee was discussing a report prepared by the rapporteur, India's Dr. Barakat Ahmad, on the torture and maltreatment meted out by the white minority regime on critics of apartheid. The report exposes the repressive legislation operation of the detention law and cites 125 cases of inhuman torture brought to

light till recently.

The resolution sponsored by India, calls upon the Secretary-General to give wide publicity to the barbarous act of the present South African government. (October 1973)

India's call to U.N. to end South Africa's policy of apartheid

India has urged in the special political committee of the U.N. that time has come for the Security Council to act "once for all" and spare the people of South Africa from the continuing tragedy perpetrated by the white minority Government.

Mr. D.P. Singh of India was among those who condemned the policy of apartheid but saw some hopeful signs in the overall situation. (October 1973)

India to Help set up Industrial units in Sudan

India pledged to help Sudan in a big way in the latter's plans to turn from a producer and exporter of primary commodities to a full-fledged developing nation. The two countries finalised a comprehensive agreement covering economic, technical and cultural cooperation after four-day talks in New Delhi and agreed to sign the document after the appropriate constitutional formalities were over.

According to a joint statement released in New Delhi at the conclusion of the high-level talks between Indian and Sudanese delegations, the Government of India had agreed to help Sudan in establishing textile factories in the context of that country's plans to convert all the cotton grown into yarn and textiles to meet its domestic demand before making any export commitments. The statement did not however indicate the steps proposed to be taken to correct the existing imbalance in trade between the two countries which had resulted in a deficit for Sudan of £ 10 million sterling and the consequent embargo by India on exports to that country.

Some of the spheres in which India has pledged to help Sudan are: studies of the cement industry and in the establishment of plants to raise cement production, extension of sugar cultivation and utilising the increased availability of cane in the production of sugar as also in utilising molasses for the manufacture of yeast and cattle feed, fruit and vegetable processing and canning, manufacture of

caustic soda and sulphuric acid and in the setting up of an industrial estate in Sudan. The projected industrial estate will have units for the manufacture of leather products, electrical fans, irrigation pumps and storage batteries.

The two countries also agreed to exchange information and data and experts and training personnel in agricultural research to improve the production of cash and food crops. They also agreed to provide facilities for training of scientists, technologists, technicians and planning officials in suitable situations and departments in the two countries. The Indian delegation at the talks was led by the Minister of Planning D.P. Dhar included Commerce Minister D.P. Chattopadhyaya and Minister of State for Planning.

The Sudanese delegation was led by Minister for Finance and Economic Development, Syed Ibrahim Moneim Mansour and included Mohammed Abdel Magid Ahmed, Commissioner-General for Development and Sudanese Ambassador in India, Ali Sahloul. Sudan offered to relax its ban on the export of coarse grains and oil seeds and immediately rush certain quantities of these to India. The offer was made to India's Commerce Minister, D.P. Chattopadhyaya by Syed Ibrahim Moneim Mansour. According to the Sudanese Minister though his country was in short supply of these and had banned their exports, he would make arrangements for immediate shipment of some coarse grains and oilseeds as an expression of Sudan's solidarity with people of India. (August 1973).

Tea export to Sudan

India agreed to resume with immediate effect exports of tea to Sudan following an agreement signed between the two countries. (August 1973).

Tanzanian Minister visits India

Dr. W.K. Chagula, Tanzanian Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning came to India for a fortnight's visit.

During his stay Dr. Chagula called on Industrial Development Minister Mr. C. Subramaniam, Heavy Industry Minister T.A. Pai and Planning Minister D.P. Dhar. (December 1973)

Rs. 50-crore Indian credit for Tanzania

With the signing of an agreement for a Rs. 50 crore Indian credit, Tanzania became the first country of mainland Africa to receive credit from India.

Finance Minister Y.B. Chavan and visiting Tanzanian Commerce Minister A.H. Jamal signed the agreement, which marked a significant step-up in Indian economic relations with Africa.

Simultaneously, high-level discussion began on expansion of trade and economic cooperation between India and Tanzania. The Tanzanian delegation was led by Mr. Jamal and the Indian delegation by Foreign Trade Minister L.N. Mishra.

The Rs. 50-crore Indian credit will be available for the purchase of machinery from this country to set up projects in the field of power, industrial estates, small-scale industries and in such other fields as are mutually agreed to by the two Governments. It will also be available for the provision of expert services from India. (December 1973)

Zaire envoy to India

Mr. Ileka Mboyo has been nominated as the Ambassador of the Republic of Zaire to India. (August 1973).

Ties with Zaire to be strengthened

India and Zaire have expressed their strong desire to strengthen further the relations between the two countries within the framework of the protocol signed during the visit to India of President Mobutu of Zaire in January.

The protocol related to economic, commercial, scientific, cultural and maritime co-operation between India and Zaire.

The Foreign Minister of Zaire, Mr. Nguza Karl-i-Bond, who was on a three-day visit to India had talks with Mr. Swaran Singh on the international situation and bilateral relations. He also met President, Mr. V.V. Giri, and the Prime Minister. (November 1973)

2nd Prize for India in Zambia fair

India won the second prize in Fair now being held in Ndola, Zambia. The first prize went to the Federal Republic of Germany.

President Kaunda, who visited the Indian pavilion on June 30 evinced great interest in Indian exhibits.

At the conclusion of the visit Indian High Commissioner A.M. Thomas presented an HMT wristwatch and an Indian transistor, radio to the President. (July 1973).

India to set up joint ventures in Zambia

The Union Deputy Minister of Commerce, Mr. A.C. George said that India intended to buy copper from Zambia.

Mr. George on a visit to Zambia said India proposed to set up joint enterprises in Zambia and added this would help build further trade relations between the two countries. (July 1973)

India gets 120-Million Zambian contract

A Rs. 120 million contract has been obtained from Zambia by the Indian Consortium for Power Projects, a public sector undertaking, it was officially announced.

The contracts relate to the supply, erection and commissioning of mechanical equipment for a vital dam project. The equipment will be designed, manufactured and supplied by Triveni Structurals Ltd. one of the members of the consortium. (July 1973).

Z.A.N.U. asks for Indian support

Mr. Herbert Chitepo, Chief of the Zimbabwe African National Union, the organization spearheading the Rhodesian liberation movement against the Ian Smith regime made an indirect plea for diplomatic and material aid to ZANU by India.

Mr. Chitepo, who was in New Delhi on his way back to Rhodesia from a tour of Australia and New Zealand, said ZANU was getting substantial arms and other aid from the Organisation of African Unity and "considerable amount of cooperation" from Mozambique. (August 1973)

Book Reviews

Robert G. Gregory, *India and East Africa: A History of Race Relations within the British Empire*, Oxford University Press, 1971.

The book consists of five hundred and fifty pages, fourteen chapters; at the outset (Page I), Dr. Gregory tells us "The History of the Indian-African relationship is but one aspect that calls for illumination", but this is conveniently forgotten after the introductory pages.

In spite of lavish 'grants', access to many archives, and much travel between the continents of Asia, Europe and Africa, the author has not been able to improve upon the existing works on Asians in East Africa.

Dr. Gregory could have taken his readers into confidence and frankly told us the *raison d'être* for his book, and then perhaps his efforts would not have been in vain.

At the end of reading *India and East Africa*, quite irrationally and unjustifiably,

one feels that Asian leaders in East Africa had commissioned this eminent scholar from the Syracuse University and pleaded with him thus. "Write whatever you want... but give us a good chit..."

And hence Dr. Gregory has taken a great deal of scholastic trouble to repeat (rather sheepishly this time) what he had categorically stated in his previous book—*Sydney Webb and the Doctrine of Native Paramountcy* (University of California Press, Berkely, 1962)—that the Asian presence and struggle in E. Africa was responsible for preventing E. Africa becoming a South Africa—"The vast African majority slowly roused by the contention between the communities began to aspire a goal completely at variance with those European and Indian aspi-

rants—'Africa for Africans' (page 3).

In my view Dr. Gregory's claim in the introduction, that "the Indian behaviour in the years from 1890-1939 determined whether they would be associated in the minds of African leaders with exploitation, or regarded as friends and allies in a common struggle against imperialism", is sheer wishful thinking and finds no elucidation in the book. African nationalists chose to deliberately ignore the 'Indian behaviour' during 1890-1939 (interpreting this as a struggle for Indian and not African, rights and privileges), and misconstrued later Indian fears and inhibitions regarding African independence as non-participation in the post World War (II) African nationalist movement.

Neither can any serious reader concede to Dr. Gregory's claim that his book "embraces the development of Indian nationalism, the growth of Indian politics and the evolution of Indian intellectual history"! It is easy and honest to admit that 'India and East Africa' rouses but 'does not satisfy the readers' curiosity. Also, in spite of the pompous title and sweeping claims, it is eminently readable, and no scholar or layman interested in Africa and India, can afford to overlook this friendly, utterly charming book. The most thought-provoking authors on Asians in East Africa continue to be—J.S. Mangat, Hollingsworth, and the Ghai brothers.

MRS. V. AJYAR

The International Aspect of the South African Indian Question 1860-1971 by Bridglal Pachai, C. Struik (PTY) LTD., Cape Town, 1971.

The plea of domestic jurisdiction is a convenient ploy adopted by colonial powers to escape international intervention in their colonial affairs. The South African Government too invoked Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter to prevent consideration of the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa by the U.N. General Assembly in 1946, as requested by the Government of India. Notwithstanding South African's objections, the issue was debated in the General Assembly successively for 15 years and Resolutions were adopted. Not that this improved the lot of Indians in South Africa; but it served to focus world opinion on one aspect of the South African Governments' racist policies until, after the Sharpeville Massacre, the entire question of the obnoxious policy of *apartheid* came on the agenda of the U.N. General Assembly.

The main emphasis of Dr. Pachai's study is on the weakness of South Africa's plea of domestic jurisdiction. Tracing the origin of the question to

the "triangular pact between the governments of Natal, India and Great Britain", Dr. Pachai has shown, with great consistency and in meticulous detail, how the issue was never one for South African Government alone to dispose of at its will. The Government of India never abdicated its right to intervene on behalf of persons of Indian origin and constantly invoked the Imperial Government's moral and legal "responsibility of keeping a benevolent watch on the future welfare" of the Crown's subjects in South Africa. Hence, the issue figured prominently in the Imperial Conferences during the Inter-War years and was the subject of bilateral negotiations between the Governments of India and South Africa. It was later taken to the League of Nations and the United Nations.

While concentrating on the international aspects of the question, Dr. Pachai has taken care not to ignore local and national developments, which inevitably cast their

ong shadow across political boundaries. In fact, he describes and analyses them in such great detail that quite often the main thrust of the essay is lost, making it necessary for the author to laboriously pick

up the threads. The end-product however, is a very informative treatise on all the essential aspects of the Indian Question in South Africa.

T.G. RAMAMURTHI

James N. Rosenau, *International Studies and the Social Science*. Sage Publications, London, 1973 pp. 148.

According to Rosenau the question of how International studies in USA should be organised and conducted is a long-standing one, but restless urgency now marks the search for guidelines and priorities. The scholars are no longer clear as to what can be accomplished and many are no longer sure of what ought to be accomplished. The funding agencies are apparently searching for guidelines and re-thinking the kinds of research and teaching programmes that should be encouraged. These questions are not the peculiarity of USA.

The importance and relevance of spending large sums of money on conducting researches in social science and on international affairs has been questioned all over

the world. In USA the researches in the field of international studies and social sciences had a setback in 1970. The main reason was the disclosures concerning the role of CIA in the funding of large number of research programmes for getting their own men penetrate otherwise sensitive areas. The CIA disclosures led to financial squeeze on the universities (Page 18). Consequently numerous government agencies turned their face to all the new research projects. As a result the prospects for increases in the future were very discouraging. Another reason for the above attitude was the failure (Page 19) of America's Vietnam policy leading to the conviction of many observers that the entire decade of foreign policy has

failed. Alliance progress failed to produce much change in Latin American and those expended on foreign assistance elsewhere in the world did not produce noticeably viable politics and economics. Besides Vietnam the author adds, the reasons have been the Bay of Pigs fiasco and Skybolt decision and series of other inept efforts to cope with the changing world. The officials of the Government agencies are finding it difficult to finance research programmes that do not produce results which can be used for their own programmes for making policy decisions.

There is a gap between the researchers and policy makers with the result that for the latter more than half of the material is 'simple gibberish'. The policy-maker cannot understand, cannot use it. In short the funding agencies want relevance.

The new urge for committed research which should

be relevant to our society has been noted by all social scientists. The search for general patterns, for similarities and contrasts for patterns of recurrent behaviour amid arrays of discrepant behaviour is simply a trend towards comparative analysis.

The question of social relevance in social sciences is the question of regarding the purpose of engagement in these disciplines. Obviously the purpose of engaging in natural science is to predict and control the phenomena in nature. The purpose of research in social science should be to improve and create condition of better use for all. In other words there should be a meaning and purpose in these disciplines. We wish the conclusion of the study was that research in social science should be relevant to society.

VIJAYA GUPTA

Pakeeza Sultan

Africa Through Indian Eyes

A Documentation List
(July-December 1973)

AFRICA THROUGH INDIAN EYES is a Documentation based on coverage of Africa in Indian newspapers and periodicals. It is arranged in a classified order. However, subject headings are broad and are in alphabetical sequence. Under each subject heading entries are listed alphabetically under the name of author or title and for each article a reference is made to the publication (name of publication is in italics) including its volume, number, date of issue and the page on which the article appears. The matter in brackets has been provided in order to make captions more clearly understood. Annotations have also been given to the articles and editorials wherever found necessary.

AFRICA GENERAL

AGRICULTURE

MEHTA (Uday) : Agricultural Reforms in the Third World. *Call*, 25(4), Dec. 1973; 20

ARTS

Cinema

D'MONTE (Darryl) : African Cinema Awakens. *The Times of India*, 23 Dec. 1973;

CONFERENCES

International Monetary Conference

AFRICA (IMF meeting in Nairobi) *Swarajya*, 18(16), 13 Oct. 1973; 15

LOSSES AND Gains in Nairobi (IMF Meeting in Nairobi) *Capital*, (9284), 11 Oct. 1973; 1597-1598

RAMARAO (G.I.) : Background to Nairobi Stalemate (Annual meeting of World Bank and the IMF in Nairobi Sep. 1973) *New Age*, Oct. 1973; 11

SANTHANAM (k) : The Nairobi Conference (The annual conference of the International Monetary Fund) *Swarajya*, 18(15), 13 Oct. 1973; 1-2

SAULDIE (Madan M) : Africans pitch high hopes on Nairobi conference (Conference of World Bank and International Monetary Fund started in Nairobi from Sept. 24) *The Hindustan Times*, 20 Sept. 1973; 5

Non-Aligned Conferences

A. H. The Dilemma of the Non-Aligned : Political Diary. *The Hindustan Times*, 11 Sept. 1973; 7

ALGERIA (fourth non-aligned summit) *Swarajya* 18(12), 22 Sept. 1973; 17

ALGERIA (The fourth non-aligned summit conference opened on Sept. 5 in Algeria) *Swarajya*, 18(11), 15 Sept. 1973; 19

ALGIERS CONFERENCE (76 nations attended the conference at Algiers, 5-9, Sept. 1973) *Foreign Affairs Reports*, 22(10), Oct. 1973; 191-211

ALGIERS' MESSAGE : Peace and Prosperity of the World. Mrs. Gandhi's speech at Non-aligned Summit *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10(23), 15 Sept. 1973; 5-6

ALGIER'S MEET : Its Problems and Prospects. *Young India*, 3(14), 20 Sept. 1973; 5-6

ALGIERS UNITY (Algiers Summit Conference) *Patriot*; 11 Sept. 1973; 7

ATTAR CHAND : The Non-Aligned Countries the United Nations. *Young India*, 3(1), (141) Dec. 1973; 21-22

BELOVSKI (Duñce) : Yugoslav Commitment to Non-Alignment. *Socialist India*, 8(1), 19 Dec. 1973; 17-18

CHATTERJE (S.B.) : Many Viewpoints for Algiers Summit. *The Statesman*, 25 August 1973; 4

DAR (A.N.) : (Arming of nations threat to peace) says P.M. *The Indian Express*, 7 Sept. 1973; 1

- DAR (A.N.) : Non-Aligned finalise joint economic plan : Development fund to be set up. *Indian express*, 9 Sept. 1973; 1
- DAR (A.N.) : Third World nations uneasy at detente. *The Indian Express*, 8 Sept. 1973; 1
- END OR BEGINNING? *The Hindustan Times*, 28 August, 1973; 5
- FOURTH NON-ALIGNED Summit (The 4th Summit at Algiers attended by 74 full members) *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10(23), 15 Sept. 1973; 6-7
- GREATER CONFERENCE in Non-aligned Summit (Returning from Algiers Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Swaran Singh expressed satisfaction over the success of the Conference) *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10(24), 1 Oct. 1973; 7
- GROWTH OF Non-aligned Movement (from Belgrade to Algiers) (1961-73) *Indian & Foreign Review*; 10(22), 1 Sept. 1973; 27
- GUPTA (Bhupesh) : Fourth Non-aligned Summit: From Lusaka to Algiers. *New Age*, 2 Sept. 1973; 6 & 14
- JAIN (Girilal) : The Non-Aligned Summit : Beginning of a new Trend. *The Times of India*; 12 Sept. 1973; 4
- KHAN (Masood Ali) : USSR hails Summit of Non-aligned Nations. *New Age*, 9 Sept 1973; 14
- KHANNA (G.L.) : Expanding Area of Non-alignment. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10(22), 1 Sept. 1973; 11-12
- LAL (M.B.) : The Algiers Summit : Providing a new approach to World Problems. *Capital*, (4282), 20 Sept. 1973; 1526-1528
- LUSAKA TO ALGIERS : *The Indian Express*, 17 August 1973; 6
- MALIK (HAIJI) : The Gains made at Algiers. *Young India*, 3(44), 11 Oct. 1973; 14-15
- MATHUR (J.M.L.) : Beautiful venue of non-alignment. *Patriot*, 1 Sept. 1973; 3
- MESSAGE OF ALGIERS : (President Boumedienne has described the fourth non-aligned conference as a historical event of Supreme importance) *The Indian Express*, 11 Sept. 1973 ; 4
- MORGAN (James) : Development in Algeria : Economic Sacrifices for a World Rok. *The Statesman*, 1 Sept. 1973 ; 6

MR. SADAT'S MISSION : (He is serious for a settlement of West Asian Conflict) *The Hindustan Times*, 22 August, 1973 ; 5

NON-ALIGNED. *Patriot*, 6 July 1973 ; 2

NON-ALIGNED. *The Statesman*, 7 Sept. 1973 ; 3

NON-ALIGNED Summit, *New Age*, 16 Sept. 1973 ; 2

NON-ALIGNMENT, 1973 ; Press Opinion. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10 (237) 15 Sept. 1973 ; 24

NON-ALIGNMENT Summit at Algiers. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10 (22), 1 Sept. 1973 ; 24

PURI (Rakshat) : Non-Alignment is a world. *The Hindustan Times*, 28 August, 1973 ; 5

RANGASWAMY (K) : The Algiers Summit. *Indian & Foreign Review* 10 (22), 1 Sept. 1973 ; 18-20

SAJJAD (I.A.) : Algiers Summit A Historic Event. (From Belgrade to Algiers) *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10 (24), 1 Oct. 1973 ; 13-16

SANTHANAM (K) : The Algiers Conference. *Swarjya*, 18 (11), 15 Sept. 1973 ; 1-2

SEN (Mohit) : COEXISTENCE, CHOICE and Non-alignment. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 2 (7), Sept. 1973 ; 3-4

SETHI (J.D.) : Dynamics of Non-alignment. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10(22), 1 Sept. 1973 ; 17-18

SINGH (J.D.) 4th Non-aligned Summit opens. *The Times of India*, 6 Sept. 1973 ; 1

SINGH (J.D.) : Areas of accord & discord at Algiers. *The Times of India*, 11 Sept. 1973 ; 5

SINGH (J.D.) : Algiers meet calls for restructuring of United Nations. *The Times of India*, 10 Sept. 1973 ; 1

SINGH (J.D.) : Five-point global strategy to be Adopted at Algiers. *The Times of India*, 2 Sept. 1973 ; 1

SINGH (J.D.) : Giving teeth to non-alignment : Preparing for Algiers. *The Times of India*, 30 August 1973 ; 4

SINGH (J.D.) : Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers Meet. *The Times of India*, 3 Sept. 1973 ; 1

SUCCESS AT NON-Aligned Summit ? (Non-aligned Conference in Algiers) *Capital*, (4281), 13 Sept. 1973 ; 1476

THE MEETING OF Algiers : (Meeting of 6 heads of States and Government at Algerian capital, *Thought*, 25 (37), 15 Sept. 1973 ; 4

VISWAM (S) : Consensus at Algiers Good Response to India's Efforts. *The Indian Express*, 2 Sept. 1973 ; 1

VISWAM (S) : High Drama Marks end to Summit. (more than 70 heads of States and Government meet) *Statesman*, 10 Sept. 1973 ; 1

VISWAM (S) : India heads of non-aligned Political Body. *The Statesman*, 5 Sept. 1973 ; 1

VISWAM (S) : Non-aligned club to be Enlarged. *The Statesman*, 30 August 1973 ; 8

VISWAM (S) : Strategy of Third World to be Evolved at Algiers, *The Statesman*, 3 Sept. 1973 ; 1

VISWAM (S) : Thorny issue at Algiers Summit (West Asian and Southern African problems were at the agenda of the Conference) *The Statesman*, 10 Sept. 1973 ; 6

WHAT LINKS The Non-Aligned? (Algiers Summit) *Thought*, 25(38) 22 Sept. 1973 ; 6

Organisation of African Unity

ESSAK (E) : The OAU : A Review. *Frontier*, 6(14), 14 July 1973 ; 14-15

MINI (Molege) : Class Struggle and African Unity : Ten years of OAU—I. *Mainstream*, 11 (48), 28 July 1973 ; 17-24

MINI (Molege) : Is a Communist Party Necessary ? Ten years of OAU—II *Mainstream*, 11 (49) 4 August, 1973 ; 19-25

OKONGWU (Obi) : The OAU Charter and the Principle of Domestic Jurisdiction in Inter-African Affairs. *Indian Journal of International Law*, 13 (4), Oct.-Dec. 1973 ; 589-593

World Peace Conferences

WORLD CONGRESS OF Peace Forces : *New Age*, 21 Oct. 1973 ; 2

CULTURE & CIVILIZATION

MEHTA (Amrita) : Unmasking clans and cultures. *The Hindustan Times*, 24 Dec. 1973 ; 3

DEFENCE & SECURITY

BHATT (V.R.) : Is the Arms Race Marking East ? *The Hindustan Times* 12 Sept. 1973 ; 5

MCLENNAN (Barbara N) : Armed Forces and Political Powers in Africa. *Africa Quarterly*, 13 (2), July-Sept. 1973 ; 131-139

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

SHANTI SADIQ ALI : The African Drought. *The Indian Express*, 28 August, 1973 ; 6

TSHUME (Albert) : Non-Capitalist-path in Africa. *Mainstream* 11(45), 7 July, 1973 ; 29-34 and 42

ECONOMIC POLICY

BHALLA (H.R.) : Debt Problem in Developing Countries—I. A—Current Trends and Future Outlook. B—Factors of growth of the Problem. *Yojana*, 17(17 & 18), 15 October 1973; 697-698 & 710

BHALLA (H.R.) : Debt Problem in Developing Countries—II C—Remedial Measures. *Yojana*, 17(19), November 1973 ; 745-748

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

Asia

CHHABRA (Hari Sharan) : India's Joint Ventures Abroad (Afro-Asian Economic Cooperation) *The Statesman*, 29 November 1973 ; 6

PAN-AFRICAN PAPER MILLS : (Afro-Asian Economic (co-operation) *The Statesman*, 29 November, 1973 ; 6

E.E.C.

HOWE (Russek Warren) : Africa and the E.E.C. : Fighting for Economic Survival. *The Statesman*, 2 April 1973 ; 6

HOWE (Russek Warren) : E.E.C. - Africa Trade Talks : Towards a wider concept of Aid. *The Statesman*, 10 Oct. 1973 ; 6

SAUL DIE (Malan M) : African Ministers to discuss ties with E.E.C. *The Hindustan Times*, 3 April, 1973 ; 7

India

EXPORTS IN 1974 : (India's export to Africa and other countries)
The Statesman, 30 Dec. 1973 ; 4

INDO-AFRICAN TRADE : (a review) *Indo-African Trade Journal*
(11 & 12), November-December 1973 ; 34-36

POINTS FROM Reports of India's Trade Representatives Abroad.
Economic Trends, 1 Oct. 1973 ; 23-24

TEXTILE MACHINERY for Africa and Far East. *Journal of*
Industry & Trade, 23 (12), Dec. 1973 ; 70-71

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

China

SHANTI SADIQ ALI : China's new Interest in Africa. *The Indian*
Express, 2 August, 1973 ; 4

TELANG (G.M.) : China's Africa Policy : A sharp Turn Towards
Moderation. *The Times of India*, 29 Dec. 1973 ; 6

France

SAULDIE (Madan M) : France-African relations. *The Hindustan*
Times, 4 Dec. 1973 ; 5

India

GUPTA (Aniruddha) : India & Africa. *Link*, 16(1), 15 August,
1973 ; 87-89

UNNA (Warren) : Swaran Singh calls for fair deal to Developing
Nations. *The Statesman*, 6 August 1973 ; 6

United Nations

JHA (S.K.) : The United Nations and Human Rights. *India*
Quarterly, 29 (3), July-Sept. 1973 ; 339-349

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

SINGH (J.D.) ; It's still a Bipolar World. *The Times of India*, 4 Dec.
1973 ; 4

LABOUR

SAULDIE (Madan M) : Philips Lisbon trip-plan angers Africans,
Labour. *The Hindustan Times*, 16 April 1973 ; 9

RAY (Sankar) : Employment : Snags in Third World. *Mainstream*
12 (10), 3 Nov. 1973 ; 11-12

Trade Union

SAULDIE (Madan M) : Organization of African Trade Union: journal. *The Hindustan Times* 26 April, 1973 ; 14

LITERATURE

ATTAR SINGH : Translation of Afro-Asian Literature. *Mainstream*, 12-(7), 13 Oct. 1973 ; 33-35

HANSCOM (Leslie) : Search for an African for Nobel Prize. *The Indian Express*, 28 August 1973 ; 6

PROBLEM OF RACE

NIHAL SINGH (S) : Racial Tension in Europe : Portents for Immigrant Workers. *The Statesman*, 6 Sept. 1973 ; 6

RACE WAR : *Patriot*, 29 April, 1973 ; 2

SAKIA (Arati) : A Season for Slaughter. *Democratic World*, 11(31), 2 April 1973 ; 7-9

REVOLUTION

DESAI (A.R.) : Two-Stages Theory of Revolution in the Third World. Need for its evolution. *Call*, 25 (3) November 1973 ; 5-9

POTHOLM (Christian P) : The International Transfer of Insurgency Techniques : Sub-Saharan Pathologies. *Africa Quarterly*, 13(2), July-Sept. 1973 ; 117-130

SOCIALISM

SANGAL (O.P.) : The Socialist System. *Indian Left Review*, 2(6), August 1973 ; 5-7

ALGERIA

AGRICULTURE

ASHFORD (Nicholes) : The Agrarian Revolution in Algeria. *The Statesman*, 9 Dec. 1973 ; 5

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

ATTAM PRAKASH : Anglo-Algerian Trade Prospects. *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 9(10), Oct. 1973 ; 25-27

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (By the Third Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Algiers. April 1973). *Indian Trade Journal*, 18 July 1973 ; B 173-B175

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Algiers. June 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 29 August, 1973 ; B613-B616

ANGOLA

LIBERATION MOVEMENT

POMIEROY (William J.) : British Support to Portuguese Imperialism (Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caetano's visits to London) *New Age*, 27 July 1973 ; B

POMIEROY (William J.) : MPLA Deals Telling Below Portuguese Colonialism. *New Age*, 8 July, 1973 ; 4

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

AGRICULTURE

ATTAR CHAND : Land Reforms in Egypt. *Mainstream*, 11(45), 7 July 1973 ; 27-28

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Cairo April-May, 1973 ; B563-568

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary, (Commercial), Embassy of India, Cairo. June 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 19 Sept. 1973 ; B853-B858

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Cairo. July-August, 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 7 November, 1973 ; B458-B560

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

PRESIDENT SADAT'S Peace Efforts : (Foreign Policy of Egypt) *Social Life*, 2(11), Nov. 1973 ; 17

India

MATAR (Janreel) : An Egyptian view of the Indian Experiment *Thought*, 25 (36), 8 Sept. 1973 ; 11-12

Libya

EGYPT AND LIBYA : (Union between Libya and Egypt) *The Statesman*, 1 August 1973 ; 4

- MESSAGE FROM TRIPOTI : (End of an incompatible partnership between Egypt and Libya) *The Statesman*, 6 Dec. 1973 ; 4
- MERGER MOVE : (Merger agreement between Egypt and Libya) *The Times of India*, 13 August 1973 ; 4
- SCARE FOR Cairo: (The Merger of Egypt and Libya) *The Indian Express* 11 July, 1973 ; 6
- SHOTGUN WEDING : (Merger of Libya and Egypt) *The Hindustan Times*, 21 July, 1973 ; 7
- UNENTHUSIASTIC UNION : (Union between Libya and Egypt) *The Statesman*, 1 August, 1973 ; 6
- UNITY MARCH or Invasion : (Merger of Libya and Egypt) *The Indian Express*, 23 July 1973 ; 6
- WHAT GADDAFY Means to Egypt (meeting between the two heads about the merger of Libya and Egypt) *Link*, 15 July 1973 ; 29

USSR

- ATTAR CHAND : Egypt-USSR Relations. *Link*, 1 July 1973 ; 3
- SASTRY (K.K.) : Egypt may abrogate treaty with Russia. *The Times of India*, 11 July 1973 ; 9

HISTORY

- SINGH (B) : The Onward March of Egypt-Under Sadat, 1970-73 *Social Life*, 2(8), August 1973 ; 21-22

SOCIOLOGY

Status of Women

- QAYYUM (Shah Abdul) : Women in West Asia—A case study of Egypt. (In Islam the honour and status due to women as human being and being the member of Social Community was acknowledged and granted with necessary protection of the Islamic law), *Islam and the Modern Age*, 4(3), August, 1973 ; 54-83

BURUNDI

PROBLEM OF RACE

- SAULDIE (Madan M) : Massacres in Africa : (Alleged massacres of Africans in Portuguese colony of Mozambique and in Burundi), *The Hindustan Times*, 30 July 1973; 7

COMMONWEALTH

CONFERENCES

Finance Minister Conference

NON-EVENT : (Commonwealth Finance Minister's meeting at Dar-es-Salaam) *Patriot*, 21 Sept. 1973; 2

Ottawa Conference

BLEAK OUTLOOK : (Ottawa Conference). *The Times of India*, 13 August 1973; 4

HOWIE (Russell Warren) : Africa's Targets : The Touchstone Issues at Ottawa (Commonwealth Conference at Ottawa), *The Statesman*, 28 August. 1973; 6

INDIA AND The Commonwealth : (32-nation Commonwealth Conference in Ottawa), *Thought*, 25 (32), 11 August 1973; 5

KAMATH (M.V.) : C'wealth bid for accord on Rhodesia. *The Times of India* 11 August. 1973; 1

KAMATH (M.V.) : C'wealth Overhauled at Ottawa. *The Times of India*, 12 August. 1973; 10

MORAES (Frank) : Whether C'wealth? (Ottawa Conference) *The Indian Express*, 4 August 1973; 6

UNNA (Warren) : The Commonwealth with the Times. *The Statesman*, 11 August. 1973; 4

WITHERING BONDS : (Ottawa Conference) *The Indian Express*, 10 August 1973; 4

EAST AFRICA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

India

RAMCHANDANI (R.R.) : Indian Emigration to East African countries During XIX and Early XX centuries. *Journal of the University of Bombay*, XLI (77), Oct. 1972; 166-188

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Problem of Asians

CLERK (Satyendra) : Asians in East Africa. *The Indian Express* 12 Sept. 1973; 6

GOPAL (Ajit S) : And now back to Kenya. (Asians Problem in Africa) *The Hindustan Times*, 1 Sept. 1973; 5

HEALTH SERVICES

DRUGS : Herbal Medicine in East Africa. *The National Herald*, 21 August 1973; 5

ETHIOPIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

ANANTHARAMAN (R) : Know your Market—Ethiopia (India's treaty with Ethiopia) *Foreign Trade Bulletin*, 4 (3), Sept. 1973: 1-4

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (By the First Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Addis Ababa. March-April 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 18 July 1973; B175-B176

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Addis Ababa. July 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 10 Oct. 1973; B97

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Addis Ababa, August-September 1973), *Indian Trade Journal*, 23 November 1973; B645-646

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

China

KAMATH (MV) : China offers arms aid to Ethiopia. *The Times of India*, 31 Dec. 1973; 5

SOCIOLOGY

Famine

SAULDIE (Madan M) : Ethiopia refutes reports of mass famine deaths. (famine in Ethiopia) *The Hindustan Times*, 5 Sept. 1973; 8

GHANA

CURRENCY

KOTHARI (M.M.) : Ghana's Currency : Coup de tats search : The Culprit. *Economic Studies*, 14 (1), July 1973; 69-72

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the

Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India in Ghana, Accra. September 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 21 November 1973; B601

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions of Ghana and Sierra Leone : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Ghana, Accra. August 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 24 Oct. 1973; B289

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

ISAACS (G.J.) : The Pre-Coup years in Ghana, 1962-66. *Africa Quarterly*, 13 (2), July-Sept. 1973; 105-116

GUINEA (Republic)

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

VISIT OF Delegation from Guinea : (Joint Director-General of the Guinea Bank of Foreign Trade paid a goodwill visit to India from November 15 to 21, 1973, and discussed with Minister of Steel and Mines and Commerce the wide scope of bilateral collaboration between the two countries) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (11), November 1973; 384-85

GUINEA BISSAU

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

Recognition

40 COUNTRIES Recognise Guinea—Bissau State. *New Age*, 7 Oct. 1973; 15

India

GUINEA-BISSAU : New Republic Marks significant Advance in Africa's Anti-imperialist struggle (Govt. of India on 7 October extended warmest greetings to the new Republic of Guinea-Bissau and announced its decision to establish relations with it) *People's Democracy*, 14 October 1973; 5

LIBERATIONS MOVEMENT

PEREIRA (Aristide) : Maria Pereira, successor of Amilcar Cabral, Secretary-General of PAIGC) *Patriot*, 1 Oct. 1973; 2

POMEIROY (William J.) : British support to Portuguese Imperialism

(Portuguese Prime Minister Marcello Caelano's visit to London)
New Age, 22 July 1973; 13

INDIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

GUPTA (A. Sen) : India's Foreign Trade After Devaluation. *Journal of Industry & Trade*, 23 (7), July 1973; 56-58

INDIA TO Promote Trade with Neighbours. *The Statesman*, 19 Nov. 1973; 7

MENON (K.S.V.) : Expanding Role of STC & MMTC in India's Foreign Trade. *Journal of Industry & Trade*, 23 (12) Dec. 1973; 61-65

POINTS FROM Reports of India's Trade Representatives Abroad. *Economic Trends*, 1 Oct. 1973; 23-24

RAUNAQ SINGH : Problems confronting India's Export Effort. *Foreign Trade Review*, 8 (2), Oct. Dec. 1973; 248-253

Africa

EXPORTS IN 1974 : (India's exports to Africa and other countries) *The Statesman*, 30 Dec. 1973; 4

INDO: AFRICAN TRADE : (a review) *Indo African Trade Journal*, 9 (11 & 12), November-December 1973; 34-36

IN THE Eyes of the Kenyan Press : (Indo-African Economic co-operation) *The Statesman*, 29 Nov. 1973; 6

TEXTILE MACHINERY for Africa and Far East : *Journal of Industry & Trade*, 23 (12), Dec. 1973; 70-71

Algeria

ATTAM PARKASH : Indo-Algerian Trade Prospects. *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 9 (10), Oct. 1973; 25-27

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Algiers. April 1973) *India Trade Journal*, 18 July 1973; B173-B175

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Algeria, May 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 8 August 1973; B393

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions: (by the Third

Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Algiers. June 1973),
Indian Trade Journal, 29 August 1973; B613-B616

Arab Republic of Egypt

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary Commercial), Embassy of India, Cairo. April-May 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 22 August 1973; B563-B565

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Cairo. June 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 19 Sept. 1973; B853-B858

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : by the Third Secretary (Commercial) Embassy of India, Cairo. July-August 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 7 November 1973; B458-560

Ethiopia

ANANTHA RAMAN (R) : Know your Market—Ethiopia (India's Trade with Ethiopia) *Foreign Trade Bulletin*, 4 (3), Sept. 1973; 1-4

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial) Embassy of India, Addis Ababa. March-April 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 18 July 1973; B175-B176

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Addis Ababa. July 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 10 Oct. 1973; B97

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary) (Commercial) Embassy of India, Addis Ababa. Aug. Sept. 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 28 Nov. 1973; B645-646

Ghana

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions of Ghana and Sierra Leone : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Accra, Ghana. August 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 24 Oct. 1973; B289-290

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India,

Ghana, Accra. Sept. 1973 *Indian Trade Journal*, 21 Nov. 1973; B601

Guinea (Republic)

VISIT OF Delegation from Guinea : (Joint Director-General of the Guinea Bank of Foreign Trade paid a goodwill visit to India in November 15 to 21, 1973 and discussed with the Minister of Steel and Mines and Commerce the wide scope of bilateral collaboration between the two countries) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (11), Nov. 1973; 384-85

Kenya

ANANTHARAMAN (R) : Know your Trade Kenya. *Foreign Trade Bulletin* 4 (5), November 1973; 1-4

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Nairobi. March-April 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 1 August 1973; B339-B342

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Nairobi. July 1973), *Indian Trade Journal*, 17 Oct. 1973; B181-184

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Nairobi. Aug.-Sept. 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 26 Dec. 1973; B854-857

Libya

NINAN (T.N.) Libya : A challenge to Indian exporters (Libya is leading for an economic boom. The discovery of oil has led to a colossal increase of revenue, and India's prospects for a chair in this prosperity are bright), *The Hindustan Times*, 7 August 1973; 9

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli. June 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 29 August 1973; B616-B618

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli. July 1973; B745-B746

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the

Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli. August 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 17 Oct. 1973; B184-186

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli. Sept. 1973 (*Indian Trade Journal*, 5 Dec. 1973; 693-694

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli. Oct. 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, Oct. 1973; B785-788

Nigeria

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary, High Commission of India, Lagos. April-May 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 15 August 1973; B-478-B480

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary, High Commission of India, Lagos. June-July 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 3 Oct. 1973; B18-20

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary, High Commission of India, Lagos. August 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 24 Oct. 1973; B290-294

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Acting High Commissioner, High Commission of India, Lagos. Sept. 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 12 Dec. 1973; B749-751

Sierra Leone

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions of Ghana and Sierra Leone : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Ghana, Accra. August 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 29 Oct. 1973; B289-B290

Sudan

INDO-SUDANESE Talks on Trade. Tomorrow : *Patriot*, 21 August 1973; 2

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial) Embassy of India, Khartoum, April 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 11 July 1973; B99-B101

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First

Secretary, Embassy of India, Khartoum. May 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 15 August 1973; B480-B482

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary, Embassy of India, Khartoum. July 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 10 Oct. 1973; B113-115

SUDAN OFFERED help in all fields : (Sudan and India talks on the possibilities of further cooperation in Trade and Commerce and economic fields in New Delhi on Thursday) *Patriot*, 22 August 1973; 8

Tanzania

REPORTS ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Dar-es-Salaam. March-April 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 18 July 1973; B176-B177

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Dar-es-Salaam. May-June 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 12 Sept. 1973; B740-B741

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Condition : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Dar-es-Salaam. July-August 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 14 November 1973; B552-B553

Rs. 50-CRORE INDIAN Credit for Tanzania : *Patriot*, 9 Dec. 1973; 1

SHARMA (R.K.) : Indo-Tanzanian Trade Relations. *Indo African Trade Journal*, 9 (8), August 1973; 31-33

Uganda

SHARMA (R.K.) : Trade Relations between India and Uganda. *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 9 (11 & 12) November-December 1973; 40-42

Zambia

INTEGRAL COACH Factory : Export of Coaches to Zambia. *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 9 (8), August 1973; 18-19

FOREIGN RELATION—(Political)

KAUL (T.N.) : India's Foreign Policy Objectives. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10 (20), 1 August 1973; 9 10

KAUL (T.N.) : Foreign Policy Basic Aims Vindicated, Strengthened.
Link, 16 (1), 15 August 1973; 61-63

KAUL (T.N.) : India's Foreign Policy Objectives. *Thought* 25 (32),
11 August 1973; 11-12

RAJAN (M.S.) : India's Foreign Policy in a Changing Framework.
Indian & Foreign Review, 10 (22), 1 Sept. 1973; 13-16

SANGAL (O.P.) : THE LAW of the Epoch (Indian and the world)
Indian Left Review, 2 (8), Oct. 1973; 3-7

Africa

GUPTA (Anirudha) : India and Africa. *Link*, 16 (1), 15 August
1973; 87-89

UNNA (Warren) : Swaran Singh calls for fair deal to Developing
Nations. *The Statesman*, 8 August 1973; 6

Egypt

MATAR (Jameel) : An Egyptian View of the Indian Experiment.
Thought, 25 (36), 8 Sept. 1973; 11-12

East Africa

RAMCHANDANI (R.R.) : Indian Emigration to East African
countries During XIX and Early XX centuries. *Journal of the
University of Bombay*, XLI (77). Oct. 1972; 166-188.

Guinea Bissau

GUINEA-BISSAU : New Republic Marks Significant Advance in
Africa's Anti-imperialist struggle (Govt. of India on 7 Oct.
extended warmest greetings to the new Republic of Guinea
Bissau and announced its decision to establish relation with
her). *People's Democracy*, 14 Oct. 1973; 5

Mozambique

DENOUNCE PORTUGUESE Crime : (Central Committee of the
Communist Party of India denounced the Portuguese colonia-
lists for the mass killings of African people in Mozambique)
People's Democracy, 29 July 1973; 7

SANTOS (Marcellino Das) : Mozambique Liberation is Advancing
on all Fronts. An exclusive Interview by Prabhat Dasgupta.
New Age, 18 November 1973; 12-13

Nigeria

RAY (Amal) : Decision-making and Federalising Process in India and Nigeria. *India Quarterly*, 29 (4), Oct.-Dec. 1973; 819-325

West Africa

SEN (Samar) : Explanation of India's vote on UN Draft Resolution on West Africa. (Text of Shri S. Sen's statement in Security Council made on 26 July 1973) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (7), 276-278

South West Africa

SAMAR SEN : Reiterates India's Support to Freedom-Fighters in Namibia. *Socialist India*, 8 (4), 22 Dec. 1973; 18

Sudan

INDIA AND The Sudan : (Text of speech delivered by Dr. Indu Prakash Singh, Ambassador of India, while presenting his letter of credence to the President of Sudan, on 10th July 1972) *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 9 (8), August 1973; 29-30

INDIAN OCEAN

MALAVIYA (K.D.) : Oil and the Indian Ocean. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10 (20), 1 August 1973; 16-17

PANIKKAR (K.M.) : Indian Ocean and US Naval Presence. *Mainstream* 12 (14) 1 Dec. 1973; 11-12

U.S. Surveillance of Oceans : *Link*, 1 July 1973; 15

KENYA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

ANANTHARAMAN (R) : Know your Trade Kenya. *Foreign Trade Bulletin*, 4 (5), November 1973; 1-4

CHABRA (Hari Sharan) : India's Journal Venture's Abroad (Afro-Asian Economic Cooperation) *The Statesman*, 29 Nov. 1973; 6

IN THE EYES of the Kenyan Press : (Indo-African Economic Cooperation) *The Statesman*, 29th Nov. 1973; 6

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Nairobi. March-April 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 1 August 1973; B339-B342

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Algeria. May 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 8 August 1973; B393

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial) High Commission of India, Nairobi. July 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 17 Oct. 1973; B181-184

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Nairobi. August-Sept. 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 26 Dec. 1973; B854-857

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Problem of Asians

MEISLES (Stanlay) : Kenya quit notice to 1,000 Asian Traders. *The Indian Express*, 21 August 1973; 5

LIBYA

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

CHATTERJEE (S.B.) : (Libya maintains hot pace on oil front. *The Statesman*, 20 August 1973; 6

MIXING OIL with Politics? Libyan government decision to nationalise the operation of US Oil Companies) *Capital*, (4282), 20 Sept. 1973; 1516-1517

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

NINAN (T.N.) : Libya : A challenge to Indian Exporters. (Libya is heading for an economic boom. The discovery of oil has led to a colossal increase of revenue, and India's prospects for a share in this prosperity are bright). *The Hindustan Times*, 7 August 1973; 9

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli. June 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 29 August 1973; B616-B618

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli, *Indian Trade Journal* July 1973; B745-B746.

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli. August 1973) *Indian*

Trade Journal, 17 Oct. 1973; B184-186

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli. Sept. 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 5 Dec. 1973; 693-694

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli. October 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, Oct. 1973; B785-788

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

Egypt

EGYPT AND Libya : (Union between Libya and Egypt. *The Statesman*, 1 August 1973; 4

MESSAGE FROM Tripoli : (End of an incompatible partnership between Egypt and Libya) *Statesman*, 6 Dec. 1973; 4

MERGER MOVE : (Merger agreement between Egypt and Libya) *The Times of India*, 13 August 1973; 4

SASTRY (K.K.) : Gaddafi accuses Sadat of unilateral action. *The Times of India*, 17 Nov. 1973; 5

SCARE FOR Cairo : (The merger of Egypt and Libya) *The Indian Express*, 11 July 1973; 6

SHOTGUN WEDDING : (Merger of Libya and Egypt) *The Hindustan Times*, 21 July, 1973; 7

UNENTHUSIASTIC UNION : (Union between Libya and Egypt) *The Statesman*, 1 August 1973; 6

UNITY MARCH or Invasion : (Merger of Libya and Egypt) *The Indian Express*, 23 July 1973; 6

WHAT GADDAFI Means to Egypt : (Meeting between the two heads about the Merger of Libya and Egypt) *Link*, 15 July 1973; 29

Malta

CHATTERJEE (S.B.) : Mintoff made Secret visit to Tripoli. *The Statesman*, 9 Sept. 1973; 6

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

SASTRY (K.K.) : Gaddafi's Absence from rally intriguing (Absence of Libyans leader from the military parade which worked the

fourth anniversary of the coup be staged against King Idris)
The Times of India, 3 Sept. 1973; 5

MADAGASCAR

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

SHANTI SADIQ ALI : Madagascar after French withdrawal. *The Indian Express*, 13 Sept. 1973; 4

MOZAMBIQUE

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

DENOUNCE PORTUGUESE Crime : (Central Committee of the Communist Party of India denounced the Portuguese colonialists for the mass killings of African people in Mozambique) *Peoples' Democracy*, 29 July 1973; 7

SANTOS (Marcellino Das) : Mozambique Liberation is Advancing on all Fronts. An Exclusive Interview by Prabhat Dasgupta, *New Age*, 18 November 1973; 12-13

LIBERATION MOVEMENT

AFRICAN MASSACRE : (Portuguese massacre of black Africans in Mozambique), *The Indian Express*, 20 July 1973; 6

A VILLAGE THAT Was : (400 men, women and children were slaughtered in the Mozambique village on Dec. 18th last year) *Link* 22 July 1973; 29

DENOUNCE PORTUGUESE Crime : (Central Committee of the Communist Party of India denounced the Portuguese colonialists for the mass killings of African people in Mozambique) *Peoples Democracy*, 29 July 1973; 7
(Genocidal Massacre of the Africans by Portuguese in Mozambique) *Commerce*, 21 July 1973; 103

MASSACRE AT Wiriyamu : (Portuguese forces killed more than 400 persons at Wiriyamu village of Mozambique on Dec. 16, 1972) *New Age*, 22 July 1973; 13

MASSACRE IN Mozambique : *The Hindustan Times*, 12 July 1973; 7

POMEIROY (William J.) : British Support to Portuguese Imperialism (Portuguese Prime Minister Marcellus Caetano's visit to London) *New Age*, 22 July 1973; 13

PORTUGAL AND The Mozambique Affairs : *Himmat*, 9(38), 20 July 1973; 10

PORTUGAL'S Crimes : (Atrocities by Portuguese in Mozambique) *The Indian Express*, 13 July 1973; 6

PORTUGUESE TROOPS Enact My Lai in Mozambique : *People's Democracy*, 22 July 1973; 9-10

SAKRAI (Lawrence J) : Freedom Struggle in Portuguese Mozambique. *Call*, 25(2), Oct. 1973; 18-20

SANTOS (Mercellino Das) : Mozambique liberation is Advancing on all Fronts. An exclusive Interview by Prabhat Dasgupta. *New Age*, 18 Nov. 1973; 12-13

SAULDIE (Madan M) : Massacres in Africa (Alleged massacre of Africans in Portuguese colony of Mozambique and in Burundi). *The Hindustan Times*, 30 July 1973; 7

NIGERIA

ECONOMY POLICIES

OKEDIJI (Francis Olu) : Socio-Economic and Demographic Aspects of Nigeria's Second National Development Plan, 1970-74 *Africa Quarterly*, July-Sept. 13(2), 140-151

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary, High Commission of India, Lagos. April-May 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 15 August 1973; B 478-B480

REPORT ON Economic and commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary High Commission of India, Lagos. June-July 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 3 Oct. 1973; B18-20

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions: (by the First Secretary, High Commission of India, Lagos, August 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 24 Oct. 1973; B290-294

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions: (by the Acting High Commissioner, High Commission of India, Lagos. Sept. 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 12 Dec. 1973; B749-751

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

India

RAY (Amal) : Decision-making and Federalising Process in India and Nigeria. *India Quarterly*, 29(4), Oct.-Dec. 1973; 819-825

NORTH AFRICA

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

Oil

ARAB OIL : *Patriot*, 5 Sept. 1973; 2

BHATT (V.R.) : New Arab Oil Policy Alarms Europe *The Hindustan Times*, 6 Sept. 1973; 5

CORINA (Maurice) : Move against Oil Giants: Gaddafi Holding the Trump Cards. *The Statesman*, 13 Sept. 1973; 6

DELAY IS Denial: (Oil Problem) *The Hindustan Times*, 6 Dec. 1973; 5

ENERGY CRISIS : *Indian Recorder & Digest*, 19(11), November 1973; 1-4

FINAL WEAPON : (Arab Oil As a Political Weapon) *The Times of India*, 20 Oct. 1973; 4

FUTURE ROLE of Nuclear Energy : (Arab oil producing countries have taken special measures to secure oil supplies to Africa and have given a mandate to Algeria to coordinate their action) *The Statesman*, 28 Dec. 1973; 4

HOWE (Russell Warren) : Arab Oil Strategy : Implications for the Third World. (Successful use of oil as a political weapon by the Arab States) *The Statesman*, 1 Dec. 1973; 4

KRIVINE (David) : The great oil blackmail. *Thought*, 25(42), 20 Oct. 1973; 7-8

LAL (M.B.) : The Oil Crisis : Is the Centre Moving in the wrong Direction ? *Capital*, (4287), 1 November 1973; 1773-1774

MORAES (Frank) : Oil and War. *The Indian Express*, 13 Dec. 1973; 6

NIHAL SINGH (S) : E.E.C. and the Oil Crisis : Waiting for a show of Unanimity, *The Statesman*, 26 Nov. 1973; 4

NIHAL SINGH (S) : E.E.C.'s Moment of Truth (E.E.C. Summit) on Oil Crisis) *The Statesman*, 14 Dec. 1973; 4

- NIHAL SINGH (S) : Libya's Oil Policy Worries Britain. *The Statesman*, 7 Sept. 1973; 6
- OIL : Portent Weapon in West Asia. *Young India*, 5(457), 18 Oct. 1973; 5-6
- OIL : The New World Problem, *Capital*, (4289), 15 November 1973; 1829-1831
- OIL AND WORLD Politics : *Peoples' Democracy*, 9(27), 14 July 1973; 5
- OIL AS Weapon. *Patriot*, 7 Sept. 1973; 2
- OIL BUYERS of Third World. Unit! *Thought*, 25(44), 3 Nov. 1973; 3
- OIL WARRIORS : *Democratic World*, 11(52), 27 Dec. 1973; 2
- OIL & WORLD Politics : *People's Democracy*, 9 Dec. 1973; 5 & 10
- POMEIROY (William J) : Arab Oil Squeeze hits Racist Regimes. *New Age*, 9 Dec. 1973; 14
- SARWER LATEET : The Energy Crisis : Cuckoo-Land Optimism in New Delhi. (debate in Parliament) *The Statesman*, 17 Dec. 1973; 4
- SAULDIE (Madan M) : Oil Against Apartheid (Oil Weapon used against the apartheid states might result in intensifying the problems of land-locked countries like Zambia, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland) *The Hindustan Times*, 11 Dec. 1973; 5
- SIMONNET (Philippe) : Hard Going for the West : Arab Oil Squeeze. *The Times of India*, 14 Dec. 1973; 4
- SINGH (J.D.): Energy Crisis hit Europe issue Before EEC. *The Times of India*, 12 Dec. 1973; 4
- THE POLITICS of Oil : From the foreign Press. *The Times of India*, 11 Sept. 1973; 4
- U.S. May use force to get Arab oil. *Patriot*, 13 Dec. 1973; 2
- USES OF OIL. *Democratic World*, 11 (37), 13 Sept. 1973; 2
- VERGHESE (Joseph) : All Arab Oil and the Third: The World over for it. *Young India*, 3(43) 4 Oct. 1973; 14818
- ZORZA (Victor) : Moscow told Arabs to use Oil Weapon. *The Statesman*, 30 Nov. 1973; 4

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

E.E.C.

NIHAL SINGH (S) E.E.C's Gesture of Peace to Arabs. *The Statesman*, 16 Dec. 1973; 1

Arab Israel Conflict

ARAB ISRAELI WAR : Some Amazing Consequences. *Thought*, 25 (517) 22 Dec. 1973; 4-5

FRAGILE CEASEFIRE (West Asian War) *New Age*, 11 Nov. 1973; 2

ISRAEL ATTACKS Again : *New Age*, 14 Oct. 1973; 2

ISRAELI ZIONIST Aggression : *Peoples' Democracy*, 14 Oct. 1973; 1

JAURA (Ramesh) : West Asian War. *Young India*, 3(50) 22 Nov. 1973; 7-8

KHAN (Masood Ali) : West-Asian Situation and Arab Communist Parties. *New Age*, 2 Dec. 1973; 5

MADARIAGA (Salvador de) : Antidote to the West Asia Crisis. *Thought*, 25(29), 8 Dec. 1973; 7-8

MADARIAGA (Salvador de) : The Fourth Civil War. *Thought*, 25 (44), 3 Nov. 1973; 6

MISRA (Panchanan) War and Politics in West Asia, *Young India*, 3 (45), 18 Oct. 1973; 6

MUKHERJEE (Sadhan) : Israel Ignites Flames of War Again, *New Age*, 14 Oct. 1973; 1 & 15

QURAISHI (Zaheer Masood) : Conflict and Resolution in West Asia. *India Quarterly*, 29(4), Oct.-Dec. 1973; 347-357

SADAT'S FUTURE : (West Asian War Policy) *Thought*, 25(49), 8 Dec. 1973; 6 & 20

WAR IN Middle East : (Arab Israel War) *Capital*, (4285), 18 Oct. 1973; 1667

Peace Move

BRIGHTER THAN Ever Before : (Security Council's debate on Arab-Israeli conflict. The Int. Peace Conference held for the development in world power politics and to sum up the West Asian question) *Link*, 8 July 1973; 30-31

ARAB-ISRAELI WAR and Peace : *Call*, 25 (3) November 1973; 4

DAS GUPTA (Prabhat) : World Congress of Peace Force opens up New Perspectives for Anti-Imperialist Action, Peace, Security and Economic Advance' *New Age*, November 1973;

INVESTMENT FOR Peace : (Arab-Israel War) *Democratic World* 11 (43), 25 Oct. 1973; 1-2

KHAN (Masood Ali) : New Dimensions in struggle for peace : World Congress of Peace Forces in Moscow. *New Age*, 4 Nov. 1973; 10

KHAN (Masood Ali) : West Asia and Chile on Agenda of Peace Meet : Struggle Against Imperialism. *New Age*, 21 Oct 1973; 14

MIDDLE EAST : After The Cease-Fire. *Capital*, (4287) 1st November 1973; 1762-1763

MUKHERJEE (Sadhan) : Anti-Soviet canard and the Reality : West-Asian Ceasefire. *New Age*, 11 Nov. 1973; 11

MUKHERJEE (Sadhan) : Arab-Israel Peace Talks in Geneva. *New Age*, 23 Dec. 1973; 15

WEST ASIAN Peace Despite the Non-Aligned. *Thought* 25 (43), 27 Oct. 1973; 3

World Opinion

Africa

NEW THESIS (President Sadat's new move to mobilise all Arab resources for direct struggle against Israel *Link*, 16 (3), 26 August 1973; 29

SASTRY (K.K.) : Gaddafi accuses Sadat of unilateral action. *The Times of India*, 17 Nov. 1973; 5

China

PEKING IN West Asia : *Mainstream*, 12 (9), 27 Oct. 1973; 30

WEST ASIA Explodes Chinese Design : gap between Maoist Words and Deepds. *New Age*, 28 Oct. 1973; 12

Germany

JAURA (Ramesh) : Turning Paint in Bonn's West Asia Policy. *Young India*, 3 (31), 12 July 1973; 11-13

India

ALL SUPPORT To Arab Fighters : (text of the statement issued by

- the Polit Bureau of CPI (M) in Calcutta on 12 Oct. 1973)
Peoples' Democracy, 21 Oct. 1973; 3
- CORRECT STAND : (India's stand on W. Asian question) *Patriot*,
2, August 1973; 2
- CPI Statement of West Asian War : *New Age*, 14 Oct. 1973; 10
- INDIAN'S SUPPORT To Arab Cause re-stated : *Patriot*, 26 Nov.
1973; 12
- NAMBOODRIPAD (E.M.S.) : West-Asia Blows Up. "New Phase"
Claim. *People's Democracy*, 18 Nov. 1973; 5
- SOLIDARITY BODY Condemns Israeli Attacks : (The Delhi Peace
and Solidarity Organization condemned the Israeli aggression
in its meeting on Wednesday) *The Statesman*, 11 Oct. 1973; 12
- SWARAN SINGH Reiterates Support to Arabs. *The Statesman*, 26
Nov. 1973; 4
- WEST ASIA : India's Stake. *Mainstream*, 12 (8), Oct. 1973; 4-6
- WEST ASIA and Indian Secularism. *Thought*, 25 (42), 20 Oct. 1973;
3-4
- WHAT NEW Delhi can do : (India's support to West Asian formula
which could create the atmosphere and conditions in which
peace can be brought within reach) *The Statesman*, 20 Oct.
1973; 4

USSR

- ATTAR CHAND : USSR and the Middle East. *Link*, 15 July 1973;
3
- KAMATH (M.V.) Soviet Walk-out in Security Council (over Israeli
bombing on Damascus) *The Times of India*, 11 Oct. 1973; 5
- KHAN (Masood Ali) : USSR Denounces Israeli Attack on Arab
Lands. *New Age*, 14 Oct. 1973; 14

United Nations

- SEN (S) : Statement at Security Council on West Asia (on 25th July
1973) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (7), July 1973; 274-276
- SUMANT (Sheila) : The Controversial U.N. Resolution 242.
Freedom First, Dec. 1973; 6-7
- THE SECURITY Council and West Asian War : *Swarajya*, 18 (16),
20 Oct. 1973; 7

United States

A SCENARIO For U.S. Intervention in West Asia *Peoples' Democracy*, 11 Nov. 1973; 3

ISRAEL FLOUTS West Asia Accord : *New Age*, 18 Nov. 1973; 14

MUKHERJEE (Sadhan) : U.S.A. Main Culprit in setting W. Asia Afame. *New Age*, 4 Oct 1973; 7

U.S. Out to Escalate West Asia War : *Peoples Democracy*, 21 Oct. 1973; 9

Palestine Problem

A HOME in Palestine : *Democratic World* 11 (42), 18 Oct. 1973; 8-9 and 18

COMMUNIQUE OF the Palestinian People's Congress : (The Congress held in Cairo from April 6-10 1972) *Indian Left Review*, 2 (10), Dec. 1973; 56-60

GALAL EL-RASHIDI : The Palestine Factor in the Arab-Israel conflict. *Indian Journal of Politics* 6 (W), July-Dec. 1972; 1-8

PALESTINIAN CONFLICT : The Background. *Thought*, 25 (42), 20 Oct. 1973; 6

World Opinion

India

A.C. Twenty Five Years of Palestine Liberation Movement and India. *Young India*, 2 (50), 23 Nov. 1972; 14-15

AHMAD (Syed Brakat) : India and Palestine 1896-1947 : The Genesis of a Foreign Policy. *India Quarterly*, 29 (4), Oct.-Dec. 1973; 300-307

United Nations

ATTAR CHAND : Some Aspects of Palestine Problem : Palestine in the UNO. *Call*, 24 (11), July 1973; 15-19

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

OIL USED as a political weapon *see also* commerce and Industry.

REGIONAL COOPERATION

Arab Unity (Algiers Conference)

ALGIERS WARNING : (Arab Summit in Algiers) *Patriot*, 30 Nov. 1973; 2

CHOPRA (V.D.) : The Developing Arab Unity (A new power circle of Egypt, Syria, Algiers and other Arab countries) *Link*, 16 (1), 15 August 1973; 71-73

DECLARATION OF Arab Summit Conference : (Text of the Summit Conference held at Algiers, Nov. 26-28. Translated from French) *Socialist India*, 8 (3), 15 Dec. 1973; 22 and 28

SASTRY (K.K.) Arab Summit bid to revive eastern front. *The Times of India*, 11 Oct. 1973; 5

RHODESIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

Commonwealth

KAMATH (C) Wealth bid for accord on Rhodesia) *The Times of India*, 11 August 1973; 1

United Kingdom

RHODESIA ; The British game. *Link*, 15 July 1973; 28-29

Zambia

ZAMBIA FIGHTS BACK Racist Blackmail : (Zambia-Rhodesia border dispute *Peoples Democracy*, 9 (4), 28 July 1973; 11

GOVERNMENT & POLICIES

HOW (Russell Warren) : Moves on Rhodesia-I : Health Faces United Commonwealth Front. *The Statesman*, 15 July 1973; 8

HOW (Russell Warren) : Moves on Rhodesia-II : Prospects of a Join-U.S.—Soviet Approach. *The Statesman*, 16 July 1973; 6

SIERRA LEONE

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions of Ghana and Sierra Leone : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Ghana, Accra. August 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 24 Oct. 1973; B289-B290

SOUTH AFRICA

APARTHEID

(Apartheid) : *Democratic World*, 11 (437), 25 Oct. 1973; 10

(Apartheid) : *Democratic World*, 11 (48), 29 Nov. 1973; 10

CHARIS and SIMON : Students and National Struggle—South Africa. *Mainstream*, 11 (50), 11 August 1973; 23-25

S. AFRICA : Intensification of Anti-Apartheid Struggle. *Peoples' Democracy*, 15 July 1973; 10

SAULDIE (Madan M) : Oil Against Apartheid (Oil weapon used against the apartheid states might result in intensifying the problems of land-locked countries like Zambia, Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland) *The Hindustan Times*, 11 Dec. 1973; 5

SHANTI SADIQALI : Contradictions of apartheid. *The Indian Express*, 5 July 1973; 6

SNUB TO Apartheid : *The Hindustan Times*, 6 Oct. 1973; 5

SOUTH AFRICAN Communist Party Appeal for World Solidarity with South African Workers (Massive struggle against Apartheid regime) *New Age*, 5 August 1973; 12

TAMBO (O.R.) Prisoners of Apartheid. *Mainstream*, 11 (47), 21 July 1973; 26-28

YOUNGHUSBAND (Peter) : Black power in S. Africa. *The Indian Express*, 21 August 1973; 4

HOW (RUSSELL WARREN) : S African Defence : Military Build up in Namibia. *The Statesman*, 23 October, 1973; 6

EDUCATION

FIGHTING APARTHEID From within (the boycott of South African Universities from the Commonwealth Universities Congress to be held in Edinburgh) *Link*, 29 July 1973; 33-34

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

Commonwealth

PRASU RAM (T.V.) : Wealth for majority rule in South Africa *Indian Express*, 12 August 1973; 1

South West Africa

SOUTH AFRICA'S Withdrawal from Namibia : *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10 (22) 1 Sept. 1973; 89

United States

ROLL OF U.S.A. in South Africa : *Young India*, 3 (31), 12 July 1973; 14-15

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

AFRICA : A Threat from the South. *Century*, 10 (30) 25 November 1972; 6

LABOUR

WAGES OF Apartheid : South Africa's Black Workers. *Democratic Would*, 11 (28), 12 July 1973; 9

SOUTH WEST AFRICA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

India

SAMAR SEN : Reiterates India's Support to Freedom-Fighters in Namibia. *Socialist India*, 8 (4), 22 Dec. 1973; 18

South Africa

SOUTH AFRICA'S Withdrawal from Namibia : *Indian & Foreign Review*, 10 (22), 1 Sept. 1973; 8-9

SUDAN

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

INDO-SUDANESE Talks on Trade Tomorrow : *Patriot* 21 August 1973; 2

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial) ? Embassy of India, Khartoum. April 1973 *Indian Trade Journal*, 11 July 1973; B49-B101

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary, Embassy of India, Khartoum, May 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 15 August 1973; B480-B482

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary, Embassy of India, Khartoum, July 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 10 Oct. 1973; B113-B115

SUDAN OFFERED held in all fields : (Sudan and India talks on the possibilities of further cooperation in trade and commerce and economic fields in New Delhi on Thursday) *Patriot*, 22 August 1973; 8

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

India

INDIAN AND The Sudan : (Text of speech delivered by Dr. Indu

Prakash Singh, Ambassador of India, while presenting his letter of credence to the President of Sudan on 10th July 1972) *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 9 (8), August 1973; 29-30

United States

MEHMOOD MUKHTAR : American Shadow over Sudan *New Age*, 30 Dec. 1973; 13

TANZANIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Dar-es-Salaam. March-April 1973) *Indian Trade Journal* 18 July 1973; B-176-B177

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Third Secretary (Commercial) High Commission of India, Dar-es-Salaam. May-June 1973) *Indian Trade Journal*, 12 Sept. 1972; B747-B748

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Dar-es-Salaam. July-August 1973), *Indian Trade Journal*, 14 November 1973; B552-B553

Rs. 50 CRORE INDIAN CREDIT for Tanzania : *Patriot*, 9 Dec. 1973; 1

SHARMA (R.K.) Indo-Tanzanian Trade Relations, *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 9 (8), August 1973; 31-33

UGANDA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

SHARMA (R.K.) : Trade Relations between India and Uganda. *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 9 (11 & 12), November-December 1973; 40-42

FOREIGN REALTIONS—(Political)

U.S.S.R.

ARMS FOR Amin : (Visit of Russian General to Uganda caused

speculation that President Amin might be securing Soviet arms)
The Times of India, 20 Nov. 1973

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Coup Attempt

SRINIVASN (Padma) : Uganda's Malaise—An Attempt at Coup
Analysis. *Africa Quarterly*, 13 (2), July-Sept. 1973; 86-104

Problem of Asians

AMIN'S LATEST : *The Times of India*, 6 July 1973; 4

LIFE IN UGANDA : (Asian Problem) *The Hindustan Times*, 27
Nov. 1973; 9

LISTOWEL (Judith) : The Dangerous Data. *The Statesman*, 2 Sept.
1973; 12

MALHOTRA (Inder) : Brown Britons of Africa. (Asian Problem in
Uganda) *The Times of India*, 30 Sept. 1973; 4

TROUBLE : (Mr. Swaran Singh said than Uganda is to pay com-
pensation for the seized properties of Uganda Asians) *Patriot*,
11 August 1973; 2

SOCIOLOGY

WEST AFRICA

Famine

DROUGHT IN Western Africa : *Link*, 5 August 1973; 27-28

ZAMBIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

INTEGRAL COACH Factory : Export of coaches to Zambia. *Indo-
African Trade Journal*, 9 (8), August 1973; 18-19

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

Rhodesia

ZAMBIA FIGHTS BACK Racist Blackmail : (Zambia-Rhodesia
Border Problem) *Peoples' Democracy*, 9 (4), 28 July 1973; 11

SOCIALISM

HOW (Russell Warren) : Zambian Leadership code : Ideals of Self-
Imposed Poverty. *The Statesman*, 27 Dec. 1974; 4

PUBLICATIONS INDEXED

| | | |
|--|-------|-----------|
| 1. Africa Quarterly | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 2. Amity | (M) | New Delhi |
| 3. Arbitration Quarterly | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 4. Bhagirath | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 5. Blitz | (W) | Bombay |
| 6. Bulletin | (M) | Madres |
| 7. Capital | (W) | Calcutta |
| 8. Call | (M) | Delhi |
| 9. Century | (W) | New Delhi |
| 10. Commerce | (W) | Bombay |
| 11. Communicator | (F) | New Delhi |
| 12. Co-operator | (M) | New Delhi |
| 13. Cultural Forum | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 14. Cultural News from India | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 15. Democratic World | (W) | New Delhi |
| 16. Eastern Economist | (W) | New Delhi |
| 17. Eastern Journal of International Law | (Q) | Madras |
| 18. Economic Affairs | (M) | Calcutta |
| 19. Economic and Political Weekly | (W) | Bombay |
| 20. Economic Trends | (F) | New Delhi |
| 21. Economic Studies | (M) | Calcutta |
| 22. Focus on Peace Proposals | (S-A) | New Delhi |
| 23. Foreign Affairs Record | (M) | New Delhi |
| 24. Foreign Affairs Reports | (M) | New Delhi |
| 25. Foreign Affairs Bulletin | (W) | New Delhi |
| 26. Foreign Trade Bulletin | (M) | New Delhi |
| 27. Foreign Trade Review | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 28. Forum | (M) | Bombay |


Publications Indexed

| | | |
|---|-------|-----------|
| 29. Freedom First | (M) | Bombay |
| 30. Frontier | (W) | Calcutta |
| 31. Gandhi Marg | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 32. Gandhi Sangrahalaya | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 33. Himmat | (W) | Bombay |
| 34. Hindustan Times | (D) | New Delhi |
| 36. India Quarterly | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 36. Indian Archives | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 37. Indian Economic Review | (S-4) | Delhi |
| 38. Indian Economic & Social History Review | (Q) | Delhi |
| 29. Indian Express | (D) | New Delhi |
| 40. Indian Finance | (W) | Calcutta |
| 41. Indian Horizons | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 42. Indian Journal of International Law | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 43. Indian Journal of Politics | (S-A) | Aligarh |
| 44. Indian Journal of Public Administration | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 45. Indian Journal of Social Work | (Q) | Bombay |
| 46. Indian Labour Journal | (M) | New Delhi |
| 47. Indian Left Review | (M) | New Delhi |
| 48. Indian Political Science Review | (H-Y) | Delhi |
| 49. Indian Recorder & Digest | (M) | New Delhi |
| 50. Indian Trade Journal | (W) | Calcutta |
| 51. Indian & Foreign Review | (F) | New Delhi |
| 52. Indo-African Trade Journal | (M) | New Delhi |
| 53. Indo-British Review | (Q) | Madras |
| 54. Institute for Deference Studies and Analysis Journal | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 55. International Journal of Contemporary Sociology | (Q) | Gaziabad |
| 56. International Studies | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 57. Islam and the Modern Age | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 58. Islamic Culture | (Q) | Hyderabad |
| 59. Janata | (W) | Bombay |
| 60. Journal of Asiatic Society | (Q) | Bombay |
| 61. Journal of Asiatic Society | (Y) | Calcutta |
| 62. Journal of Industry and Trade | (M) | New Delhi |
| 63. Journal of Oriental Research | | Madras |
| 64. Journal of the Oriental Studies | | Baroda |

Publications Indexed

| | | |
|--|------|------------|
| 65. Journal of the Consitutional & Parliamentary Studies | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 66. Journal of the Gujarat Research Society | (Q) | Bombay |
| 67. Journal of the Indian Law Institute | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 68. Journal of the Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy of Administration | (Q) | Mussoorie |
| 69. Journal of the National Academy of Administration | (Q) | Mussoorie |
| 70. Journal of Parliamentary Information | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 71. Journal of the University of Bombay | (Y) | Bombay |
| 72. Link | (W) | New Delhi |
| 73. Literary Criteria | (Q) | Bombay |
| 74. Literary | (HY) | Mysore |
| 75. Mainstream | (W) | New Delhi |
| 76. March of the Nation | (W) | New Delhi |
| 77. Modern Review | (M) | Calcutta |
| 78. New Age | (W) | New Delhi |
| 79. New Frontiers in Education | (Q) | Delhi |
| 80. Niti | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 81. Organise | (W) | New Delhi |
| 82. Patriot | (D) | New Delhi |
| 83. People's Democracy | (W) | Calcutta |
| 84. Quarterly Review of Historical Studies | (Q) | Calcutta |
| 85. Quest | (Q) | Bombay |
| 86. Seminar | (M) | New Delhi |
| 87. Social Action | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 88. Social Scientist | (M) | Trivandrum |
| 89. Socialist Digest | (Q) | Bombay |
| 90. Socialist India | (W) | New Delhi |
| 91. Socialist Perspective | (Q) | Calcutta |
| 92. States | (F) | New Delhi |
| 93. The Statesman | (D) | New Delhi |
| 94. Swarajya | (W) | Madras |
| 95. The Times of India | (D) | New Delhi |
| 96. Thought | (W) | New Delhi |
| 97. Weekly Round Table | (W) | New Delhi |
| 98. Yojana | (F) | New Delhi |
| 99. Young India | (W) | New Delhi |

11 JUN 1975



Documentation List

Contents

| | |
|---------------------------------|---------|
| 1. Africa General | 79—86 |
| 2. Algeria | 86—87 |
| 3. Angola | 87 |
| 4. Arab Republic of Egypt | 87—88 |
| 5. Burundi | 88 |
| 6. Commonwealth | 89 |
| 7. East Africa General | 89—90 |
| 8. Ethiopia | 90 |
| 9. Ghana | 90—91 |
| 10. Guinea Republic | 91 |
| 11. Guinea Bissau | 91—92 |
| 12. India | 92—98 |
| 13. Indian Ocean | 98 |
| 14. Kenya | 98—99 |
| 15. Libya | 99—101 |
| 16. Madagascar (Malaghasy) | 101 |
| 17. Mozambique | 101—102 |
| 18. Nigeria | 102—103 |
| 19. North Africa General | 103—109 |
| 20. Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) | 109 |
| 21. Sierra Leone | 109 |
| 22. South Africa | 109—111 |
| 23. South West Africa (Namibia) | 111 |
| 24. Sudan | 111—112 |
| 25. Tanzania | 112 |
| 26. Uganda | 112—113 |
| 27. West Africa General | 113 |
| 28. Zambia | 113 |
| 29. Publications Indexed | 115—117 |

**Africa Quarterly
is Available in
MICROFORM
from....**


Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road,
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
(313) 761-4700

PLEASE WRITE FOR
COMPLETE INFORMATION

"Articles appearing in this journal
are indexed by ABC POL SCI :
Advance Bibliography of Contents :
Political Science and Government".

**Riviera Campus, 2040 Alameda
Padre Serra, Santa Barbara,
California 93103-USA**

PLATE I





Vol. XIV Nos. 3 & 4 1974

AFRICA QUARTERLY

Pluralistic Structures and Development Criteria

Dr. R. R. Ramchandani

Revenue Allocation in Cameroon

Dr. Wilfred A. Ndongko

The Sona and the British South Africa Company

Dr. David Chanaiwa

India and Africa

Dr. Vijaya Gupta

Africa Through Indian Eyes

Pakeeza Sultan

AFRICA QUARTERLY

Volume XIV

NUMBER : THREE & FOUR



Combined Issue for No. 3 &
4 of Vol. XIV Covering
October - December 1974
and January - March 1975.

INDIAN CENTRE FOR AFRICA
ICCR, Azad Bhavan, Indraprastha Estate,
New Delhi-110001

AFRICA QUARTERLY

PUBLISHER

Smt. SOONU KOCHAR

EDITOR

DR. VIJAYA GUPTA

Editorial Advisory Board

Dr. Anirudha Gupta, *Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.*

Prof. Daleep Singh, *University of Delhi, Delhi.*

Prof (Miss) A.J. Dastoor, *University of Bombay, Bombay.*

Prof. C.P. Bhambhri, *Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.*

Shri B.H. Zaidi, *National Herald, Delhi.*

Africa Quarterly is published Quarterly every January, April, July and October by The Indian Centre for Africa ICCR Azad Bhavan, New Delhi-110001.

The views expressed in the articles are the author's and not necessarily those of the Indian Centre for Africa.

Contributions

African quarterly welcomes contributions on African Affairs from scholars for publication in the Journal. The objective of these contributions should be promotion of knowledge about Africa and better understanding between the peoples of India and Africa.

Manuscript should be type-written with double spacing and be in the form in which the authors wish them to appear in print. The right of editing the articles is vested with the Editorial Board. The original, as well as a carbon copy of the article, along with a summary of not more than 300 words should be submitted to the Editor. Contributors are, in their own interest, advised to retain a copy of their article as unpublished works will not be returned.

The authors are advised to include footnote material wherever possible. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively throughout the article. Bibliographical references should give the author's last name, date and place of publication and specific pages. Articles may be illustrated with line drawings and maps, classified as figures, to be submitted in final form (except size). Tables, if included in the text, should replace it and not duplicate it.

All editorial correspondence and manuscripts, including book reviews, should be addressed to the Editor. Africa Quarterly, Indian Centre for Africa, I.C.C.R., Azad Bhavan, New Delhi 110001.

Subscriptions

All cheques and bank drafts for subscription and payment of Africa Quarterly should be drawn in the name of Editor, Africa Quarterly, ICCR, Azad Bhavan, New Delhi.

Subscription (India) Rs. 20 per annum
Single Copy Rs. 6

Subscription (Foreign)

By Sea Mail \$ 7 or £3

By Air Mail \$ 14.5 or £5.10

© Contents Copyright

AFRICA QUARTERLY

- 5 Pluralistic Structures and Development Criteria : A case of
Sub-Saharan African Economies.
Dr. R.R. Ramchandani
- 22 Revenue Allocation in Cameroon under the Federal System
Dr. Wilfred A. Ndongko
- 35 The Shona and the British South Africa Company in Southern
Rhodesia, 1890-1896.
Dr. David Chanaiwa
- 64 India and Africa (A Quarterly chronicle for January
December 1974)
Dr. Vijaya Gupta
- 92 Africa Through Indian Eyes—A Documentation list (January-
June 1974)
Miss Pakeeza Sultan

Our Contributors

- | | |
|-----------------------|---|
| Dr. R.R. Ramchandani | Reader, Programme of Area Studies, University of Bombay, Kalina Campus, Kalina, Bombay-29 |
| Dr. Wilfred A Ndongko | Assistant Professor of Economic Faculty of Law and Economics, University of Yoomide, Cameroon. |
| Dr. David Chanaiwa | Assistant Professor, Department of His- tory, San Fernando Valley States College, California, US. |
| Dr. Vijaya Gupta | Editor, Africa Quarterly, Indian Centre for Africa, New Delhi. |
| Miss Pakeeza Sultan | Incharge, Indian Centre for Africa Library, New Delhi. |
-

Dr. R. R. Ramchandani

Pluralistic Structures and Development Criteria : A Case of Sub-Saharan African Economies

THIS paper aims at analysing pluralistic characteristics of the sub-Saharan African economies and discuss development criteria suited to that situation. Ever since Professor Boeke raised the question of the need for a separate economic theory for the dualistic economies of the Eastern Countries, many economists and other social scientists have had a closer look at the dual character of the Asian and African economies. The names of Professors Benjamin Higgins, J.S. Furnival, Henry Leibenstein, S. Ellis, A. O. Hirschman, Leo Kuper, Hilda Kuper, Arthur Lewis and Gunnar Myrdal readily come to mind in this connection.¹ In case of African economies it goes to the credit of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa to conduct in recent years some depth studies into the structures and resource endowment of different African regions as well as several individual African countries. While the need for further economic studies in this regard is duly stressed by the UNECA, its findings with regard to plural character of African economies deserve our attention.

Dualism in Underdeveloped Countries

However, before we go into the UNECA's findings, it will be useful to define dualism in the context of underdeveloped economies of Asian and African countries. By dualism we generally mean the presence within the country a modern exchange system along side a traditional economic system. According to Professor Hirschman "dual" character of underdeveloped countries as often noted would mean the existence of hyper modern "side by side with the traditional, not only in techniques of production and distribution, but also in attitude and in ways of living and of doing business". It is

suggested that most of the developing countries present some form of this model. In the Asian situation Professor Boeke refers to social dualism which he defines as "...the clashing of an imported social system with an indigenous social system of another style. Most frequently the imported is high capitalism. But it may be socialism or communism just as well, or a blending of them . . . the essence of social dualism is the clash between an imported and an indigenous social system of divergent character".³ This dualism according to Boeke is a "...form of disintegration (which) came into existence with the appearance of capitalism in pre-capitalist countries".⁴

In his critique of Boeke's dualistic theory Professor Benjamin Higgins rejects Boeke's findings with regard to sharp contrast between the two "full grown" social systems—the traditional and the modern—and asks : Where does one find a "full grown" capitalism side by side with a "full grown" pre-capitalist society with nothing in between. He, however, agrees that "some degree of 'dualism' certainly exists in underdeveloped areas. In most of them, it is possible to discern two major sectors ; one which is largely native, in which levels of technique, and levels of economic and social welfare are relatively low ; and another, usually under western leadership and influence, in which techniques are advanced, and average levels of economic and social welfare are relatively high".⁵ But, he recognises that distinctions are not sharp, are becoming less sharp and are not immutable. These are, then, some of the general characteristics of 'dual economies' whether one looks at the Asian situation or the African situation. But, one of the purposes of this paper is to search broad distinction between the 'pluralistic' character of African economies—particularly those lying south of the Sahara' and those of the eastern economies. That is important for two reasons :

(i) To bring home a point that even though the two regions are similar in the matter of having 'dual or rather plural' economies, yet there are some fundamental points of distinction between the 'plural' characteristics of the two.

(ii) It will be helpful when we discuss development criteria for African economies.

Plural character of Asian Economies

It need to be mentioned that in the eastern economies the traditional sector is not to be taken as coterminous with the subsistence sector in the sense that there is no surplus production for sale, or that the exchange is incidental and marginal. Before the colonial era, many Asian countries could compare their level of technology and quality of production with the then most advanced countries of Europe. Myrdal writes : "In quality and variety of products as well as production techniques, large parts of the region may even have been somewhat in advance of the West".⁷ Its arts and crafts, technology and science, its internal trade as well as maritime trade, its literature and philosophy could in no way be ranked behind that of the West ; and going still further in the past the historians record that when European countries had yet to breakthrough the vicious circle of self-contained structure of their societies, many Asian societies had already developed the necessary institutional and value framework and achieved the requisite technological breakthrough to evolve a sizable exchange sector. But, then as the maxim goes 'growth breeds growth and stagnation breeds stagnation'. Later, when the eastern societies were caught in the grip of stagnation, their decay was further accelerated by their colonisation when the colonial powers prescribed for them the role of "hewers of wood and drawers of water". There is no doubt that the colonial domination of the East was essentially due to its economic and social stagnation caused by the decay of its institutional framework which was unable to quickly adjust and adapt to new challenges from outside, but it is in vain to suggest that the colonial structuring had nothing or little to do with further decay of these societies setting back the clock of their economic advancement which they were bound to set in motion had they been left free to adjust their values, attitudes and institutions to the requirements of the technological development achieved in the West. I maintain this on two counts : (i) The history of colonial policy in this country as also in the other Eastern and African countries provides ample evidence that the metropolitan countries were primarily concerned with the welfare and economic advancement of their own peoples rather than the colonial peoples, and that they were positively interested in their own industrial advancement, rather than colonial advancement on this account.

While this is a negative factor which does not necessarily justify saying that but for such colonial policies the Eastern societies would have achieved the industrial advancement of much higher order in the wake of their developing contact with West. But, there is some evidence of that, too. (ii) This could be seen in the remarkable economic enterprise shown by the people of Indian, Chinese or Indonesian origin wherever they went outside their countries, and whenever they were allowed comparatively a free hand in the economies of the countries they went to. Even when the indentured labourers and coolies were initially recruited for the purposes of working on European plantations as in the Union of South Africa, Mauritius, Fiji etc, or railway construction as in Uganda ; and even though such immigrants belonged to the lower strata of Indian society, but as soon as they completed their terms of contract and were allowed to operate with little more freedom, many of them soon emerged as successful traders and skilled personnel and some even became big merchants. Those who emigrated as traders and professions also recorded remarkable progress, for example, the Asians in the East African countries. This kind of success of the emigrants may be explained by some in terms of the challenge which the emigrants face in new countries where the economic factor all of a sudden goes skyhigh in their scale of social value, but this is also because the people of Indian or for that matter Chinese origin, were well acquainted with the mechanism of exchange economy in their countries of origins, and had, therefore, little problem in their economic adjustment to the new environment. Hence, they made faster and greater progress than the indigenous peoples of those countries.

This is why, I believe, that the Western enterprise under capitalist drive and new techniques of production in the wake of industrial revolution, together with the colonial policies, dictated largely by the consideration of metropolitan development, were in many ways responsible for the decay of rural communities alongwith the decay of indigenous handicrafts and techniques of production in the Eastern countries. This led to the lopsided development and the emergence of present variety of traditional sector which uses different production function as distinct from that of the advanced sector.⁸ It is dominated by feudal attitudes towards commerce and industry. "There, as in Europe generations ago" writes Higgins,

“the gentleman does not sully his hand in trade”.⁹ The traditional sector in the Asian countries could therefore, be further sub-divided into two sectors : 1. Subsistence sector, and (ii) Traditional Monetary Sector. Similarly, the third sector which could be termed as Advanced Monetary Sector, may also be sub-divided into two sectors namely indigenous advanced sector and foreign enclave. Thus, in the Asian situation, there are four sectors : (1) Subsistence Sector ; (2) Traditional Monetary Sector ; (3) Indigenous Advanced Sector ; (4) Foreign Enclave. By subsistence sector we mean that part of the economy in which exchange is marginal and incidental, depending upon the availability of a marketable surplus, and not the primary objective of economic activity. The traditional monetary sector may be defined as one in which marketable surplus is not incidental or marginal, but neither is it totally governed by some mores and values as obtained in the advanced monetary sector. The concepts like economic profitability, technological perfection in terms of capital/output ratio, modern methods of organisation and market management are largely left to the advanced sector—hyper modern, while the traditional monetary sector continues to imbibe some of the old values of the society and is generally concerned with small-scale and cottage scale operation and uses different production function which is labour-intensive as against capital-intensive production function associated with the advanced sector.

Plural character of African Economies.

Let us now take up the case of African economies. In the African societies, mainly sub-Saharan territories, exchange economy has emerged as a more consistent feature during the present century. In the period before the western contact, exchange system was largely unknown to the mass of the people. In some societies to which it was evolved, say parts of West Africa—Ghana, Mali and Songhai ‘empires’—and portions of eastern Africa—Zimbabwe and Kilwa ‘Kingdoms’—it was still highly elementary based mostly on barter and primitive accounting. The impact of their contact with the ‘meghrab’, i.e. North African countries and other Arab and Asian countries had as yet been experienced only at fringes of the sub-Saharan African societies and had remained mostly peripheral. Nor had the early Western contact been fruitful. On the contrary during the long period from the 16th to the 19th century the Western influ-

ence had resulted in such a large-scale slave trade that at the end of its four-century span the African societies were left with a total mess and utter confusion so that there was hardly any trace of exchange system which could be attributed to the genius of African enterprise or collective African social will. What had survived were the self-contained rural African communities based on subsistence production.

The Western political dominance of African countries, therefore, followed as a matter of course. It has been during the period of such dominance and contact, roughly coinciding with the partition of Africa in the early 1880s that we have witnessed the capitalist drive guided and operating chiefly under western leadership. That has been the *raison d'être* for the new pattern of socio-economic system of many African countries, one of the most significant features of which has been the dual or rather plural character of their economic structure as we shall shortly see.

We, thus, see that before the European colonisation, as seen above, and even before the ushering of slave trade in the 16th century "the traditional economies of the continent were basically organised for the need and with the resources of self-contained rural communities".¹⁰ These subsistence economies were characterised by three related features like : (1) Lack of regular production of a surplus; (2) Lack of specialisation on a significant scale; and (3) stationary technology. The growth of exchange economy based on legitimate trade soon resulted in a two-tier economy in which subsistence economy worked side by side with money economy.

In the sub-Saharan African economies the self-contained traditional sector is not characterised by the same kind of feudal attitudes as found in the Eastern societies, and nor had this sector experienced, before the European impact, the agricultural techniques, handicraft and cottage production comparable to that in the Asian countries. In that sense the dualistic structures of the sub-Saharan economies presents a sharper case in point and could be suggestively denoted as composed of "subsistence sector" and modern 'money sector' : There is little scope for sub-dividing the subsistence economy into two — i.e. "subsistence sector" and "traditional monetary sector" as we did with the Asian economies. But, in the African conditions we would do well to sub-divide "money economy" into two sectors

as a UNECA Study¹¹ does. The study refers to the plural character of sub-Saharan economies as 'a specific salient feature' of those economies. In Northern Africa this feature is less apparent and the situation there is more comparable to the Asian economies. Describing the sub-Saharan economies, the study explains the situation thus: "The economic system of Africa may be divided into two sectors — the modern sector and the traditional sector ... However, close consideration of the African situation leads to the further conclusion that in fact we are dealing here not with a dual system but with a case of plural economies and societies. The first duality has been mentioned above and the second duality arises out of the fact that the economy (and society) is divided into two other sectors, namely, the indigenous (national) sector and the non-indigenous (non-national or non-African) sector which may be devoted, also suggestively, as the foreign enclave. The latter sector is inherently related to the money economy. The economy should then be divided into three sectors, namely, (1) subsistence, (2) indigenous money economy, and (3) foreign enclave, thus presenting a plural economy".¹²

Almost 75 per cent of the population of sub-Saharan African countries are placed under subsistence sector, the gross income per capita of which amounted on an average to US \$ 30-32 during the period 1950-1967. A little more than 8 per cent of this income was monetised. The indigenous population belonging to money economy had a substantially higher per capita gross income which during the period 1950-1967 grew from around US \$ 90 to some US \$ 125 of which some 12 per cent was subsistence income. However, in terms of share in the gross domestic product, the dominant sector in such pluralistic economies is neither the subsistence sector nor the indigenous money sector, although they between themselves occupy 98 per cent of the total population. It is the foreign enclave sector, composed of non-Africans and foreign (non-African) corporate business. It is that sector which during 1950-1967 accounted for some 41 per cent share of the gross income and 55 per cent share in the gross money income of the sub-Saharan countries excluding the Union of South Africa). In 1950 its share in gross income was 26 per cent and in gross money income some 42 per cent. Thus, its grip on the economy further tightened during the first development

decade. It is suggestive of the fact that even though the colonial system — which was the harbinger of striking asymmetries in the distribution of income, particularly money income, came to a formal halt around early 1960s yet its structures and philosophy persisted and have been according to the UNECA study “reorganised into new forms of exploitation, called ‘neo-colonialism’ a name which fairly well defines the inherent values”. It is then such pluralistic structures of the sub-Saharan countries that we have to bear in mind while discussing the development criteria suited to the sub-Saharan African situation.

Development Criteria

In such a situation, development was highly conditioned by the functioning of the foreign enclave which had become the prime-mover of money economy. For instance, between 1950-60 the rate of growth of foreign enclave in the countries south of the Sahara was spectacular 11 per cent per annum and the growth rate of the economy as a whole was 6.3 per cent p.a. With the political uncertainties of the early 1960s—independence leading to the emergences of African regimes etc.—the growth rate of foreign enclave declined to 3.5 per cent p.a. during 1960-1967. It immediately resulted in the declining rate in the growth of whole economy from 6.3 per cent 3 per cent p.a. It may be pointed out that during the two decades—1950s and 1960s—the gross income of the African population in monetary sector (25 per cent of the total population) grew at the rate of around 2.1 per cent (3.3 per cent p.a. during the fifties, and declining by 0.2 per cent during the sixties).

It will, therefore, be seen that throughout this period the foreign enclave hardly helped in the process of the transformation of the economy. It neither cut into the subsistence economy in any significant way, nor widened the scope of indigenous money economy which largely stagnated. As such the proportion of the African population in the subsistence sector to that in the money sector remained almost totally unaltered as we find from the table on page 13.

This then is the worst aspect of stagnancy in the African economies. Even when some African economies experienced quite vigorous growth rates, that did not help the national money sector in register-

TABLE I
Developing Africa : Population in the Subsistence Sector

| | Population in the subsistence sector per cent | | | Rate of growth of the subsistence sector population per cent p.a. | | Rate of growth of the total popu- lation per cent p.a. | |
|-----------------------|--|------|------|--|---------|---|---------|
| | 1950 | 1960 | 1967 | 1950-60 | 1960-67 | 1950-60 | 1960-65 |
| Developing Africa | 59 | 59.1 | 59.1 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.1 | 2.4 |
| Sub-Saahran Africa | 74.9 | 74.3 | 74.4 | 2 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.5 |

Source : UNECA, Some features of Development in Africa
F/CN. 14/INR/183

(a) i.e. excluding south Africa.

Notes : Data for Northern Africa have been available only for
Sudan .

ing higher rate of growth of population within its borders than the rate of growth of population as a whole. While the foreign enclave prospered in the colonial or neo-colonial situation, the indigenous African population benefited very little excepting that there was a little improvement in the per capita gross income of the African population in the money economy which in terms of index rose from 100 to 142 between 1950-1967, although during the sixties the per capita income of the indigenous population in money income totally stagnated. This, is despite the fact that the foreign enclave in this period was growing at the rate of 3.2 per cent per annum, the gross domestic product rose at the rate of 2.8 per cent p.a. and the per capita rate of growth of the whole population was rising by 0.4 per cent p.a.

In such conditions the question that perturbs the mind is : Development for whom? Can we or shall we define development in terms of crude increase in the G.D.P. per capita without considering the increase in the gross income of the indigenous population, which we have described above as national sector. Since the development of national sector has to be the chief motivation and main

objective of all planning by the national African governments, it is useless and unrealistic to suggest that the economists should be valued neutral in the matters of the goals of economic activity as suggested by some. From the national point of view any exercise conducted without keeping in view the national good, i.e. the good of the indigenous population will be an exercise in futility. Gunnar Mardal rightly reminds: Our research interests, the particular approach we choose, the course we follow in drawing inferences and organizing our findings are not determined by facts and logic alone".¹³ At other place he prescribes: "... the student should feel bound not to select his value premises arbitrarily. They should be chosen because they are both relevant, in that they reflect actual valuation held by people who are concerned with problems being studied, and significant, in that these people are influential in moulding public policy".¹⁴ If such considerations were ignored "It might be sufficient for the accomplishment of development" as the UNECA study rightly puts it: "to expand only the foreign enclave by an influx of non-African immigrants and by injection of foreign capital but the impact of such expansion of the indigenous population might be negligible". In these circumstances the question of income distribution between national and non-national sector is as important as the question of the rise in the GDP per capita. The crux of the problem is to work out suitable set of goals which takes care of both the aspects and also to formulate suitable indices to see that the development effort is recording due progress on the prescribed lines. What could then be the set of goals and indices of observation. The UNECA study has worked out the following criteria.¹⁵

- (1) The money economy expands in real terms;
- (2) The growth rate of the indigenous population in the money economy is faster than the growth rate of the total population;
- (3) The foreign enclave's share in the income declines in relative terms.

The idea implicit in the above criteria is that the money economy should expand in real terms but the rate of expansion should be faster in the indigenous money economy than in the foreign enclave. Further to that, there should be increase in the rate of flow of the people from the subsistence sector into the

indigenous money economy, and that the increase in the flow rate should be significant to account for the higher rate of growth of population in the indigenous monetary sector than the growth rate of the population as a whole. The expectations is that with the faster expansion of money economy (in terms of both population and per capita income level) its impact on the subsistence sector will grow still further. There will be, a growing feed back effect which at present cannot be quantified, e.g. expressed in terms of an accelerator.¹⁶ Since this pattern was largely realised by the Northern African countries, during the 1st development decade, the study considers it a workable proposition for the sub-Saharan countries during the second development decade. The following table shows for the period 1950-1960 and 1960-1967 the rate of growth of the

TABLE II
Developing Africa^a : Growth Pattern and the Behaviour of
Foreign Enclave

(Constant Prices)

| | Foreign Enclave's Share in Gross Income | Rates of Growth (per cent p.a. 1950- 1960) Foreign Enclave ^b Economy ^c | | Foreign Enclave's share in Gross Income (in per cent) 1960 | Rates of Growth (per cent p.a. 1960 & 67 For. Encl ^b Whole ^c Economy | | Foreign Enclave's share in Gross Income (per cent) 1967 |
|--|---|---|-----|---|---|-----|---|
| Developing Africa ^a | 41 (53) | 6.3 | 4.8 | 47 (58) | 1.3 | 4 | 33 (39) |
| Northern Africa ^a | 59 (61) | 2.8 | 3.7 | 60 (62) | 9.7 | 5.4 | 22 (22) |
| Developing Africa South of the Sahara ^a | 26 (42) | 11 | 6.3 | 40 (54) | 3.5 | 3.0 | 41 (55) |

Source : UNECA, *Some Features of Development in Africa*
E/CN. 14/INR/183 16 Apr. 1971

Notes : ^a Excluding South Africa

^b In terms of gross income

^c In terms of GDP at Factor Cost

^d Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, U.S.R.

G.D.P. and the foreign enclave and the share of foreign enclave in the Gross Income of Northern Africa and developing Africa south of the Sahara.

It is observed that in the sub-Saharan Africa, development has been highly dependent upon the role of the foreign enclave, the decline or rise in the growth rates of the whole economy largely following the decline or rise in the growth rates of the foreign enclave. Same has, however, not been the case in Northern Africa. There, too, the position was almost similar during 1950s. When the rate of growth of foreign enclave was 2.8 per cent and that of the economy almost coincided with it, but it is suggested by the UNECA study that "Basic policy change occurring late in the fifties and early in the sixties, the core of which was (though not in all countries) a kind of discrimination against the foreign enclaves — at least in its colonial form — resulted in the acceleration of development from a meagre 2.7 per cent p.a. in the fifties to a spectacular 5.4 p.c. p.a. in the sixties. Although mining sector (hydro carbons) was mainly responsible for this acceleration in the rate of growth yet other sectors also fared well as seen from table III.

TABLE III
Developing Africa : Production Sectors Contribution
to the Rate of Growth (in per cent per annum,
factor cost, constant prices)

| Sector | All Developing Africa | | Northern Africa | | Developing Africa South of the Sahara | |
|-----------------------|-----------------------|----------|-----------------|----------|---------------------------------------|----------|
| | 1950-'60 | 1960-'67 | 1950-'60 | 1960-'67 | 1950-'60 | 1960-'67 |
| Agriculture | 3.0 | 0.7 | 1.3 | 1.1 | 4.6 | 0.4 |
| Mining | 0.4 | 1.6 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 0.3 | 1.0 |
| Manufacturing | 1.4 | 1.7 | 1.0 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 1.6 |
| Total Economy | 4.8 | 4.0 | 2.7 | 5.4 | 6.3 | 3.0 |
| Total (except Mining) | (4.4) | (2.4) | (2.3) | (3.0) | (6.0) | 2.0 |
| Population | 2.1 | 2.4 | 2.2 | 2.4 | 2.0 | 2.5 |

*Source : UNECA, Some Features of Development in Africa
F/CN. 14/INR/183, 16 Apr. 1971, Table 6.*

It is found that apart from the mining sector, manufacturing also showed vigorous growth trend during the first development decade and accounted for nearly 2 per cent of the 5.4 per cent rate of growth of the total economy, as against 1 per cent during 1950-'60.

On the basis of above analysis, three observations of the UNECA study, which deserve to be quoted : 1. Its major conclusion is that "... the African societies have actually benefited very little from the presence of the prospering foreign enclave of the colonial or neocolonial type."¹⁷ (2) "As long as the presence of foreign enclave in its traditional colonial form is accepted by African economies, their development will be limited by its nature."¹⁸

(3) "...the decline in relative share of income occurring in the foreign enclave will, in most cases, be a symptom of development; this is not to say, however, that positive measures to reduce the income of the foreign enclave will bring about development."¹⁹

From the above it will be seen that the sub-Saharan economies need not collapse with the declining role of foreign enclave in generating growth. On the other hand the development loses much of its meaning if there is excessive dependence on the foreign enclave and it does not help significantly in the advancement of the indigenous African population as such. The next question is how best to widen the share of indigenous monetary sector in the gross income and reduce that of the subsistence sector and foreign enclave.

Systematic Pattern

To achieve that, it will be necessary to bring to the fore the process of interaction between the money and subsistence economies. This issue is central for the understanding of the internal functioning of the system as a whole. Exogenous factors, like changes in terms of trade, or in the flow of capital from abroad have a bearing on the fate of the system. But the interaction among the components of the developing economic system have at least an equally significant impact on its future. The UNECA study suggests that this aspect of the problem demands deeper probing and requires experimentation with a method of analysis which makes possible the synthesising of the three divergent economies into a systematic pattern.

The question arises how the Northern African countries were able to achieve or, say, were comparatively more successful in achieving this synthesis, while the sub-Saharan countries failed? How do we explain further entrenchment of foreign enclave in the sub-Saharan economies during the two and a half decades since the second world war—the period in which the colonial governments generally behaved more responsibly in the matter of their duty towards the development of the territories and the people under their charge; and since early 1960s when the national governments had already taken over the reins of governments in their hands? Can we explain this by a reference to the nature of pluralistic structures of the Northern African economies as distinct from the sub-Saharan economies? It is important to find out this so that the development criteria as outlined above also takes care of that.

Missing Links

To me it appears that the plural character of the Northern African economies U.A.R., Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco—bear greater resemblance to the Asian situation in that they, too, like Asian economies possesses a sizable exchange sector under traditional economy as also an indigenous advanced sector. In such a structural framework, if the economy is boosted up due to a favourable situation in one or more of the production sectors at it happened in Northern African countries where Mining sector provided the booster during the 1960s—then the results are likely to percolate fast to all the sections of the people in money economy. And with the national governments ready to back up the claims of the indigenous population as against those of foreign enclave, both the traditional monetary sector and indigenous advanced sector record faster progress, while the foreign enclave contracts. This is what really happened in the Northern Africa but did not and still does not happen in Africa south of the Sahara. Professor Higgins in his critique of Professor Boeke's "social dualism" in the Eastern societies maintains that: "In many oriental villages there are only two classes: rich and poor. Nothing approaching more or less continuous gradation of modes of life found in the West exist in such villages. There is no lower middle, middle-middle, and upper-middle class through which to move,

and a single jump from lower to upper class occurs very rarely, and is hard to imagine, apart from political upheavals".²⁰ Prof. Higgins seems to be thinking of peasant-zamindar, peasant-big farmer situations in many south Asian countries. But as we are aware, this is not an entirely correct picture in the rural areas today and still less so in the urban countries. Although rich landlords, capitalists and princes in the Asian condition constitute a class by themselves which is akin to monopoly capital' class, and it is indeed a rare feat to jump from the lower to this upper class, but within the so categorised "lower class", there is a smooth upward moving curve. It must, however, be mentioned that in the Asian situation apart from the conspicuous wealth generated in the "monopoly capital" sector, each step of the income ladder it is so much crowded that those placed a step lower have virtually to push their way up. This generally happens after climbing a few steps. The stagnancy in this situation arises out of highly pressing unfavourable land/people ratio within a given technological factor. Here the development depends not jolely on the technological-cum organisational breakthrough, but also on limiting the population within reasonable limits at least till the economy takes off.

It is the African environment south of the Sahara which presents the problem of wider gaps between the subsistence and indigenous monetary sector, and again between the indigenous monetary and foreign enclave sectors. It is here that the continuous gradation of modes of life have never been there. It is therefore, in those economies that there is an urgent need to see that over a well defined period of time they develop a sizable traditional monetary sector as also advanced in indigenous sectors in their respective economies.

Need for Afro-Asian Cooperation

And it is the working out of these sectors and their smooth development that there is an urgent need for forging closer cooperative links between the sub-Saharan and the Asian and Northern African economies with a view to the transfer of technology of that variety which the local sub-Saharan economic situation warrants. Since some Asian countries like India have already achieved some success in developing intermediate level of technology it could be of

direct relevance to the need of sub-Saharan economies in the matter of the development of small-scale industries as a part of the indigenous money economy. Similarly, the Indian or rather Asian type large-scale manufacturing industry might be helpful to develop in African countries indigenous advanced monetary sector. That could help bridge up the wide gap between foreign enclave economy and the indigenous money economy. Whereas today the sale of wage labour has been the major agency for the African entry into the money economy, successful operation of small-scales and large-scale manufacturing industry as a product of Afro-Asian cooperative effort could soon add to the enterprising faculty of an African entrepreneur, and provide new sources of finance and enterprise from within the national sector. Definitely the leading development inducing sector of today and of the nature is the manufacturing industry. But, it is the kind of manufacturing industry that need to be developed and the nature of technology required, that there lies the urgency of much greater Afro-Asian economic cooperation than what has been achieved thus far.

FOOTNOTES

1. Boeke, J.H. *Economics and Economic Policy of Dual Societies*, 1953 ; Higgins, Benjamin, *Economic Development*, 1959, and "Economic Development of Underdeveloped Areas Past and Present", *Economiedan Keunaeen Indonesia*, Dec. 1954, "The Dualistic Theory of Underdeveloped Areas", *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Jan. 1966 ; Furnivall, J. S., *Netherland India: A study of Plural Economy*, Cambridge 1939 ; Leibenstein Harvey, "Technical Progress, the production Function and Dualism", *Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review*, Dec. 1960 ; Ellis, S. "Dual Economics and Progress", *Revista de Economia Latin Americana*, 1962 ; Hirschman A.O., "Investment Policies and Dualism in Underdeveloped countries", *American Economic Review*, Sept. 1957 ; Lewis A.W., *Theory of Economic Growth*, 1955, and "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour," *The Manchester School*, May 1954 ; Kuper Lee and Smith, M.G. (Eds) *Pluralism in Africa*, 1969 ; Myrdal Gunnar, *Asian Drama : An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations*, 1968

2. A.O. Hirschmen, "Investment Policies and Dualism in Underdeveloped Countries", *American Economic Review*, Sept. 1957, p. 557

3. Boeke, *op. cit.*, p. 4

4. Boeke, "Three Forms of Disintegration in Dual Societies", *Indonesia* Vol. 7, No. 4, April 1954, p. 282

Pluralistic Structures and Development Criteria

5. Higgins, Benjamin, "A Critique of Boeke's 'Dualistic Theory' in Maier, Gom, *Leading Issues in Development Economics*, p. 61

6. "Dualistic Development" in *Ibid.*, p. 85

7. Myrdal *op. cit.* p. 453

8. Production function in the traditional sector is characterised by variable technical coefficients of production, labour is relatively abundant so that techniques of production are labour-intensive. In contrast advanced modern sector is characterised by fixed technical coefficients, and the production processes are relatively capital intensive.

9. Higgins in *Leading Issues, op. cit.*, p. 63

10. U.N., Dept. of Economic Affairs, *Structure and Growth of selected African Economies*, N.Y., 1958. p. 1

11. UNECA, *Some Features Development in Africa*

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9

13. Myrdal, *op. cit.* p. 6.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 49

15. *Some Features of Development in Africa, op. cit.*, p. 16

16. *Ibid.*, p. 24

17. *Ibid.*, p. 13

18. *Ibid.*, p. 10

19. *Ibid.*, p. 18

20. Higgins in *Leading Issues op. cit.*, p. 64

Dr. Wilfred A. Ndongko

Revenue Allocation in Cameroon under the Federal System

I. Introduction

It has been pointed out in the literature on fiscal federalism that "imbalance in the allocation of functional responsibilities and financial resources between the central and regional governments is characteristic of all federations."¹ Although this is true, the absence of a well specified formula of revenue allocation between the federal and State governments to enable them execute those functional responsibilities, can generate disaggregative forces which may lead to the instability of any federation.

To this extent, the former Cameroon Federation existed for eleven years without any rationale criteria for allocating revenues between the Federal and State governments. It is in the light of this unsatisfactory situation, that this paper will be devoted to examining how the system of revenue allocation in the Cameroon Federation operated; with a view to suggesting some principles on which the division of revenue between the different tiers of government in old and new federations could be based.

To this end, therefore, the paper will be divided into seven sections. Section II is a general introduction to the former Federal Republic of Cameroon. In Section III, an examination of the pre-Federation governmental financial situation with respect to the former Federated States of East and West Cameroon is undertaken. Section IV looks at the constitutional provisions relating to the division of financial responsibilities and revenue sharing between the Federal and State Governments. In Section V, the 'ad hoc' system of revenue allocation and its evolution is analysed. Section VI is concerned with a critical appraisal of the revenue allocation

system. In Section VII, some principles that can be followed in reaching a formula for future allocation of revenue are suggested. The concluding remarks are made in Section VIII.

II. The Former Cameroon Federation

The Federal Republic of Cameroon was formed on October 1, 1961. It was composed of two states—East Cameroon, formerly known as French Cameroon, and West Cameroon, which was the former Southern Cameroons under the United Kingdom Trusteeship. French Cameroon became independent first, on January 1, 1960, as the Republic of Cameroun, and later on in 1961, the British Southern Cameroons reunified with the new Republic. At the same time the British Northern Cameroons joined Nigeria.

The Cameroon Federation was the direct result of the plebiscite conducted by the United Nations in both the southern and northern sections of the British Cameroons on February 11 and 12, 1961. Faced with the choice whether they preferred union with Nigeria or with the Republic of Cameroon, voters in the Northern Cameroons opted to join Nigeria while those in the Southern Cameroons voted overwhelmingly to join the new Republic.² The figures for the plebiscite³ were as follows:

| | |
|---|----------|
| Southern Cameroons: for Cameroon Republic— | 235,571 |
| for Nigeria | — 97,741 |
| Northern Cameroons : for Cameroon Republic— | 97,659 |
| for Nigeria | —146,296 |

III. Pre-Federation Governmental Financial Situation

In order to understand, the magnitude of the financial needs of each State at the time of Federation, it will be pertinent to examine the financial situation of former West and East Cameroon. To this end, the absence of a strong financial foundation for the State of West Cameroon was one of the elements that produced a reunification movement in that State. This was because before 1954 when West Cameroon was administered as an integral part of the Federation of Nigeria, no separate budgetary or public accounts were maintained for the former.

Government revenues from West Cameroon were included without any distinction in the budget of Nigeria as a whole and

expenditures were allocated to it, not on the basis of need but on the basis of a general criterion that was applied to the various regions of the Nigerian Federation with which it was administratively and economically integrated.⁴ As a consequence when West Cameroon became a separate administrative unit in 1954, a fiscal commission studying the financial implications of the change reported that the State could not be viable without external financial assistance although large surpluses were claimed to have accrued to the territory some six years prior to separation. In fact, the budget of West Cameroon during the first financial year 1955-56. showed a deficit of about £286,000 (197,912,000 francs CFA).⁵

Consequently, the Federal Nigerian government constitutional grant was instituted with a view to paying to the West Cameroon government every penny (sterling) which that government (Nigerian) got from the territory and did not expend on Federal services in that territory.⁶ This system of revenue allocation was deemed more adequate and satisfactory to the West Cameroon than that applied to the Eastern Region of Nigeria. Apart from the constitutional grant, a special advance of £300,000 was also earmarked for West Cameroon.

In regard to capital expenditures in West Cameroon, the Nigerian Federal government made significant contributions towards the operation of this item of expenditure. Financial allocation by the Nigerian government averaged £300,000 per annum between 1955 and 1958.⁷ The development and construction of road network in the West Cameroon also depended heavily on financial support from Nigeria. In this respect, the 1959 Economic Programmes of the Nigerian Federation earmarked an additional sum of £1,200,000 for the completion of the Victoria-Bamenda road.⁸

With respect to East Cameroon, this state notwithstanding the greater diversity of its economy, a higher per capita income of 30,000 francs as compared to 18,000 francs for West Cameroon and a relatively larger budget than that of West Cameroon, (10,000 million francs as against 1,800 million francs), it had its own financial needs and problems too. Indeed, the post-war development of that State was accompanied by heavy doses of both French public and private capital investments much more than Nigeria and Britain together had invested in West Cameroon. For example, during

the first decade of the trusteeship rule in East Cameroon, France contributed some 71.5 billion francs CFA (\$286 million U.S.) towards the budgets of that State—over 95% of the total government expenditures.⁹ In particular, during the period 1946-1958, France contributed some 77 billion French Francs towards the capital budget of East Cameroon.¹⁰

In addition to direct French public aid, there was also investment by para-public agencies such as the Bureau de la Recherche des Petrole, which poured 5 billion francs into East Cameroon during the same period. Furthermore, private investment in that State from France was about 2 billion French francs.¹¹

An analysis of the total French public capital flows to East Cameroon, and which (including private investment) represented more than 10% of the GDP of that State, during the entire Trusteeship period is presented in Table I.

TABLE I
French Aid to East Cameroon, 1950-1958 (in million French Frs)

| Year | Metrop. Budget.* | French Treasury | FIDES | CCFOM | BRP | Total |
|--------|---------------------|--------------------|--------|--------|-------|---------|
| 1950 | 2,570 | — | 25,841 | 3,222 | — | 31,633 |
| 1951 | 1,248 | — | 7,721 | 2,060 | 180 | 11,209 |
| 1952 | 2,246 | — | 3,873 | 3,454 | 217 | 9,419 |
| 1953 | 1,925 | — | 7,772 | 3,393 | 253 | 13,343 |
| 1954 | 2,188 | 780 | 4,731 | 14,359 | 398 | 22,447 |
| 1955 | 2,504 | 1,259 | 8,509 | 3,355 | 1,536 | 17,154 |
| 1956 | 3,432 | 2,506 | 6,817 | 2,009 | 1,080 | 15,843 |
| 1957 | 8,632 | 1,393 | 7,084 | 3,924 | 775 | 21,809 |
| 1958 | 8,792 | 2,000 | 4,997 | 318 | 454 | 16,560 |
| Total | 33,545 | 7,938 | 76,956 | 36,094 | 4,874 | 159,426 |
| Grants | 33,545 | — | 56,428 | — | 4,874 | 94,847 |
| Loans | | 7,938 | 20,547 | 36,094 | | 64,579 |

Source : Kjeil Anderson, *op. cit.*, (Passim)

Assuming that the heavy doses of French public and private capital accounted for the rapid rate of economic growth in East Cameroon, then the maintenance of that rate of development was much dependent on the continuous flow of French aid, even after

independence and reunification. However, the increasing disapproval from the French tax payers that France's economy could not stand the strain of such a philanthropy, led to a drastic reduction of the French contribution towards the first East Cameroonian prepared budget in 1958. As a consequence, it was balanced only after capital expenditures were cut back.

But this action was only for an interim period, for France continued her generous policy towards East Cameroon even after independence. For example, her contribution to the 1960 Cameroonian budget was about 600 million CFA in the first three months,¹² twice the amount in the year before independence. In addition to the normal budgetary subsidy, a special grant was given (*Aide Exceptionnelle du Budget*) which amounted to some 1.3 billion francs CFA for the whole fiscal year. The total French aid to East Cameroon in 1960 was about 3.2 billion francs CFA.¹³ In fact by 1965, when French budgetary subsidies ceased, France's aid to East Cameroon had reached nearly \$80 million (U.S.).¹⁴

In view of the foregoing analysis of the background to the public finances of the Federated States of West and East Cameroon and the extent of their dependence on foreign aid, it is clear that the Cameroon Federation had to depend heavily on external assistance. Adequate finances had to be provided in order to meet the increasing needs of the less developed State of West Cameroon.

This meant the establishment of a proper and rational allocation system of both domestic and external resources between the Federal and State Governments, so that problems arising from the Federation could be immediately arrested, particularly in West Cameroon where a disruption of the pattern of production and trade had taken place. Furthermore, the reunification of East and West Cameroon implied a drastic change in the financing of West Cameroon capital and recurrent expenditures, since that State left the Sterling zone to enter the Franc zone and had to revise its new revenue sources and expenditures in the context of the new Federation.

IV. Federal Constitutional Provisions :

Under any kind of federal system the division of legislative and executive powers, economic and social responsibilities between the

various tiers of government is carried by means of bargaining process which leads to the fashioning of the constitutional provisions and instruments designed to enable each government carry out its own functions. To this end, therefore, the provisions of a federal constitution relevant to economic policy and development are those which define the allocation of fiscal and financial powers between federal and State governments and in some cases indicate the extent of the extreme control and guidance of the economy by the former. These constitutional provisions, which are an essential part of the political bargain that is struck when a federation is established, go to ensure that no tier of government affects the federation or any individual State's economic destiny, independently.

However, in the case of the Cameroon Federation, it is surprising to note that little was mentioned in the Federal Constitution of 1961 regarding finances and in particular, revenue allocation between the different tiers of government. Rather, Article 5 (8) empowered the Federal Government to regulate "Currency, the Federal Budget, Taxation and other Revenue to meet Federal expenditure." This was a wide, although necessary mandate, considering the range of responsibilities that the Federal Government had, constitutionally, to shoulder. Specifically, there was no formula in the Federal Constitution outlining the method of allocating revenue between the Federal and State Governments, as in the case of say the Nigerian Constitution, to enable them meet their respective social and economic responsibilities as spelled out in the Constitution. Rather, grants from the Federal to State Governments were made purely on "ad hoc" basis as will be seen in Section V.

V. The System of Revenue Allocation

It is clear from Section III, that there was no agreed formula or principle for allocating revenues between the Federal and State Governments in the Cameroon Federation. The absence of such a formula was never explained nor was it understood. As a consequence, the federated States of East and West Cameroon depended exclusively on 'ad hoc' subventions from the Federal Government to balance their budgets. However, the extent of the financial dependence by West Cameroon on the Federal Government was greater than that of East Cameroon. This is revealed in Table 2.

TABLE II
Federal Government Subventions to State Budgets
1962/63 - 1970/71 (in millions of francs CFA)

| <i>Year</i> | <i>West Cameroon</i> | <i>% of State Budget</i> | <i>East Cameroon</i> | <i>% of State Budget</i> |
|-------------|----------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|--------------------------|
| 1962/63 | 1,150 | 67% | 283 | 3.9% |
| 1963/64 | 1,270 | 68.5% | 890 | 23.5% |
| 1964/65 | 1,440 | 55% | 1,371 | 19% |
| 1965/66 | 1,350 | 51.5% | 1,285 | 14% |
| 1966/67 | 1,950 | 70% | 1,280 | 10% |
| 1967/68 | 1,800 | 64% | 1,000 | .9% |
| 1968/69 | 1,640 | 69% | 650 | 6.4% |
| 1969/70 | 1,400 | 50% | none | 0% |
| 1970/71 | 1,700 | 63% | none | 0% |

Source : Federal Republic of Cameroon : Estimate
1962-63 to 1970-71.

It can be observed from Table 2 that Federal subventions accounted for about two-thirds of the recurrent budget of West Cameroon, and only a little over one-tenth of that of East Cameroon. This arrangement continued till 1970/71, despite the fact that for the 1962-63 financial year, a provisional arrangement for the allocation of revenues (was agreed whereby all customs receipts as well as revenues) in respect of other Federal Departments in both States became Federal, and in turn, the Federal Government was to meet this gap between the remaining revenues which were at the disposal of the States and the planned expenditures of the State Governments.

It was emphasized at the time and was accepted by both sides, however, that this arrangement was on a provisional basis and should not be regarded as continuing system of revenue allocation. However, nothing was done to replace the 'ad hoc' system, with a well spelled out principle. This was certainly continued to plan their yearly revenues and expenditures, under uncertainty.

In the particular case of West Cameroon, it may be helpful to analyse the system as it worked in practice during the years 1962-63

and 1963-64. Table 3 presents the actual figures with respect to Federal—West Cameroon financial relations.

TABLE III
Federal-West Cameroon Financial Relations

| 1962-63 | 1962-63—1963-64 | |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|
| | <i>Frs. CFA</i> | <i>Frs. CFA</i> |
| Total Revenue collected by Federal Departments in West Cameroon | | 1,195,353,212 |
| Federal Expenditure on Federal Departments in West Cameroon | 701,053,393 | |
| Federal Government Subvention to West Cameroon | 1,150,000,000 | |
| Total Federal Expenditure on West Cameroon | | 1,851,053,393 |
| Excess of Federal Expenditure on West Cameroon over Federal Revenue deriving from West Cameroon | | 655,700,181 |
| Total Revenue Collected by Federal Departments in West Cameroon | | 1,668,109,000 |
| Federal Expenditure on Federal Departments in West Cameroon | 666,882,213 | |
| Federal Government Subvention to West Cameroon | 1,270,000,000 | |
| Total Federal Expenditure on West Cameroon | | 1,936,882,213 |
| Excess of Federal Government Expenditure on West Cameroon over Federal revenue deriving from West Cameroon | | 268,773,213 |

Source : West Cameroon and Federal Budgets 1962-63 and 1963-64.

The harsh realities of this situation were that whereas under the Nigerian regime, the Southern Cameroons got less than her fair share of the distributable revenue, West Cameroon was being heavily subsidized by the Government of the Federal Republic of Cameroon. On the other hand, the relatively lower dependence of the East Cameroon State on the Federal Government subvention was due mainly to the fact that State had a higher taxable capacity than West Cameroon. As a consequence, a greater percentage of East Cameroon's revenue was derived from taxes. Indeed, yearly average percentages of total revenue accruing to East Cameroon attributable to taxes were 76% as compared with only 25% for West Cameroon.

VI. Appraisal of the system

It will be agreed that in any federation, it is necessary that an orderly and acceptable arrangement regarding the allocation of financial resources of the entire federation between the Federal and State Governments should exist. This is essential if all tiers of government are to function smoothly and efficiently. To this extent, the system of 'ad hoc' Federal subventions to the federated States in Cameroon was definitely unsatisfactory, because it limited the financial autonomy of the States particularly in regard to those decisions which relate to the proper size of their budgets which were expected to be drawn up in the light of expected or actual revenue for that financial year.

The Cameroon Federal Constitution, as indicated earlier above, defined the responsibilities of the Federal and State Governments in the sphere of public services and development. If the Federation was expected to work in accordance with the conception of a federation both the Federal and State governments must have been assured of stable revenue resources with which to finance the services for which they were responsible as laid down under the provisions of the Constitution.¹⁵ It was clearly virtually impossible for each State to be responsible since it could not rely on receiving a certain section of the revenue resources available in the Federation.

For the State Governments to have depended on 'ad hoc' grants from the Federal Government was highly dangerous as it rendered the State Governments almost entirely dependent upon the attitude of the Federal Government at any given time for the funds

with which to carry out their responsibilities, whereas the funds necessary to carry out these functions were not similarly allocated to the State Government by an agreed formula. Secondly, for all practical purposes, such an arrangement detracted from the fiscal autonomy of the State Government and that was contrary to the spirit of federalism.

From the point of view of each State Government, it was almost impossible in those circumstances to plan, in a coherent fashion from year to year or even within any year. The implication was that, each time additional unforeseen expenditure became necessary in the course of any year, the State Government had to apply to the Federal Government for an increase in its subvention. This virtually placed it in the position of suppliant begging for charity. This did not engender a proper sense of responsibility in the State Government as it tended ultimately to encourage the State Government to ask for a great deal more than it really required in order to secure adequate funds for its real needs.

From the Federal Government's point of view, the situation was also unsatisfactory, since there was no fixed division of resources between the Federal and State Governments, for the former was placed in a position whereby it was virtually obliged to accede to any requests for subvention to cover expenditure proposed by the State, assuming such proposals were of a reasonable nature. In other words, the Federal Government could not know from year to year, what its own commitments, which regard to the subvention to the States were going to be and clearly this also mitigated against any orderly and coherent planning.

VII. Principles for a revenue allocation system

Whatever the rationale might have been for being silent on this very important question of revenue allocation system in the Federal Cameroon Constitution, it is clear from the foregoing analysis of the 'ad hoc' system, that the framers of the Constitution consciously or unconsciously left unsettled this major problem that has plagued both new and old federations alike. The allocation of revenue on 'ad hoc' basis in Cameroon was definitely not in the best interest of the federated States. It is in view of the necessity for reform, that the present section of this paper will be devoted to

suggesting some principles that could be followed in arriving at a more rationale and stable system of revenue allocation in old and new federations.

To this end, in any federation, it is true that the revenue resources to be allocated to the Federal and State Governments are normally regarded as of two kinds:—

- (i) Revenues declared to be State revenues over which the State has full power of regulating;
- (ii) Revenues collected by the Federal Government of which some are retained by it either in whole or in part and some which are divided according to fixed principles and formulae between the States.

In assessing how such revenues should be divided it is normal to take into consideration the following factors:

- (a) The existing level of expenditure on Federal and State services with an assessment of future prospective levels for such expenditure;
- (b) The principle of derivation—that is giving to a State a sum related to that State's contribution to Federal Revenue;
- (c) The principle of national need and state of development of the various parts of the Federation which must be set against (b) as this affects the wellbeing of the Federal Republic as a whole.

Consequently, it can be argued that in a permanent system of allocation of resources between the Federal and State Governments, it is quite usual for the Federal Government actually to collect the greater part of revenues available but for part of these to be returnable by law to the State Government in accordance with an agreed formula accepted by all the Governments concerned. The most obvious example of this is usually customs revenues which must clearly all be collected by the Customs Service but some of which could subsequently be split on a basis of derivation and need between the State and Federal Governments.

However, if an entirely equitable and satisfactory arrangement for the division of resources is to be evolved, it would be desirable that this complex and important problem should be studied by a specially appointed commission. It would be the function of such

a commission to examine fully all the aspects of the problem including the resources available to the governments in relation to their responsibilities, the need of certain areas for special attention where the development of such areas has been neglected in the past, the possibilities of raising new sources of revenue or increasing present sources and the general development needs of the government of a federation.

It is not contended that the mere appointment of a revenue allocation commission for the establishment of a more orderly arrangement for the division of resources, whether consisting of internal or external exports, would in itself result in an increase of the resources available. Rather, an agreed formula for division of revenues would greatly strengthen the foundations of the machinery of government in a federation and would enable orderly and coherent planning to proceed. Further, it would indicate the awareness of the governments of a Federation of the necessity for establishing sound principles on which the division of revenue resources should be made. As this is a key factor in the functioning and development of a vigorous and forward-looking federal system, it would undoubtedly work to the advantage of the different tiers of government and the public as a whole.

VIII. Concluding remarks:

The fundamental necessity for a careful and thorough examination of a revenue allocation system in an orderly and systematic fashion is beyond doubt. The system ultimately devised for the allocation of resources between the federal and state governments does have a very great influence on the manner in which the Federal Constitution develops. Since harmony and mutual confidence are to be engendered, it is essential that the State governments know precisely their responsibilities and are provided with the necessary funds with which to carry out those responsibilities. Indeed, any revenue allocation system which depends on arbitrary or 'ad hoc' grants or subventions is bound to be unsatisfactory because it mitigates against full understanding and confidence between the State and federal governments and the growth of a full sense of responsibility on the part of the State government.

FOOTNOTES

1. A.T. Eäpen, "A Critique of Indian Fiscal Federalism", *Public Finance* Vol. XXIV, 1969.

2. The Northern Cameroons became part of Nigeria on July 11, 1961. It had been hoped that the Northern Cameroons would opt for Union with the Republic to make it the third member of the federation.

3. A full description of the plebiscites including the breakdown in voting for all the Southern and Northern Cameroon electoral districts is found in the *Report of the United Nations Plebiscite Commissioner for the Cameroons under United Kingdom Administration, Plebiscite in the Southern and Northern parts of the Territory on February 11 and 12, 1961*. U.N. Doc. A/4727 (New York, 1961) originally issued as U.N. Docs. T/1556 Appendix and T/1556/Appendix/Add 1 and 2, April, 11, 1961.

4. United Nations Official Records, *Reports of United Nations Visiting Missions to Trust Territories in West Africa*, Mission Supplement, Doc. No 2,77798, New York, 1949.

5. Southern Cameroon, *Budget Estimates 1955-56*, Buea, March, 1965.

6. United Nations, *Report on the Cameroons Under British Administration*, (New York: 1956) U.N. Doc. No. T/1239 p. 25, para. 214. The 1954 system of revenue allocation for the then Southern Cameroons is embodied in Section 163 of the Nigerian (constitutional) order in Council, 1954.

7. Sir Sidney Phillipson, *Report on Financial Economic and Administrative Consequences to the Southern Cameroons os Separation from the Federation of Nigeria*, Lagos: Federal Government Printer 1959) passion.

8. F. Okotie—Oboh, *Speech to the Nigerian House of Representatives*, Lagos, February 17, 1959.

9. United Nations Document, No. T/1441 p. 19, paragraph 41.

10. The administration of these funds was done by the French Agency for external aid: d'Investissements pour le Developpement Economique et Social des Territoires d'Outremer (F.I.D.E.S.). It was later named Fonds l'Aide et de Cooperation (F.A.C.).

11. Kjeil Anderson, *op. cit.* p. 29

12. Republic of Cameroon, *Budget 1960-61*, Yaounde, July 1960, p. 20.


13. Gilbert Comte, "La Cooperation avec la France", in *Europe France-Outre-Met*, No. 379, Paris.

14. United Nations, *Industrial Development in Africa*, (New York : Dec. No. 1D/ConF. 1/RBP/1, 1967), p. 254.

15. Federal jurisdiction cover nationality, external affairs, national defence, internal and external security; development planning, money supply, determination of taxes to meet federal expenditure. (e.g. all customs and excise, import duties, etc. are federal), secondary and higher education, external aid, justice, penal law and labour regulations, health. All other areas fell within State jurisdiction, including primary education and local government.

David Chanaiwa

The Shona and the British South Africa Company in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1896



Introduction

The relation between the Shona speaking people of Southern Rhodesia and the British South Africa Company between 1890 and 1896 was on the whole ill-defined and, therefore, easily misinterpreted and misunderstood by both sides. The British South Africa Company had occupied Mashonaland (September 12, 1890) on the strength of Rudd Concession.¹ This controversial concession was an agreement between Lobengula, the King of the Ndebele, and Rhodes' agents, Rudd, Thompson and Maguire. The concessionaires obtained complete and exclusive charge over all metals and mineral situated and contained in Lobengula's kingdom, principalities and dominions, and the right to take the necessary steps to protect and exploit the minerals. They also got Lobengula to agree not to grant land without their consent. In return, the concessionaires agree to pay Lobengula and his heirs 100 British pounds a month in perpetuity; to give Lobengula 1,000 Martin-Henry rifles together with 100,000 rounds of cartridges; and "to deliver on the Zambezi River a steamboat with guns suitable for defensive purposes upon the said river." In addition, Lobengula made verbal stipulations that he would allow only ten white men at a time to engage in prospecting and mining in his country and that the ten men would be (under his jurisdiction and would be) obligated to fight for Lobengula when asked to do so. But these verbal agreements were not included in the written Concession. When this mistake was brought to Lobengula's attention, he made an unsuccessful attempt to repudiate the Concession.

It is important to note that both Lobengula and the concessionaires had stretched the boundaries of the Ndebele nation to include,

areas, such as central and northern Mashonaland, which had not been under Ndébele suzerainty historically. It was to Lobengula's advantage to claim the areas and to put them under the British sphere of influence in order to exclude the Portuguese, the Germans and the Lozi. The concessionaires, on the other hand, intended to use Lobengula's claims as a basis for occupying Mashonaland and for excluding the Portuguese and the Germans, in accordance with the terms of the Berlin-West African Conference. So far the Shona themselves had not been consulted and were not aware of the fact that their paramountcies had come under the British South Africa Company's sphere of influence.

Lobengula was not successful in his attempt to repudiate the concession, and, later, in his struggle to maintain his sovereignty, mainly because he did not comprehend the nature of the European scramble for Africa, and especially the motives of Cecil John Rhodes. The Ndebele nation, as well as Mashonaland, had already come under the British sphere of influence under the Moffat Treaty of 1888. What was needed in 1889 was effective occupation. Rhodes, therefore, was really negotiating for the right to occupy and settle in south-central Africa. The Rudd Concession was only an essential instrument with which he was going to seek a monopolistic charter from the British government, in order to exclude other British companies and individuals. A royal charter to the British South Africa was more important than Lobengula's objections. As soon as Lobengula and his *indunas* had signed the Rudd Concession, Rhodes used it as the basis for applying for the charter, which he obtained in September, 1889.² The British South Africa Company finally occupied Mashonaland on September 12, 1890, on the basis of the authority vested in it by the royal charter, despite Lobengula's objections.

Both the occupation and administration of Mashonaland by the British South Africa Company were based on two erroneous but convenient assumptions. The first assumption was that all the Shona had historically been under Ndebele sovereignty, and the second one was that they were "a downtrodden race, who were grateful to the white men for protection against the ravaging raids of the Matabele and others, which allowed them to graze their stock and till their gardens in peace."³ The British settlers, therefore,

concluded that the Shona would readily accept them as their masters. The Shona were largely taken for granted, partly because the Europeans believed that they were rescuing them from the Ndebele and partly because there were actually no highly centralized nor militaristic paramountcies to threaten European settlement.

On the other hand, the Shona themselves, especially those in central and northern Mashonaland, viewed the relation from a very different angle. The major Shona Paramounts of Mangwende, Makoni, and Mtoko, who had never, been under Ndebele suzerainty, were very conscious of their political independence and were jealously guarding their sovereignty. They still considered themselves the rightful owners of the land and rulers of their people. They also erroneously thought that the British settlers were merely interested in trading guns, cloth and other foreign items for local ivory, gold and foodstuffs, and that like the Portuguese before them, they would eventually go away.

Soon after the arrival of the Pioneer Column, agents of the British South Africa Company had gone about making treaties with Shona paramount chiefs. The treaty forms that the agents presented the chiefs were exactly the same. Only the names of the paramountcy, and the place at which the negotiations took place, as well as the date and signatories were different.⁴ There were altogether about eighteen Shona chiefs with whom the company made treaties. Under these treaties, the Company promised to protect the paramountcy against outside attack; "to support and maintain the said chief and his lawful successors in the constitutional maintainance and exercise over the subjects of his powers and authority," and "to hold its servants liable for any ill-treatment or interference with any of the King's native subjects." The treaties also stipulated that missionaries were to be allowed to preach and educate the Africans, but only under the authority and supervision of the paramount chief.

In return the paramount chiefs, like Loben Gulo, gave the British South Africa Company complete and exclusive charge of all minerals in their country, as well as the right to take the necessary steps to exploit them. They agreed not to make any other treaties or grant land to other Europeans without the consent of the Company officials. They also promised not to make war on another chief without Company consent.

The first contact between the two sides was generally peaceful and friendly. The treaty negotiations had been conducted in an atmosphere of quality and friendship. The British South Africa Company treaty agents had actually recognised the power and authority of the paramount chiefs and had not presented nor suggested any real threat to the indigenous sovereignties. It took the Shona some five years to accurately perceive the nature and dimension of the occupation of their land by the British settlers.

But the British settlers had brought upon the Africans (of Southern Rhodesia) much stronger pressures—military, economic, political and religious than those of the Portuguese and the Ndebele. They established their capital Salisbury, and raised the British flag right in the heart of Mashonaland. Although they remained nominally independent between 1890 and 1897, the indigenous Shona paramount chiefs witnessed the continuous erosion of their political independence and foreign interference on the daily lives of their people. This foreign interference intensified in proportion to the settlers' increasing need for cheap indigenous labour to work on the farms and in the mines and for the hut tax to meet part of the administrative expenses. As a result, relations between the settlers and the Shona steadily deteriorated. Between 1896 and 1897, the Shona made an unsuccessful attempt to expel the British intruders from their motherland.⁵ They were conquered and henceforth the British colonists occupied Mashonaland and imposed their foreign rule by right of conquest.

The British Settlement of Southern Rhodesia

The British colonists in Southern Rhodesia were essentially paid agents of a colonization scheme that was being perpetrated by the imperialistic merchant-adventurer, Cecil John Rhodes, to whose foresight, physical energy and indomitable will, was due to the fact that some 700,000 square miles of territory were added to the British empire, over which the Union Jack flew from September 12, 1890 to 1969. Having established firm economic monopoly of the Kimberly diamond mines through his De Beers Company and then acquiring a major share of the gold mines of the Transvaal through the Consolidated Gold Mining Company, Rhodes had his mind set on the potential wealth of Southern Rhodesia, the legendary 'Land of

Ophir.' He organized and subsequently dominated the British South Africa Company for the purpose of occupying and then exploiting the riches of that area. The Company was a joint-stock commercial concern, whose major interest in Mashonaland was to make money, by honest means if possible.

Rhodes' consuming desire to occupy and exploit south-central Africa was shared by many other English-speaking colonists, as well as some Afrikaaner colonists, in South Africa. The settlers in the Cape Colony and, to a less extent, in Natal, felt threatened by the economic hegemony of the Transvaal Afrikaaners, who were in possession of the gold fields. Cape commercial interests were expecting to discover more gold in the northern hinterland than was to be found on the Transvaal Rand.

South-central Africa was coveted both for its economic value and for its potential political importance. A gold rush in Mashonaland was expected to counterweigh the economic dominance of the Afrikaaner Republics in South Africa. The Afrikaaners themselves were also especially interested in the grasslands of Mashona land. By then the European scramble for African territories had already begun and the Germans were pushing inwards from German West Africa and German East Africa; the Portuguese from Mozambique. So both British interests in London and settler interests in Cape Town saw special urgency with regard to the control of the hinterland, because of the fear that either the Afrikaaners of the Transvaal, the Germans or the Portuguese would beat them and thereby "shut them in." The British South Africa Company, therefore, was organized to promote the commercial expansion of the Cape Colony and to forestall the occupation of South-Central Africa by other European powers. It was at one and the same time an agent of the sub-imperialism of the English colonists in South Africa and of the British international interest in southern Africa.⁶ Rhodes, through the British South Africa Company provided the leadership, money, supplies and manpower, while the British government provided the necessary diplomatic leverage and umbrella against the Germans, Portuguese and Afrikaaners.

The colonists who joined the Pioneer Column and occupied Mashonaland in 1890, were primarily fortune seekers. They were

“paid pioneers who came for gold—unlimited gold, of course, if they could ‘strike the reef’ but at any rate a certain sum in hard coin from the Company when the column was disbanded.”⁷

As individuals the pioneers were expecting to become rich easily and quickly from the over-advertised mineral wealth of the “Land of Ophir.” Each recruit had been promised fifteen claims of gold, “150 feet along the strike of the reef and 450 feet across the reef,” and was also entitled to 1,500 morgen of land upon arrival in Mashonaland. But land and commercial agriculture were really of secondary importance to most of the Pioneers. In fact, many of them, expecting to become rich through mining, had traded their title to the 1,500 morgen of land to the British South Africa Company at the rate of 40 British shillings an acre, before the occupation.

The majority of the members of the Pioneer Column were colonists of South Africa, both English and Dutch. Their calibre ranged all the way from sons of English noble families to the never-do-wells. The Pioneer Column also included a few Americans, Canadians and Australians. The historical significance of this South African origin of the settlers is that Mashonaland (and Matabeleland after 1893) was essentially a distant outpost of the South African cultural milieu, especially in the area of European and African relations.

The settlers brought with them stereotyped ideas about the “native”. Many of them had previously participated in colonial wars against the Zulu, Xhosa, Swozi and other African societies in South Africa. Many of them had strong preconceived opinions about the ways and means of “disciplining the native”. Even the ‘native administration’ of the British South Africa Company was essentially a replica of the “Native Laws” of South Africa, especially the Cape Colony. In fact, the first ordinance of the Company Administration in Salisbury simply endorsed the laws and regulations of the Cape Colony as the new laws of Mashonaland.⁸ For the most part, the Company Administration simply replaced the name Cape Colony by Mashonaland. This link with South Africa has continued to be part and parcel of the overall historical processes in Southern Rhodesia. Even after the settlers had overthrown Com-

pany Administration and had gained self-government, what was a "native law" in South Africa today usually became the "native law" of Southern Rhodesia tomorrow.

As it turned out in Mashonaland,, both the Pioneers and the British South Africa Company were terribly mistaken and hence disappointed. It quickly became obvious to many of the fortune-seekers that while the promised land was geographically and climatically beautiful, it was also economically an open waste. The fabled ancient mines of the Land of Ophir had long since been depleted. Cecil John Rhodes himself, when addressing delegates of the Annual Meeting of the British South Africa Company on November 29, 1892 acknowledged the unexpected disappointment of the settlers.

"They found that they could not pick up gold like gooseberries, and that to acquire it necessitated hard work, toil and patience, and the result was that depression ensued after the first sanguine hopes as to the nature of the promised land."⁹

While they were still going through the depressing experience of failing to "pick up gold like gooseberries", the Pioneers were soon greeted by a hostile rainy tropical summer. The summer of 1890-91 was awfully protracted and severe. Some of the prospectors being insufficiently supplied with clothing, shelter, food and medicine, contacted malaria and died. Several of the pioneers actually returned to South Africa.

As the chances of striking gold reefs and accumulating easy fortunes fizzled out, the Company decided to exploit what was then the greatest economic asset, land.

The investments of the shareholders were then secured by the millions of acres of land, which were snatched away from the Shona people and sold out to pioneers, private syndicates, police and missionary groups.¹⁰ The value of land began to rise and the settlers were eager to own as much of it as possible. But European desire to appropriate land was matched by African anxiety over the loss of his basic possession. This was the beginning of the tragic conflict of interests between Europeans and Africans of Southern Rhodesia, which has continued to this day.

The British South Africa Company was in essence primarily

and necessarily a commercial concern, whose major object was to make money. But the possibilities of making money, in Mashonaland were then predicated more upon the effective settlement and cultivation of land than upon mining. The Company itself was also engaged in commercial agriculture. It owned several estates, e.g., the premier estate near Umtali, on which it grew maize, wheat, tobacco and citrus fruits. The largest portion of its profits, however, came from the sales of land to European settlers and syndicated groups. The Company Administration, therefore, made all sorts of attempts to keep the remaining disillusioned pioneers in Mashonaland and to attract more settlers from other African colonies and from overseas. Mashonaland was then highly advertised for its fertile lands, expansive enough to satisfy "the primeval land-hunger" of every colonist.¹¹

The Company acted simultaneously as the agent of colonial administration in Mashonaland and as a profit-making commercial concern for its shareholders. But neither the Rudd Concession, the Royal Charter nor the treaties with Shona paramounts had conferred legislative and administrative powers upon the Company. The British Government had stipulated in the Royal Charter:

"The Company no doubt understands that the Concession about referred to (the Rudd Concession) does not confer such powers of government or administration as are mentioned in clauses 3 and 4 of the charter. Those powers will have to be obtained wherever a proper and favourable time for approaching Lo Bengula on the subject arrives."¹²

Neither Lo Bengula nor the Shona paramount chiefs ever conferred such powers upon the British South Africa Company. Furthermore, no conquest had ever taken place and the Shona never thought of themselves as the subjects of the Europeans. But neither the British government, nor the British South Africa Company had ever taken serious consideration of Shona independence and sovereignty. The "downtrodden" Shona were looked upon as helpless victims of the Ndebele raids, and were supposed to be thankful for British "protection" through submission. The Europeans had regarded Mashonaland as theirs since September 12, 1890.

The Company, therefore, was held responsible for maintaining

law, order and peace in Mashonaland and for regulating the relations between European settlers and the indigenous people. But because of its concern for profits, the Company was very reluctant to incur administrative expenses. Its greatest concern was to assist the European colonists in their efforts to appropriate land and stock and to procure cheap African labour. "Law and order" simply meant protecting European lives and property against the Africans.

The Company Administration did not tolerate any obstacles to its economic adventures, even if the obstacles heppened to be Shona lives and rights. In practice the Company Administration readily forfeited Shona lands, stock and foodstuffs and subjected Shona people to forced labour in order to reconcile the interests of the settlers who had been brought to Mashonaland under promises of a better, easier and richer life. The "natives" to the majority of the settlers, including the heads of the Company Administration (first Grey and then Jameson) were simply a reservoir of cheap labour for white farms and mines.

The first form of conflict between the settlers and the indigenous people was primarily economic. The Shona-speaking people were mainly subsistence farmers and occasional hunters. They depended solely on land for their livelihood. Snatching the best parts of their land, therefore, was going to threaten the very backbone of their way of life. They also considered themselves as the legitimate owners of the land and were not inclined to give it away to foreigners. In the course of time, both sides viewed this economic conflict as a matter of survival, in which the European colonists played the aggressive and dominant role.

Company Administration: Phase I, 1890-94

The British South Africa Company was determined to cut down on administrative expenses. By 1891 it was administering "a discontented [European] population of about 1,500 people, at an expenditure of about £ 250,000 a year upon police".¹³

By the end of 1893 there were altogether about 3000 colonists in Mashonaland. In 1891 Rhodes had instructed Jameson, the head of the Company Administration from 1891-1895, to reduce administrative expenses down to an impossible figure of £ 3000. Jameson tried to follow the instructions and by the end of 1892 he had

reduced the figure from t 250,000 to t 30,000. He was forced to disband the original police force and to rely on a small volunteer group of colonists.

Jameson, therefore, could not establish and maintain an effective administrative machinery for Mashonaland. Although he was officially designated as the "Administrator" of Mashonaland, he was rated, not only by his capability to maintain law and order and to regulate the relations between the colonists and the Shona, but also by his success in making plenty of profits for the shareholders of the Company. So he was forced to devise cheap and expedient administrative techniques in order to save money, but not to meet the realities of the situation. He decided to apply the "Native Laws" of South Africa, especially those of the Cape Colony to regulate the relations between settlers and Africans in Mashonaland. The borrowing of familiar laws and techniques from South Africa, however, was a great mistake of oversimplification. The Africans in South Africa had already been conquered and many of them had been under colonial domination for over forty years. The Shona, on the other hand, had never been conquered; had not accepted Company authority; and many of them had never even seen a white man.

Lacking in both manpower and money, Jameson then relied very heavily on the colonists themselves to effect the "native administration." The period between 1890 and 1893 (i.e. up to the Ndebele War) was indeed "the age of the pioneer spirit" in Mashonaland. The European settlers, either as individuals or in a group, often acted as the policemen, lawyers and judges in their own disputes with the Shona. Cases of theft, desertion, and insubordination were usually taken care of right on the spot in the form of a "father correction," without trial or pleading. What the settlers wanted most was not justice, but a constant supply of cheap and reliable African labour, as well as a harmonious "Master and Servant" relation between them and the African respectively.

Very few of the colonists had come to Mashonaland with the intention of labouring themselves in the fields or in the mines. A great many of them had come as fortune-seekers and were suffering from the disillusionment and disappointment of having failed to strike gold reefs in Mashonaland. They were, therefore, psychologi-

cally unprepared for the hardships and frustrations of trying to make a living from mining and farming. These settlers were prone to venting their frustrations of the African labourers, especially because the latter were unskilled workers who often did not use European machines and tools efficiently, and because they often did not comprehend orders given in English or Chilapalapa (pigeon English).

Most of the settlers had very little capital to invest in machinery and implements, and, therefore, depended rather heavily on cheap African labour. Labour shortage, desertion and insubordination were immediate threats to their economic survival. Any African requests for better wages or living conditions were also real economic threats because they would lead to a diminished profit margin. It was very common for Europeans to pick up a quarrel with an African labourer two or three days before his pay day; fire him for insubordination and forfeit his wages.

The first phase of the Company Administration of the Shona people was predicated upon local settler autonomy. Jameson decided to adopt an old Cape colonial practice of appointing individual European settlers as Field Cornets.¹⁴ A Field Cornet was a local administrator of a district, which was demarcated according to European demographic patterns. He was usually a man of standing and popularity among the local Europeans, and was appointed by the Company administrators on the strength of a petition signed by the majority of the European residents. In theory, a Field Cornet was responsible to the Company Administration, but in practice his powers were unlimited and his actions unchecked, especially in districts that were far removed and isolated from Salisbury. Some districts were virtually local autonomies in which the Field Cornet was the law maker, chief of police and judge.

He was responsible for making sure that each white farmer had a sufficient supply of African labour and for regulating the relations between the settlers and the indigenous people. It was he who requisitioned the Shona chiefs for labourers and then distributed them among his fellow settlers. He also was empowered to settle "native disputes," and when necessary, to form and lead a settler commando force against "insubordinate Shona Chiefs."

The basic weakness of this system of local administration was

that it did not guarantee impartiality nor fairness in disputes between the white settlers and the Africans. The Field Cornet was actually responsible to his local peers. He too was in need of a constant supply of cheap and reliable African labour, and he shared his peers' stereotypes about the "native." As a result, judgements were overwhelmingly in favour of the Europeans and the sentences were often carried out with the characteristic brutal force of frontiersmen, organized into a commando force by the Field Cornet.

Mining communities were also given a large degree of local autonomy. The European population consisted mainly of traders, merchants, and prospectors. There was, however, an acute need for African labourers in mining communities, and, as the mining industry progressed, it became increasingly difficult to procure and to retain indigenous labourers. One major problem was the unwillingness of Africans to work in the mines; due primarily to the unfair treatment at work and to poor pay and living conditions. But, although they were still predominantly subsistence farmers, the Africans had tasted the value of cultivating for cash. They were becoming accustomed to trading their crops, vegetables and stocks for European goods. It was possible for an enterprising African to make as much as five British pounds a month through peaceful trade with Europeans, after a good harvest. Two European traders were reported to have bought six hundred bags of maize from Africans of the Bulilima reserve, at ten shillings a bag.¹⁵ So, forced labour at ten to thirty shillings a month was not only unbearable and discouraging, it was also an economic loss.

The Company-appointed officials in mining districts were known as Mining Commissioners. They had jurisdiction over the Europeans and Africans within the districts. They were responsible for maintaining law and order; for settling disputes among the Europeans and between the Europeans and the Africans; for procuring labour from the African communities and for inspecting labour conditions. A Mining Commissioner, therefore, possessed the powers of a law-maker, judge and policeman. He was, however, still responsible to the Company officials in Salisbury. He often took immediate police action against an African community that had failed to supply labourers upon demand. On such punitive expeditions, the Commissioner not only took away the labourers, but often seized

stock. For an example, in July, 1893, Nesbitt, a Mining Commissioner in Mazoe, demanded labourers from a village headman called Amanda.¹⁶ Amanda refused to send the men. Nesbitt then sent his messengers to arrest Amanda and to bring him in for punishment. Amanda was administered fifty lashes before his own village men and other Africans from different villages. He was also fined three head of cattle and six goats.

It must be stressed, however, that there were very few large European settlements between 1890 and 1893. It may even have been more appropriate to treat this local administration through the appointment of Field Cornets and Mining Commissioners as an exception rather than the rule. In general practice, the individual European farmer, trader or prospector took the law into his hands, with the blessing of the Company administration. This was strictly a type of private justice, that was dependent on the white settlers' initiative and personal judgement. Even hasty, arbitrary and unjust actions of a settler, who was motivated by either land hunger, need for cheap labour, sense of insecurity and contempt for the "native" were readily supported by the Company administrators in Salisbury. If a settler provoked a group of Africans, or an African paramount chief, he could always count on police reinforcement from Salisbury.

A good example of this settler immunity was the Gomwe Affair.¹⁷ The affair was caused by a misunderstanding between a Shona village headman, Gomwe, and a white trader, Bennett. Bennett had established a trading post in Gomwe's village area, and there in an enclosure he had displayed his merchandise. He, however, did not allow the African customers to enter the closure to choose their items. But a son of Gomwe, declaring himself to be royal and hence privileged, insisted on entering the enclosure. Bennett and his African helpers pushed the son out of the enclosure. When Gomwe heard about the pushing he confiscated some of Bennett's merchandise for damages. Bennett and his helpers tried to retrieve the merchandise, but they were beaten off by the village men.

Bennett then reported the incident to Jameson, the head of the Company Administration in Salisbury. Jameson's course of action was very similar to the one used previously by the Ndebele kings, Mzilikazi and Lobengula, against tributary chiefs.¹⁸ The incident gave him the opportunity to demonstrate to the indigenous people

the military superiority of the Company government and to give the Africans a true taste of the white man's power. He immediately commissioned a Captain Lendy to investigate the matter. At first Lendy ordered Gomwe to give back the merchandise and surrender himself for trial by the Magistrate in Salisbury. Gomwe flatly refused. Lendy then returned to Jameson for further instructions and reinforcements, and returned to Gomwe's village the following week, with a British South Africa Company police force of thirty-five men. Together with Gomwe's village was raided and completely demolished. He himself and twenty-one of his village men were killed, some forty-seven cattle and some goats were taken away as loot.

The arbitrariness and irregularities of the Company Administration stemmed in from the assumption that the Shona-speaking people had become very much accustomed to Ndebele authority which was based on strong and despotic discipline, and that anything short of a Ndebele-type of authority would denote weakness. In their continuous effort to impress the superiority and invulnerability of the white man upon the Shona, the settlers often committed more barbaric acts and brought more hardships than the Ndebele had ever done, especially in central and northern Mashonaland, whereas we have already pointed out, the Ndebele had never established their authority.

Company Administration : Phase II, 1894-96, The Passing of Shona Independence

The second phase of the British South Africa Company Administration over the Shona people came after the Ndebele War (November, 1893).¹⁹ The defeat of the Ndebele not only led to a new feeling of security and optimism among the Europeans, it also enhanced the powers and prestige of the British South Africa Company.

The settlers were happily receiving their share of the Matabele loot,²⁰ and moving about in the newly conquered territory to prospect for minerals and land. The Company, on the other hand, was negotiating with the British Government for the powers of government and administration over both the Ndebele and the Shona, by right of conquest. The British government officially grant-

ed to the Company both legislative and administrative powers under the Matabele Order in Council on July, 18, 1894.²¹

Despite its limited title, the Matabele Order in Council was meant for application in all the three territories of Matabeleland, Mashonaland and Manicaland. Legally this was a tremendous victory for the Company. The Order gave extensive powers and freedom, especially with respect to internal affairs.²²

The Company Government in Salisbury then had the legal right and authority to pass and administer local law on the Africans, especially the right to

"Impose such taxes, including a hut tax in respect of the occupation of native huts, and such customs duties upon goods entering the limits of this Order as are necessary to provide a revenue for carrying out the effective administration of affairs within the limits of this Order."²³

The significance of the Matabele Order in Council to our discussion of the relation between the Shona and the British South Africa Company before 1896, is that the fate of the Shona people, who had not yet been (conquered and had never accepted foreign rule, had then been) entrusted to the Company Administration, whose interests and operations had already proved to be incompatible with theirs. From then onwards, European pressures upon the Shona, especially economic, political and administrative ones, were greatly intensified. By the end of 1895, the Company Administration had instituted the Hut Tax, the "Native Department," "Native Reserves" and the Pass System, all of which were for the purposes of promoting and maintaining European interests.

Despite its new extensive freedom of control over internal affairs, as well as the high level of morale and optimism among Europeans, the British South Africa Company was still reluctant to assume administrative expenses, and was still looking for cheap administrative remedies. The administration in Salisbury had always wanted to tax the Shona before 1894, but it lacked legal authorization under the Charter.²⁴ So one of the legislative powers that the Company exercised without delay was the taxation of both the Shona and the Ndebele "to cover the cost of protection and

good government of the natives and in order to induce them to devote more time to labour and industry" A Hut Tax Ordinance was passed in 1894, under which every head of an African family was to pay ten shillings a year in money, grain or stock.²⁵ The only problem was how to establish the ways and means of collecting the tax. Historically speaking the "Native Department" of Southern Rhodesia was a byproduct of the Hut Tax.

There has always been an inseparable relation between African labour and taxation in Rhodesia. In essence, African taxation has always served both for administrative expenses and as an incentive for cheap labour. By implementing the hut tax, the Company Administration hoped to make it necessary for Africans to leave their villages for work in European mines and on farms, in order to pay the tax. By 1894, European demand for cheap African labour had increased tremendously. Conquest of the Ndebele had brought the mines and farms of Matabeleland under European control and many of them had moved in as prospectors and farmers. There was now a high demand not only of a regular flow of labour but of the deployment of labourers to European settlements located in areas that were less populated by Africans. In fact, the question of obtaining and maintaining cheap African labour, rather than that of African rights and freedoms, was what the Company administration considered the "native problem".

Although the Company was counting on the hut tax to solve the "native problem" it did not establish a more positive system of "native administration." It simply poured new wines in old bottles by choosing to use the Field Cornets and Mining Commissioners as tax collectors, and by appointing local Europeans in districts where there were no Field Cornets or Mining Commissioners.

On the whole this system of farming the hut tax to individual Europeans was very unsatisfactory. The tax collectors were not only untrained and inexperienced for their task, they also had their own private business to attend to, so that they often did not have the time to trace every African tax payer in the district. As a result, labour became increasingly scarce while the total hut tax from April to August of 1894 was about £ 229/12s/1^d, compared to £ 4,323/15s/9^d for the same period in 1895.²⁶ There was also strong resistance by the Africans against the hut tax and especially against the forceful

methods employed by some of the tax officials.

For the purposes of introducing efficiency and, thus, increasing the volume of the hut tax and African labour, the Company instituted the "Native Department" in September of 1894, and appointed civil servants known interchangeably as Hut Tax Collectors or Native Commissioners. There were altogether eleven of these Native Commissioners, under the command of a Chief Native Commissioner who resided in Satisbury.²⁷ The District Commissioners were authorized to recruit their own African messengers and police to assist them.

The major weakness of the Company's new administrative approach was that there were no definite rules and procedures to be followed by the District Commissioners. There were also no uniform laws and regulations on African administration. As William Edwards said after his appointment as the District Commissioner of the Mangwende Paramountcy, "No one those days set down what a Native Commissioner's duties were." The only directives from the Chief District Commissioner were: "Get to know your district, and your people, keep an eye on them, collect tax if possible, but for God's sake don't worry Headquarters if you can avoid it."²⁸ The Company had simply recognized the "native problem" but it had no definite "native policy." It was more interested in taxes and labour which it intended to collect as cheaply but efficiently as possible. Lack of comprehensive and closely controlled laws and regulations, meant that the success of the new Department depended rather heavily on the integrity and imagination of the District Commissioners.

These District Commissioners were responsible for the collection of the hut tax, recruitment of labour, maintenance of law and order and suppression of African customs that appeared repugnant to the European sense of justice and morality.

Generally speaking, however, the District Commissioners tended to be young and inexperienced men.²⁹ The appointments were often not based on the qualifications of the candidates. They were more or less cases of patronage and rewards from the Company officials. A few of them had acquired some limited experience in "handling natives" through trading, farming and mining. Many of them, however, relied heavily on their African messengers for

communicating with the Africans and on their notorious "Native Police" for carrying out their duties. Besides the District Commissioner's salary was a mere £20 a month, so that mostly only the less successful Europeans were really anxious for the positions.

By comparison, however, the new system of African administration was a bit more efficient and effective than the previous ones. The volume of the hut tax in 1865 was almost twenty times that of 1864, and the labour supply had also increased steadily. Although the system was still less satisfactory as a means of solving the "native problem," it proved to be too strong a challenge to the independence, freedom and traditional way of life of the Africans. Some communities began to feel the tax burden, while many African men were forced to leave their homes to work for Europeans. Taxation and forced labour became the foremost African grievances against European occupation of Southern Rhodesia. Worst of all the grievances were the brutal force, the flogging and verbal abuses applied by the European employers and especially by the "Native Police" which the District Commissioners sent out to recruit labourers. Several members of the "Native Police" were not kinship members of the communities in which they worked. Some were also former slaves, servants or renegades who had sought refuge with the District Commissioner. Their behaviour was notoriously provocative, especially when they were conducting punitive raids against villages that had failed to produce the required number of labourers had failed to report a runaway labourer. They not only would use force ruthlessly, but would also confiscate much property as booty. Generally speaking, many of the District Commissioners, who often applied force and flogging themselves, neither condemned nor prohibited these irresponsible acts. The result was that many Shona people of central and northern Mashonaland, such as the Nhowe, actually suffered much more from raids and flogging under the British than they had during the period of Ndebele dominance in south-central Africa. The friendly but cautious Shona reception of the Europeans in 1890, therefore, had gradually turned into suspicion and deep resentment, which was often aggravated by the paternalistic and overbearing manners of some European employers. In addition to low wages and poor living conditions, the employers of ten showered verbal abuses and insults at the labourers, by using

stereotyped derogations such as 'kaffir', 'boy', 'baboon' and 'monkey.'

Very often the European administrators would argue that the hut tax was in essence not new to the Shona, because they had always paid tribute, first to the Mwene Mutapas then to the Rozvi *Mambos* and lastly to the Ndebele. Tribute, however, was never demanded upon every adult male, rich or poor, sick or well. It was communal responsibility, during which the members of the community pulled their resources together. Often the poor and sick members did not contribute, and, furthermore, the previous overlords, including the Ndebele, had never applied violence and brutality to the extent of the "Native Police." The hut tax was a fixed amount demanded from everybody and then taken away by Europeans, whom the people had not yet acknowledged as their rulers or conquerors. The majority of the Shona people did not work for Europeans nor use money, and so they had to pay their tax in grain, cattle, goats, sheep and even pigs. In some instances, some of the poor people had to give away most or all of their animals, while others give away a greater portion of their grain and subsequently starved.

The psychological effects of the hut tax upon the people were even greater than other aspects. By the beginning of 1896, many Shona people were brooding deeply against the white man's rule. They had begun to realize that the European claim to be the champions and saviours of the Shona people against the "ravaging raids of the Ndebele" was, in effect naked hypocrisy. The coming of the Europeans had brought the hut tax, forced labour, flogging, suppression of their traditional customs and more hardships than they had ever encountered under the period of Ndebele dominance in south-central Africa.

By an unfortunate coincidence, Rhodesia experienced a succession of natural disasters in 1896. First, there had been a severe small-pox epidemic in 1895, during which the District Commissioners had administered massive compulsory vaccinations. Then during the summer of 1895-96, the whole country suffered from a severe drought. Most Africans were, therefore, suffering from famine, while many animals were dying from lack of grass and water. Some people were living mainly on wild roots, plants and fruits and other

were actually dying from starvation. There was also a concurrent plague of locusts, that

“arrived in such swarms that they darkened the sky and cut a swath of devastation through the country side as they consumed every green leaf and every blade of grass.”³⁰

The whole country was going through a very trying period of immeasurable misery, destitution and hopelessness. Whatever green grass or vegetable had survived the drought, was likely to be devastated by the locusts.

Nature had yet another disaster in store for the wretched cattle of Rhodesia. Around March of 1896, rinderpest dropped like a bomb-shell on the poor animals. Then the Company government decided to destroy some of the cattle in order to prevent the disease from spreading. Although the veterinary campaigns might have appeared sound from scientific point of view, they none the less caused more misunderstanding and resentment between the Africans and the Europeans. Several herds of healthy cattle were slaughtered and then buried or burned by government officials, as a preventive measure against the spreading of rinderpest. To most Africans the veterinary campaigns were not only very provocative but also wasteful and senseless.³¹ It was indeed unfortunate that the Company government failed to measure the extent of suffering and frustration among the Africans and, especially, the deep mood of resentment against European rule. The District Commissioners went ahead with the compulsory veterinary campaigns and even obtained police reinforcements to assist them.

In an atmosphere of resentment, distrust and frustration, most Africans came to believe that the white man was the cause of all their troubles. He was held responsible not only for the hut tax, forced labour and flogging but also for the drought, famine, locusts and rinderpest. The fact that the District Commissioners continued to collect tax and labour and to enforce the veterinary orders during such difficult moments appeared as ample proof that the European had only come to cause hardships and miseries. Because of the intensity of European pressures, which were accompanied by a great deal of cruelty and oppression, several African paramounts, both Shona and Ndebele, finally felt the necessity of taking action against the

European intruders, between 1895 and 1897. Resentment against an alien administration, forced labour, hut tax and the "Native Police" nurtured a common feeling for resistance and a strong sense of unity among the traditionalist Shona politicians, their followers, and the spirit medium (the *svikiro*), who articulated the grievances and troubles to a deeply frustrated and thus highly receptive African audience.

The political power and authority of Shona paramounts such as Mangwende, Makoni, or Mtoko were limited to their own paramountcies. There was neither a political nor military institution that cut across local allegiances and loyalties. The only persons whose influence spread across paramountcies were the *svikiro*. The *svikiro*, did not only have inter-territorial authority and influence, they also functioned rather independently of the paramount chiefs.

The spiritual provinces, such as those of Chaminuka, Nehanda, and Kagubi covered more than one political organization. Kagubi's spiritual provinces covered most of Matabeleland; Nehanda's province was northern and central Mashonaland. Unlike the paramount chiefs, the *svikiro* had an elaborate but secret network of communications. They exchanged a lot of messages and also coordinated their efforts.

The Shona believed that the *svikiro* had the power to communicate with Mwari and to learn about his wishes and order which they were obligated to announce to the people, who were, in turn, expected to listen to and carry out the orders once they were announced. The message that the *svikiro* were then spreading among the people was that the cause of all their grievances as well as the locusts and rinderpest was the white men, and that the Shona god, Mwari, having been moved by the suffering of his people, had decreed that the white men were to be driven out of the country. Generally speaking, many Africans believed that the *svikiro* were announcing Mwari's wishes and orders, and that failure to obey would bring natural disasters such as locusts, rinderpest, or droughts to paramountcies as well as personal misfortunes to individuals.

The *svikiro* also informed the people that they had nothing to fear because Mwari, being on their side, would turn the bullets of the white men's guns into harmless water. To many Europeans, and especially to most of the District Commissioners, the role of the *svikiro* upon the morale of the warriors was so strong that they

generally regarded them as the sole "agitators" of the resistance (*Chimurenga*).

Not all of the paramount chiefs, however, responded to the orders of the *svikiro*. Some, such as Mtoko and several others in the Midlands area, actually collaborated with the Europeans against their traditional enemies. Others, such as Mutasa, did not fight at all. Although the *svikiro* had provided a great deal of inspiring propaganda and high morale the success or failure of the *Chimurenga* depended more heavily on the political authority and influence of the paramount chiefs over their local followers and on the organizational skill of individual generals in each paramountcy. There was no common military front and very little coordination of operations among the revolting paramountcies. Each paramount chief either surrendered or was defeated separately, and by the end of 1897 both Ndebele and Shona had finally been thoroughly conquered by Europeans.

COMPANY ADMINISTRATION : PHASE III, THE END OF SHONA INDEPENDENCE

By 1898 the British South Africa Company had won complete control of all the Africans of Rhodesia by right of conquest, and the Company government made no delay in instituting the new order of things, which was to bring about fundamental changes, especially in the role of the paramount chiefs. The new order of things was laid down in the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council, 1898.³² Articles 1 to 78 deal primarily with European interests and with the relationship between the British South Africa Company and the British Government. In a very brief summary, the Order created a government that was to be entered upon the Company 'Administrator. In addition, there was to be an Executive Council.

'to assist the Administrator, consisting of the (British) Resident Commissioner, every Administrator other than the Senior Administrator, and not less than four members appointed by the Company, with the approval of a Secretary of State.'³³

The Order also created for the first time a legislative body for Southern Rhodesia.³⁴ The multiracial franchise of the Cape Colony was introduced in Southern Rhodesia, but here, as in the Cape

Colony, the number of Africans who could qualify to vote was quite small. In principle the Legislative Council was empowered to legislate for both the European and African populations of Southern Rhodesia, and its laws required the approval of the British High Commissioner of South Africa.

Simultaneously, the Order also instituted a special administrative system for the African population. It provided for a separate system of 'Native Administration.' "The Administrator shall appoint an officer to be called the secretary for Native Affairs and officers to be called Native Commissioners, and, if occasion requires, Assistant Native Commissioners . . ." ³⁵ The Secretary for Native Affairs' was supposed to "represent and protect" African interests in both the Executive Council and the Legislative Council.

The African population was then divided into two major districts, Matabeleland and Mashonaland. Each district was under a Chief District Commissioner, who was in charge of several District Commissioners.

The Order also allowed the Company to assign the Africans to 'Native Reserves,' which are currently termed Tribal Trust Lands, in which the Company was to retain the mineral rights. In theory the reserves were named after the traditional paramountcies, e.g. the Mangwende Reserve. But not all of the traditional paramount chiefs were recognized. Occasionally local sub-chiefs or village headmen who had been loyal to the Company Government during the *Chimurenga*, were recognized as paramount chiefs. By about 1900, nearly 150 paramount chiefs had been recognized and their number increased to 271 in 1911 and 330 in 1921. One of the aims of the European administrators was perhaps to break the Africans into several small units so as to prevent the recurrence of another *Chimurenga*. Besides, the boundaries of the new reserves rarely corresponded with those of traditional paramountcies.

Thus, in theory the Southern Rhodesia Order in Council of 1898 made provisions for a common multiracially oriented Legislative Council, but in practice it laid the foundation for a differential system of government and administration, in which European interests were equated with 'public interests', while Africans were relegated to the minor realm of 'Native Affairs'. The basic principles of the Rhodesian 'Native Policy' and administration, therefore,

were already in existence by December, 1898 and have continued to the present day.

While the Order had dealt primarily with the structure of the 'Native Administration', another ordinance, "The Native Regulations, 1898" provided more details on the powers, duties, and responsibilities of the Secretary for African Affairs, the Chief District Commissioner, the District Commissioner, Chiefs and Headmen.³⁶ Another ordinance, the "Registration of Native Regulations" had already been passed in 1895 to regulate European/African relations in urban areas. This ordinance laid the foundation for the notorious pass system and separate African locations in every Rhodesian town. Its major objective was to check the rate of African migration from the reserves into European towns.

The District Commissioner was designated as the major controller of European/African relations: "A Native Commissioner shall control the natives through their Tribal Chiefs and Headmen." Not only was he allowed full political control of the Africans, he was also given considerable authority to regulate their daily lives.

"A Native Commissioner shall have the power subject to the approval of the Administrator in Council of assigning lands for huts, gardens and grazing grounds for each kraal on vacant land or reserves in his district, and no new huts shall be built, or gardens cultivated without his consent and approval of the position selected."³⁷

He was responsible for maintaining law and order, for registering the huts in each village and for collecting the hut tax and labour. In short, the District Commissioner had become the real ruler of the Africans.

The traditional role and customary functions of the African had virtually disappeared. Although the Chief had been recognized as the local spokesman for his people, he had lost political autonomy and initiative. He was now required to "aid and assist" the District Commissioner in "the registration of huts and in collection of the hut tax when the same becomes due," in the arrest of criminal offenders and suppression of customs and habits considered repugnant according to the European notions of justice and morality and to announce and implement "all such public orders, directions

or notices as may be notified to him." He had essentially become an instrumental link between the European and the African populations. As a civil servant he was at the very bottom of the African Administration and had no share in the decision-making processes. As a tribal leader he was right at the top of his African population. He was, therefore, placed in the most unenviable position of having to speak for both the European authorities and his people simultaneously, especially when the interests of the African Administration were incompatible with African interests. The Chiefs, therefore, had to devise ways and means of reconciling the two interest groups—the Europeans who confirmed their appointment and paid their salaries and the Africans, whose choice, confidence and support they needed to remain popular and effective.

FOOTNOTES

1. It is not within the scope of this article to make of a detailed commentary on the Rudd Concession, and its tragic effects upon the Ndebele nation. For more details on the Concession consult, Stanlake Samkange, *On Trial for My Country* (London: Heinemann, 1969); Claire Pailey, *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia, 1888-1965*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966); Philip Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma; the Conquest and Settlement of Rhodesia*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1958); Great Britain, Colonial Office, Command Papers, Numbers 5918 and 7171; and Ulnindlela Mtshali, *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict* (New York: Hawthorn Book Inc, 1967).

2. For detail about the Charter see Great Britain, Colonial Office, Command Papers, Numbers 5918, 7383, and 7171, and Rhodesia, Southern, Laws Status etc., *The Status Law of Southern Rhodesia, from the Charter to December 31, 1898*, edited by Morgan O. Evans. (Salisbury: Argus Printing and Publishing Company, 1899.), pp. 1-10.

3. William Edwards, "Wiri" in Rhodesia, Southern, Department of Native Affairs, *The Native Affairs Department Annual* (Hereinafter referred to as *NADA*), Vol. 39, 1962, p. 23.

4. For more details on these treaties between the B.S.A. Co. and Shona Chiefs, see, Rhodesian National Archives, Item Number CT 1/11/1/8. See also the Treaty between Mutasa and the Company which is identical to the treaty-form presented to all Shona paramount chiefs in *NADA* Vol. II, 1933, p. 93.

5. It would not be within the scope of this article to discuss the details of the Shona resistance against the settlement of their mother country by the British settlers. For further details see especially, Great Britain, Colonial Office, *Report on the Native Administration of the British South Africa Company*, Sir Richard E.R. Martin, Chairman (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1897). Also Sir Johan Hobbs Harris, *The Chartered Millions; Rhodesia and the*

Challenge to the British Commonwealth (London: The Swarthmore Press Ltd., 1920);

Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma: the Conquest and Settlement of Southern Rhodesia* and Terrence

O. Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia, 1896-97: A study in African Resistance* (Evanston: Illions: Northwestern University Press, 1967).

6. For details on the connection between Rhodes, the British South Africa Company and the British Government consult, Great Britain, Colonial Office, Command Papers. Numbers 5918, 5524, 5904, 7190, and 7171. Also Harris, *The Chartered Millions; Palley The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965*; Sarah Gertrude Millin, *Rhodes* (New York: Kraus Reprint, 1969); and Samkange, *On Trial For My Country*.

7. R.S. Fairbridge, "The Pioneers of '91" in *Rhodesian Annual*, 1912-13 p. 13. For more details on the members of the Pioneer Column consult, Rhodesian National Archives, Item Number CTI/20/2, on recruitment, instructions and the Mashonaland. Also march from South Africa to Marshall Hugh Hole, *The Making of Rhodesia* (London: Cass, 1967); Mason, *The Birth of a Dilemma*, and Oliver Ransford, *The Rulers of Rhodesia*, from earliest times to the referendum (London: The Camelot Press Ltd., 1968).

8. "Be it therefore enacted that the Laws now in force in the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope shall, so far as applicable, be the laws to be in force and to be observed within the aforesaid territory of Mashonaland, save as here in after in this ordinance is specially otherwise provided." Rhodesian National Archives, Item Number A1/7/1, "Mashonaland Laws and Regulations, Ordinance Number 1,1890, p. 3.

9. The British South African Company, Report, *Annual Meeting*, November 29, 1892, p. 5

10. For further information on the economic switch from mining to agriculture consult, Montague Yudelman, *Africans on the Land, Economic Problems of African Agricultural Development in Southern. Central and East Africa, with special reference to Southern Rhodesia* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1964); and William J. Barber, *The Economy of British Central Africa; a case study of economic development in a dualistic society*, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1961).

11. Although commercial agriculture had then become the major economic activity, the Company was still advertising the possibilities of large gold reefs in Matabeleland. Many of the colonists, therefore were eager "to take the field" against the Ndebele. During the course of his speech before the Annual Meeting of the B.S.A.Co., November 29, 1892, Rhodes himself made a penetrating confession: "In fact, I came to the conclusion that it was easier to conquer an old country than to occupy a new one (delegates cheered) because in the one case however, terrific the contest might be, there was the wealth of the land and of the citizens, the wealth of the country as perhaps the reward." Within less than a year Rhodes saw the fulfilment of his dream. The British South

The Shona and the British South Africa Company

Africa Company had mobilized the despairing settlers and invaded the Ndebele Kingdom in October, 1893. They defeated Lo Bengula and appropriated not only his land and subjects but also his cattle, which became the property of the Company.

12. Consult Great Britain, Colonial Office, Command Paper Number 5918, p. 224. Consult also *The Statute Law of Southern Rhodesia from the Charter to December 31, 1898*, edited by Evans, p. 5, for the Royal Charter; Rhodesian National Archives, Item Number CTI/11/118 for treaties between the B.S.A.Co., and Shona paramount chiefs; Harris, *The Chartered Millions* and Palley, *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia*, 1888-1965.

13 Speech by Cecil John Rhodes, at an Annual Meeting of the B.S.A. Co., November 29, 1892, p. 6.

14 "In view of the recent disbandment of the Military Police, I would point out that the immediate appointment of Field Cornets is imperative, taking into account the numbers of native disputes and other slight troubles, constantly occurring over a very wide area and the impossibility, with our small civil Police Force (quite sufficient for ordinary Police duties) of constantly sending parties out to enquire into these matters." Jameson to the Secretary of the British South Africa Company, Cape Town, January 11, 1892. Rhodesian National Archives, Item Number LOS/2/17. Consult also the Cape of Good Hope, Transkeian Territories, Laws, Statutes etc. *Revised Proclamations and other Legislation in force in the Transkeian Territories*, edited by M. Smuts, Vol. 1, 1877-1910. (Pretoria : Government Printer, 1937), for the origin as well as the duties and responsibilities of a Field Cornet.

15 Martin, Chairman, *Report on the Native Administration of the British South Africa Company*, Command Paper Number 7171, p. 33. Africans in fertile locations and especially in the vicinity of mission stations, where some progress had been initiated in improving the methods of agriculture through manuring and crop rotation, were also considered a threat by the white colonists. These Africans were very unwilling to leave their profitable agricultural pursuits for the low wages and terrible working conditions on white farms and in the mines.

16 Rhodesian National Archives Item Number DSI/1/1. Report by Nesbitt himself to the Resident Magistrate in Salisbury, August 3, 1893. For more information on the labour practices of the Mining Commissioners, see Great Britain, Command Papers Number 7171.

17. March 17, 1892, in the Mangwende Paramountcy. Generally known as the Ngomo Affair (Ngomo being the Europeanized version of Gomwe), Consult, Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, p. 64 ; and especially Martin, *Report on the Native Administration of the British South Africa Company*, Command Paper Number 7171. Also Jean Farrant, *Mashonaland Martyr* (London : Oxford University Press, 1966) ; p. 151-153.

18. The Administrator, like the other white settlers in Mashonaland believed in swift, authoritative action against the "natives." "Jameson's administration fully recognized its obligation to maintain the armour of respect,

the cloak of invulnerability. Its only major activity in the field of 'native affairs' arose out of this obligation", Ranger, *Revolt in Southern Rhodesia*, pp. 64-69. The Gomwe affair was preceded by another punitive raid against headman, Chirimuzimba (Rhodesian National Archives Item Number CT1/15/1). A white prospector Guerold had died in the Chirimuzimba area. Jameson sent Captain Graham with police reinforcement to investigate the cause of death. He returned to Salisbury with seven suspects, after having burned three villages. The seven were summarily sentenced to death.

19. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss the details of the Ndebele War. The result of the war, however, had tremendous consequences for the Shona. For details of the war itself consult, Great Britain, Colonial Office, Command Paper Numbers 1970 and 7555. Also Stafford Glass, *The Matabele War* (London: Longmans, 1968,); and W.A. Wills and L.T. Collingridge, *The Downfall of Lo Bengula; the cause, history, and effect of the Matabele war* (New York: Negro University Press, 1969)

20. The settlers who volunteered for military service during the Company, invasion of the Ndebele nation were promised land, claims of gold and booty, just as the Pioneers of 1890. For further details on the "Matabele Loot," as it was officially called, consult Rhodesian National Archives, Item Number T8/3/1.

21. For items of the Matabele Order in Council, consult Evans, editor *The Statute Law of Southern Rhodesia from the Charter to December 31, 1898*, pp. 22-26. See also Palley, *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1969*, for legal and historical significance of the order to the Company, the Ndebele and the Shona.

22. "The main change as between old and new administrative arrangements was that the Company was to enjoy real legislative power based on authorization by the Crown after British conquest of the country. Not only was its legislative power now firmly based, but it was augmented by a grant to the Administrator and an advisory Council of power to pass Regulations." Palley, *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965*, p. 115.

23. Evans, editor, *The Statute Law of Southern Rhodesia from charter to December 31, 1898*. The Matabele Order in Council, Part II, Administration Legislation, Section 22, p. 25.

24. In a conversation which Jameson in May 1892, Rhodes himself had stated: "At my suggestion please consider we are strong eno' to put on a hut tax for the following reason we don't sell liquor to natives and they must be choke full of beads and calico. The result is a steady drain on any gold in the country which is either buried or taken to Portuguese, to buy liquor with. A hut tax taking money produce or labour will at any rate save us of our gold carted out of the country: the only doubt is whether we are strong eno'." Rhodesian National Archives, Item Number A1/5/10.

The Shona and the British South Africa Company

25. Mashonaland Laws and Regulations, Rhodesian, National Archives, Item Number A1/7/1 and also Item Number. A15/1/1.

26. British South Africa Company, *Annual Report*, 1894-1895.

27. The author prefers to use the more acceptable term, *District Commissioner* instead of *Native Commissioner*, and also *African Administration* instead of *Native Administration*.

28. William Edwards, one of the first District Commissioners of the Company Administration in Southern Rhodesia. He was assigned to the Mangwende Paramountcy, about fifty miles north-east of Salisbury. "William Edwards" in Rhodesian National Archives Item Number Ed6/1/1, p. 2.

29. According to Sir Richard E.R. Martin, Chairman of the Royal Commission that investigated that the cause of the Shona and Ndebele revolts of 1895-96, "I think, however, more care might with advantage have been taken by the Administration in the selection of officials entrusted with control of the Natives, some of whom were too young and inexperienced for the important posts they held, and were not men calculated to inspire the Native with respect, either for themselves or the government that they represented." *Report on the Native Administration of the British South Africa Company*, p. 7.

30 Farrant, *Mashonaland Martyr*, p. 200.

31 As William Edwards, the District Commissioner over the Mangwende paramountcy at the time observed, "The policy of the government in destroying herds of healthy cattle, so as to check the spread of the disease, was misunderstood by the native; and what was even worse from the native point of view, the carcasses of the dead and slaughtered cattle were burned or buried. 'Who ever heard of food being destroyed like this, if our cattle die well, we could eat them; but these people bury and burn them, and grain is scarce. They want us to die of famine.'" Edwards, "The Wanoe; A Short Historical Sketch in *NADA*, No. 4, 1926, pp. 20-21.

32. Exans, editor, *The Statute Law of Southern Rhodesia from Charter to December 31, 1898*. Also Palley *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965*.

34. "There shall be in Southern Rhodesia a legislative body to be styled 'The Legislative Council' composed of the Administrator or Administrators for the time being, the Resident Commissioner, and nine other members, of whom five, hereinafter referred to as "nominated members," shall be appointed by the Company with the approval of the Secretary of State, and four shall be elected by the registered in the manner hereinafter provided." *Ibid.*, Article 17, Section 1, p. 38.

35. *Ibid.*, Part V, Article 79, Section 1.

36. *Ibid.*, The High Commissioner's Proclamations, "The Southern Rhodesia Native Regulations," December 30, 1898, p. 167.

37. *Ibid.*, Article 10, p. 169. Also Martin, Chairman, *Report on the Native Administration of the British South Africa Company*, p. 79; and Palley, *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965*.

Dr. Vijaya Gupta

India and Africa

QUARTERLY CHRONICLE

January-December 1974

Arabs 'inspired' by the Indian PM's support :

The new Chief Representative of the Arab League in New Delhi Mr. Shurallah, has said that the "Arab nation has drawn strength and inspiration from Mrs. Indira Gandhi's support for them during the recent battle.

Placing wreaths at the Rajghat, Shantivana and Vijayaghat—Mr. Shukrallah, said Mahatma Gandhi had forged links of brotherhood between the India and Arab struggles for national liberation. His novel method of fighting for freedom had made a profound impression on the Arab minds ; in Mr. Nehru they had found one of the greatest champions of freedom and justice. (January 1974)

Seminar on Comparative Education Education Minister's Inaugural Address

Prof. S. Nurul Hasan, Union Minister of Education Social Welfare and Culture, inaugurated a seminar on Educational Structures in developing countries at the National Staff College, New Delhi, Speaking to the participants Prof. Hasan said that in most international forums the usual practice is to bring together the developed and developing nations. Problems common to the developing countries cannot be adequately highlighted at such forums and it is, therefore, essential that they should meet by themselves to devise solutions to the various issues facing them.

Educational experts from Tanzania, were among the delegates attending the two-day seminar. Among the subjects listed for discussion were alternative educational strategies and implications of the life long education concept. (February 1974)

Swaran Singh hits out at US, UK on base

Mr. Swaran Singh, External Affairs Minister who was speaking at a meeting of the Bureau of Nonaligned Summit, said the Anglo-American decision on Garcia base was a serious development which went against the publicly expressed desire of the overwhelming majority of the littoral State of the Indian Ocean to make this area a zone of peace through a reduction of great power rivalries and tensions.

He said the decision to develop the base facilities constituted explicit extension of the presence of one great power which could not but have an effect of sparking escalation of rivalries and consequent tensions. It ignored calls made by nonaligned countries since the Lusaka conference for keeping the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and constituted violation of the declaration adopted by UN General Assembly.

It was India's earnest hope, the Foreign Minister went on, that even at this late stage the great powers concerned would respect the wishes of the littoral powers and desist from proceeding further with the implementation of their decision, it was, therefore, appropriate that all nonaligned nations continued their efforts both in the United Nations and elsewhere in their common endeavour to attain this objective. (March 1974)

Concern on Garcia conveyed to U.S.

India has conveyed its "deep" concern to the United States about its proposal to establish a military base in the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia, the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Surendrapal Singh, told the Lok Sabha (Indian Parliament). (April 1974)

Protest against Diego Garcia at US Embassy

More than 500 persons, including some Members of Parliament, demonstrated outside the American Embassy in Chanakyapuri to protest against the setting up of the US air and naval base at the Diego Garcia island in the Indian Ocean.

The demonstration, which included about 50 women, was organised by the Delhi Peace and Solidarity Organisation in response to a call from the World Peace Council.

Speaking at the rally later, the leaders demanded of the US Government to dismantle the base and leave the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. A copy of the protest note was handed over to an Embassy official. (April 1974)

Nehru's works for Dakar University

The Indian Ambassador to Senegal has presented several volumes of Jawaharlal Nehru's Works on politics and culture to Dakar University. (April 1974)

African students hail Portugal coup

The African Students' Association (India) has welcomed the coup d'etat in Portugal as it has raised the hopes of the liberation movements in Africa, a note issued by the association in Delhi said.

"It would be naive to expect the freedom-fighters to lay down arms after a decade of struggle, and Lisbon must keep in mind that any dialogue with them would require goodwill and understanding, they would not surrender, the note added.

"Though there had been talk on the possibility of the Portuguese settlers making a unilateral declaration of independence like Mr. Ian Smith did in Rhodesia, such a move would be suicidal" the note said. (May 1974)

India's Support to African freedom-fighters

Addressing a public meeting organised by the All India Peace and Solidarity Organisation at New Delhi to observe "South African Freedom Day". External Affairs Minister Sardar Swaran Singh called upon the International community as a whole and each individual foreign country not only to lend their moral support but also to give maximum possible material support to the south African people's long and difficult struggle.

The External Affairs Minister said the International community should not shirk its responsibility towards these struggling people of South Africa because apartheid was not only an African problem but a problem of the entire humanity. He welcomed the recent events leading to coming into power of a liberal

regime in Portugal and said that for India and other Afro-Asian countries, the test of this change of wind in that country would be the attitude of the new Portuguese regime adopted towards the liberation of its colonies.

Mr. K.D. Malaviya, Union Minister of Steel and Mines, who presided, appealed to all countries of the world to extend their fullest possible support to freedom fighters of Africa, particularly for the anti-apartheid struggle of the South African people.

The meeting later adopted a resolution reiterating India's traditional support for the South African people's long and difficult struggle against the "inhuman system of apartheid". The resolution also renewed the Indian people's determination to continue to render all possible support to the liberation movements in southern Africa and Guinea Bissau till final victory.

The meeting paid its homage to the innumerable martyrs of all races and ethnic origins who had laid down their lives in freedom struggles in South Africa in order to build a society based on equality and brotherhood. (June 1974)

India Supports African Move at U.N.

India gave strong support in the U.N. Security Council on October 26, 1974 to the move by African States to expel South Africa from the world organization for its continued adherence to racialism and defiance of the U.N. charter.

"It is our view that South Africa has earned its expulsion by its incorrigible conduct", said Mr. Rikhi Jaipal, Permanent representative of India at the resumed meeting of the Council. A draft resolution to clinch the issue of expulsion was brought before the Council by the African members of the Council i.e. Kenya, Mauritania, Cameroon. The resolution invokes the charter to recommend the expulsion. (October 1974)

India renews support to people of Zimbabwe

India has renewed at a United Nations forum its "moral and material support" to the people of Zimbabwe in their legitimate struggle against the illegal Ian Smith regime of Southern Rhodesia to achieve independence".

Mr. D.C. Gosawami, MP, member of the Indian delegation, intervened in the debate on Rhodesia in the UN Committee on Non-Self-Governing Territories, to welcome the action taken by the freedom-fighters in stepping up their guerilla activities in Zimbabwe, specially in north-eastern part of the territory.

"We wish them all success in their efforts and hope that the struggle for self-determination and independence, though hard and arduous, will soon come to a worthy end, namely in ending servitude and oppression which the people of Zimbabwe have endured for all these years. If history was any guide" he said "their sacrifices would not go in vain".

Mr. Goswami expressed dissatisfaction at the half-hearted way" in which the UK government as the 'de jure' administering power was tackling the illegal Ian Smith regime. (October 1974)

Walk-out against invitation to South Africa

India walked out of the executive committee meeting of the International Dairy Federation (IDF) in Delhi on November 29, 1973 to protest against the stand taken by the Federation on invitations to South Africa and Israel.

India as host country had not extended an invitation to the two countries to attend the annual meeting of the Federation and the executive took exception to this. Dr. T. Kurien, leader of Indian delegation and Chairman of the forthcoming International Dairy congress staged a walk-out. (November 1974)

Algeria Hails Tripartite Agreement :

President Boumedienne and Foreign Minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria in letters to the Presidents, Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of India and Bangladesh have hailed the signing of the tripartite agreement between India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

Mr. Boumedienne's letter reads: "Algeria is deeply pleased with the signing of this agreement which illustrates the triumph of wisdom and high sense of responsibility. The success that countries have just obtained will be hailed by all peace and liberty loving forces as an act of faith in the future of the sub-continent a future of stability, progress and wellbeing for the whole people of the region".

"It marks the resolute will of your peoples and their eminent leaders to devote themselves further to the economic liberation, the development and the promotion of a new era of understanding and cooperation.

Mr. Bouteflika has said : "It constitutes the most outstanding stage in the process of total normalisation of your relations and opens real perspectives of comprehension and understanding. This agreement confirms us the faith that we are always having in the policy of brotherhood and good neighbourliness . . ." (April 1974)

Algerian Minister Meets Mrs. Gandhi

The Algerian Foreign Minister, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika had a 90-minute meeting with the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, he gave her a detailed account of the proceedings of the third Islamic Foreign Ministers conference in Kuala Lumpur. Mr. Bouteflika made an unscheduled halt here on his way from Kuala Lumpur where he headed his country's delegation to the conference.

Mr. Bouteflika conveyed to Mrs. Gandhi the Algerian President, Mr. Boumedienne's views on India's peaceful nuclear blast.

Mrs. Gandhi explained to Mr. Bouteflika that India's intentions were to use nuclear energy only for peaceful purposes and that the exaggerated fears expressed by some of India's neighbours were unfounded. (July 1974)

Indian Ventures in Gabon mooted

India has agreed to extend technical and economic co-operation on a wide-ranging scale to Gabon under a protocol signed here between the two countries.

India would depute teachers doctors and engineers and assist Gabon to get in touch with Indian industrialists interested in establishing soap, glass, plywood, shoe and tobacco, industries in that country.

The protocol, details of which were worked out during discussions between officials of the two sides which continued till early hours of this morning, were signed by T.A. Pai, Minister for Industries and Civil Supplies, on behalf of India and Mr. Paul Moukambi, Minister for Economy and Finance on behalf of Gabon.

Indian private firms would make contacts with organisations

in Gabon to explore the possibilities of establishing such industries in that country. Gabon has indicated that terms for private investment in that country are very liberal.

Along with rail, road, bridges and ports engineers, Gabon also wanted railway wagons and track equipments and India has agreed to make an offer for supply of this equipment.

On its part, India has made known to the Gabonese that it is interested in undertaking turnkey jobs in Gabon or to subcontract for the supply of machinery and equipment including those for refinery, iron ore, mining, production of natural gas, establishment of cement, textiles and paper plants as well as machine-building industry.

India has also shown interest in joint venture in fisheries.

Gabon is rich in minerals including uranium and crude oil. India has offered its consultancy services and indicated that it would be interested in prospecting oil in Gabon.

Regarding trade between the two countries, preliminary discussions have indicated the possibilities for the supply of several commodities to Gabon. Gabon, on its part, has agreed to consider the question of increasing the production of palm oil for export to India (October 1974)

India Egypt for further co-operation :

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Sadat met without aides for more than an hour and they discussed ways and means of greater bilateral cooperation. The talks dealt with wide-ranging subjects, particularly the situation in West Asia.

Mr. Sadat received unstinted support from India for the Arab struggle for the liberation of their lands, while Mrs. Gandhi expressed warm appreciation of the "Wise and far-sighted role Mr. Sadat was playing.

President V.V. Giri at the banquet later pointed out that for the last quarter century Egypt along with other Arab countries had to face the problem of an expansionist and aggressive neighbour. "We saw how a part of the national energies of Egypt was diverted to rectifying this unacceptable and intolerable situation, with the result that the tasks of economic reconstruction and social and cultural regeneration could not proceed as fast as they would otherwise

have". Indian President pledged India's support to the Arab people in the difficult days ahead, and said "While we share your joy and satisfaction at your great successes, we have no illusions of the difficult days ahead. We shall stand by you and give whatever support we can in this great struggle of the Arab people." he added.

The Egyptian leader expressed warm appreciation of India's stand in a reply to the President's toast said : "It is not only a duty but also an honour which compels us to correct a situation which Your Excellency has quite rightly described as intolerable. I appreciate India's stand and brotherly support for us in our just struggle against aggression which has not been aimed at Egypt only but against our Arab neighbours, the peoples of Palestine and our holy places in Jerusalem".

Cairo Indians' fund for war wounded :

The Indian community in Cairo has made a contribution of Rs. 39,460/- for the benefit of soldiers wounded in the October war.

A cheque for the amount was presented in Cairo yesterday to Mrs. Gehan Anwar-el Sadat, President of the Egyptian Red Crescent Society by Mrs. Ashok Bhadkamkar, wife of the Indian Ambassador to Cairo.

Receiving the donation, Mrs. Sadat thanked Mrs. Bhadkamkar and members of the Indian community for the kind gesture. (February 1974)

Swaran Singh confers with Sadat and Fahmy :

The External Affairs Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh, conferred at Cairo with the Egyptian President, Mr. Anwar Sadat, during a one-day stopover in the Egyptian capital.

Mr. Swaran Singh spent about an hour with President Sadat discussing West Asia, the Indian sub-continent and the general international situation.

Mr. Swaran Singh also met the Egyptian Foreign Minister Mr. Ismail Fahmy, for a discussion on the Non aligned Nations' Bureau meeting which Mr. Swaran Singh was on his way to attend at Algiers. (March 1974)

Indian aid offer to Egypt :

Indian is willing to help in Egypt's post-war reconstruction programme, including the development of the Suez Canal, Indian Commerce Minister D.P. Chattopadhyaya said in Cairo.

Mr. Chattopadhyay, who held talks here with the Deputy Premier and Economy Minister, Dr. Abdel Aziz Hegazy, said India would also take part in rebuilding the canal region with new railways and engineering work.

The Minister said that during his talks he discussed the need to increase trade between the two countries, which had dropped in recent years. (March 1974)

New Egyptian envoy presents credentials :

The new Egyptian Ambassador Mr. Zakaria El-Adli Iman conveyed to the President Mr. V.V. Giri, that people of his country followed "with enthusiasm the great strides which India is achieving in Industry and agriculture as well as in science and technology".

Presenting his credentials, the new Ambassador said that Egypt admired the wise and determined initiatives taken by India which are leading steadily to normalisation among the countries of the Indian sub-continent. Stressing the close relations that existed between the two countries, he said he was confident that there was greater scope for widening and deepening these relations.

Mr. Imam also appreciated the constant and staunch support India lent to the cause of Palestine and the struggle of Arab countries against the expansionist designs of Zionism.

Welcoming the new Ambassador, Mr. Giri reiterated India's stand that a solution to the West Asia problem should be on the basis of restoration to the right owners of all Arab lands occupied by armed aggression and a realisation of the rights of Palestinians. He had no doubt the determination of Egyptians to safeguard their legitimate rights and their capacity for sacrifice in the nation's cause would ensure an early attainment of this objective. (June 1974)

Reconstruction : Egypt Keen on Indian Knowhow.

Egypt has proposed to India that in co-operation with any other friendly country, triangular arrangements be made for assisting Egypt's massive reconstruction programme.

Prima facie, it has been noted that in a wider range of intermediate technology, India has achieved reasonable sophistication and it would be possible for India to co-operate purposefully in the Egyptian reconstruction programme.

In this connection, areas like geophysical and hydrological surveys, participation in new railway construction and irrigation programmes and the capital goods have been identified.

There will be an exchange of technical-cum-business groups between the two countries to study the wide spectrum of these possibilities. (June-1974)

Strengthening Economic Ties with Egypt :

Egypt will import short-staple cotton from India to be used in the manufacture low-priced cloth an agreement to this effect was concluded in Cairo on March 19 between Mr. Hegazy, Deputy Premier Economy and Foreign Trade, and Mr. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Indian Minister of Commerce. Under the agreement the volume of trade exchange between Egypt and India in 1974 will be increased. The consolidation and strengthening of trade and economic ties between the two countries within the framework of tripartite cooperation between Egypt, India and Yugoslavia was also discussed during the meeting.

The two sides reviewed the volume of trade exchange between the two countries last year amounting to £ 30 million and to increase it. At the beginning of the meeting Dr. Hegazy explained the dimension of development of the Egyptian economy and of open-door economic policy allowing for cooperation with other countries especially friendly ones. Referring to Egypt's needs Dr. Hegazy said that it needed foodstuffs, raw materials and spare parts to operate the idle capacities which had an estimated production of L.E. 500 million.

He said there was a project for the increase of cultivated area in Egypt by 800,000 feddans of which half a million feddans had been reclaimed. Egypt needed aid to finish the work of reclamation, he added. The Indian Minister said that it would be possible to effect a fruitful and authentic cooperation between India and Egypt. He said there would be an exchange of technical and technological experience between Egypt and India and technological

experience between Egypt and India and that India would participate in transport projects in Egypt especially maritime transport.

The Indian Minister added that his country would further take part in Egyptian free zone projects. India will send government and private sector delegations to Egypt to study the requirements of the country in the field of light and heavy industries and the extent of possible cooperation in this respect, it was agreed.

Exchange of farm tools with Egypt

A protocol for the exchange materials, including seeds and implement for experimental purposes and Information and documentation in agriculture was signed between India and Egypt, in Delhi on November 28, 1974. This was in continuation of the protocol signed earlier, in 1969, between the two countries concerning technical and scientific cooperation in the field of agriculture.

In the field of crop improvement, both countries would cooperate in evolving high-yielding and high-quality varieties and hybrids of field crops. (November 1974)

Kenya Mayors honoured

The Municipal Corporation, Delhi, gave a reception to the six Kenya mayors who were on an official visit to the Capital.

In an informal chat with newsmen, the mayors said they were impressed by the beatification and other utility project accomplished by the Municipal Corporation.

Mr. J.K. Mundia, Mayor of Thika, said the town in his country were comparatively small and did not have the complexity of problems in civic matters. Nairobi, which was the largest and oldest town, had a population of nearly 3 lakhs. Other cities had a population of as much as 60,000.

The Mayors also visited some of the housing colonies built by the Delhi development Authority. (March 1974)

India, Kenya discuss tax evasion

Indian and Kenyan officials held at New Delhi seven-day discussions on avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion. (May 1974)

Indian firm to help build nylon unit in Kenya

A synthetic yarn plant costing 5.3 million Kenyan pounds (6.2 million sterling) is to be built at Thika, near Nairobi, as a joint venture of a Kenya and an Indian company.

The plant will produce more than five tons of nylon and rayon yarn a day, according to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

The project is a joint venture of the Kenyan Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation and JK Synthetics of India and will employ 1000 people.

The Ministry said there were also plans for two more textile factories in Nkuru and Eldoret which are approaching completion. (October 1974)

Kenya backs stand on Indian Ocean

Kenya shares with India the view that the Indian Ocean should be a zone of peace.

This was stated in a Press release issued by the Kenya High Commission in New Delhi on the eve of the 11th independence day of Kenya.

The release also says that India's support for the struggle for Independence in South Africa Rhodesia and other African countries still under colonialism has been "highly appreciated" by the Kenya Government. (December 1974)

Indo-Kenyan joint ventures

The Press release refers to the trade and co-operation between the two countries in economic and industrial fields. It says that Kenya tops the list of African countries which have joint ventures with Indian counterparts.

The biggest of their joint ventures is the \$ 50 million pulp and paper project of Pan African Paper Mills in Kenya. This is a joint venture of the Government of Kenya, Orient Paper Mills of India and the International Finance Corporation.

The Industry went on trial production on December 1 and this is a one of the largest single industrial ventures in East Africa. India and both Kenya welcome such joint ventures, especially between developing countries as they contribute towards closer economic

cooperation transfer of appropriate technology and expansion of trade. (December 1974)

Exports to Libya by 580 pc:

India's exports to Libya during the first six months of 1973 have shown an increase of nearly 580 per cent over the same period last year.

From January to June 1973, India exported goods worth Rs. 2.71 crores as against goods worth only Rs. 4.6 lakhs in the same period in 1972:

The main terms of exports to Libya were steel pipes structural angles, manhole covers, textile machinery and accessories tobacco tea aluminium conductors, cables, jute bags, five horse power diesel engines, turmeric, handicrafts and textile fabrics. The number of items exported to Libya have also gone up from 50 in 1972 to 115 in 1973. (January 1974)

Technical help with Libya discussed

The three-member Indian hydro-geological delegation, which recently visited Libya, discussed the possibility of technical co-operation between the two countries in various fields like drilling, hydro-geology, hydrophysics and hydrology. (March 1974)

India and Libya sign oil agreement

An oil agreement under which India would buy crude from Libya during 1975 and provide that country with oil technicians was signed in Tripoli on October 12, 1974.

The agreement called for an exchange of contracts between Libyan and Indian officials on the possibility of granting India oil exploration opportunities in Libya on the basis of starting production. The agreement provides for the training by India of a number of Libyans on technical matters.

The agreement followed talks in Tripoli by an Indian team led by Additional Secretary in the Petroleum and Chemical Ministry S.M.H. Burney. (October 1974)

House-Building knowhow for Libya

Prospects of Indian collaboration with Libya in construction

works have been opened up with the visit of a builders delegation from India.

While India has considerable expertise and experience in this sector; this is the first time it has offered assistance in a big way.

The builders delegation, accompanied by the Indian Ambassador to Libya had talks with the Libyan Housing Minister and other senior officials on the terms for collaboration.

Several projects are likely to be finalized.

The Libyan authorities have also provided the delegation with data on construction patterns and the relevant rules and regulations in force in that country. (November 1974)

Mauritius Minister arrives

Mauritius works Minister Abdool Khak Mahmood Osman came to India on a 14-day official visit.

Mr. Osman who was received by the Union Minister for works, Housing and Urban Development, Mr. Bhola Paswan Shastri and others at the airport went around CPWD works in the Capital and discussed matters of mutual interest with Mr. Shastri.

Mr. Osman also visited Bombay, Agra, Ajmer and Hyderabad. (February 1974)

India's assurance to Mauritius

India has assured all necessary technical assistance for the development of Mauritius particularly for reorganisation of technical infrastructure for execution of projects.

This assurance, was given by Works and Housing Minister Bhola Paswan Shastri, when the visiting Mauritius Minister of Works A.H.M. Osman, called on him.

During the meeting, steps to increase the scope and extent of Indian technical assistance to Mauritius for strengthening the technical assistance in the ministry works were discussed. (February 1974)

Mauritius on American base in Indian Ocean

The Mauritius Prime Minister Sir Ramgoolam, at a half-hour meeting with the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi, expressed his country's total opposition to the conversion of the Indian Ocean

island of Diego Garcia into a military base.

Sir Ramgoolam, who arrived at New Delhi on a three-day visit, called on Mrs Gandhi at her house and talks with her on important bilateral matters and the Indian Ocean.

Speaking to newsmen latter, Sir Ramgoolam said: "We have been talking on matters which are of common interest to Mauritius and India". He said relations between the two countries "are most friendly". Both the countries were constantly in touch with each other on various international issues.

Mrs. Gandhi gave an informal dinner in honour of the visiting Prime Minister.

Mauritius given patrol boat :

The Mauritius Prime Minister, Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam received at a simple ceremony a police patrol boat. INS Amar, a gift from India presented by the Indian High Commissioner Mr. K.D. Sharma. (March 1974)

India-Mauritius aid talks :

India and Mauritius are to explore further avenues of cooperation in economic and industrial fields.

Matters relating to development projects of Mauritius, including housing, are likely to be discussed between the leaders of that country and the Union Minister for Works and Housing Mr. Bhola Paswan Shastri, who went to Port Louis on a five-day visit at the invitation of the Government of Mauritius.

Mr. Shastri attended the Sixth Independence Anniversary celebrations of the island on March 12. India and Mauritius signed an agreement of cooperation and assistance during the visit to India by the Prime Minister, Sir Ramgoolam in January 1972.

Under this agreement, India agreed to give Mauritius a grant of Rs. 1 crore and a loan of over Rs 3 crores for various development projects. India also agreed to provide technical assistance at a cost of about Rs. 20 lakhs. (March 1974)

Indian Envoy to Mauritius :

India's Ambassador to Argentina, Mr. Madan Mohan Khurana, has been appointed High Commissioner of India to Mauritius in

succession to Mr. Krishan Dayal Sharma. (August 1974)

BSES gets Mauritius contract :

Bombay Suburban Electric Supply has secured a contract for the electrification of a five star hotel in Mauritius, through its contract division.

The division has also signed a contract for the erection of a hydro set at Vaitarna. (September 1974)

Indo-Mozambique Relations :

India's Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi, congratulated the President of the front for liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), Mr. Samora Machel, the Prime Minister of the provisional government of Mozambique, Mr. Jeochim Cissano, and their colleagues on their inspiring leadership, which culminated in the heroic victory of Frelimo in attaining independence for Mozambique. In a letter delivered in October to Mr. Machel at Dar-es-Salaam by Mr Jagat Mehta, additional secretary to the ministry of external affairs, and special envoy of Mrs. Gandhi, she said that Frelimo's achievement was an outstanding chapter in the attempt of the people of Asia and Africa to throw off the colonial yoke. She expressed the hope that Mozambique and India, with their traditional friendship and as neighbours across the seas, would forge new and mutually beneficial relationship in keeping with the spirit of the age and in the interest of the developing world.

Mr. Mehta also had a wide-ranging discussion with President Machel who outlined how new Mozambique would seek to embark on its goal to ensure political, economic, social and cultural liberty for her people. Frelimo he said, was committed to opposing all discrimination on grounds of race, religion tribe or sex. Mr. Machel expressed his appreciation of Mrs. Gandhi for sending a special envoy to greet the new government of Mozambique and explore possibilities of developing fruitful cooperation between the governments and and peoples. (November 1974)

Indian Trade Team in Mozambique :

An Indian trade delegation, by led Mr. C.M. Stephen, MP, visited Mozambique.

The delegation had talks with the officials of the transitional Government of Mozambique on establishing trade relations between the two countries. (December 1974)

Indian help for Nigerian paper mill :

Nigeria has signed two agreements with an Indian-firm for the expansion of the Country's only paper mill at Jebba and the establishment of a shrimp company.

The agreement with the Indian firm Birla Brothers (Private) Limited is to expand the mill which produces industrial papers from its current output of 12,000 tons annually to a capacity of 100,000 tons at a cost of 48 million naira. (July 1974)

President Senghor Visits India :

The ten-day State visit of Mr. Leopold Senghor resulted not only in a series of bilateral agreements on economic, cultural and technical co-operation between India and Senegal, but more significantly in a deepening sense of respect for the poet-President who has come to symbolise over the past three decades the renascent spirit of Africa.

Trade accord with Senegal :

India and Senegal signed a five-year agreement for economic, technical and scientific cooperation and a separate one-year trade agreement for stimulating imports and exports between the two countries.

The two agreements were signed by the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh and the Senegal Foreign Minister, Mr. Assance Seck in Rashtrapati Bhavan, New Delhi, shortly before the departure of the Senegal President, Mr. Leopold Sedar Senghor.

Under the trade agreement, which is renewable every year, India will export to Senegal textiles, chemical products, engineering and electrical goods, rubber manufactures, tobacco and food and beverages. At present Indian export to Senegal amount to Rs. 1 crore annually.

In turn India will import from Senegal petroleum products, rock phosphate, hides and skins, chemical fertilisers and raw cashew-nuts. (May 1974)

India-Senegal cultural pact :

India and Senegal signed a cultural agreement. The agreement envisages promotion and development of relations between the two countries in the following fields : literature, arts, science, technology, education, radio, TV, press and tourism. Scholarships to students of both countries, concerts theatrical performance, exhibitions youth exchange programmes in the sphere of popular education and sports are also covered by the agreement.

An India-Senegal joint commission would be set up so on to draw up time-bound cultural exchange programmes.

Prof. Nurul Hasan Union Education Minister, signed the agreement on behalf of India and Mr. Assame Seck, Foreign Minister of Senegal, on behalf of his country. (May 1974)

Senghor hails India's scientific achievements :

Senegalese President Leopold Sedar Senghor has expressed confidence in the success of the Indian revolution and attributed it to India's scientific progress and cultural attainments.

At a press conference in New Delhi during a 12-hour stopover on his way back, President Senghor said India was carrying out the very difficult experiment of democratic socialism. This involved discipline coupled with freedom and liberty. He was confident India would solve its problems because of its scientific attainments and progress as demonstrated recently in nuclear explosion proving that Indian scientists have attained levels of international scientific progress. Apart from its scientific achievements, India also had one of the greatest cultures of the world—a culture that was the symbiosis of various cultures. (May 1974)

President Nimeri-backs India's peace initiatives:

President Nimeri of Sudan broadly supported the initiatives India has taken in normalising relations with Pakistan.

Speaking at a glittering banquet which the President Mr. Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, hosted in his honour, President Nimeri expressed satisfaction at the progress achieved by India in its relations with the Pakistan. He said the Indo-Pakistan agreements would help bring about normalisation and further the cause of peace in the subcontinent.

President Nimeri came to the banquet after an hour long talk with the Prime Minister Mrs. Indira Gandhi. They are stated to have had a general discussion in the course of which Mrs. Gandhi is believed to have explained the visiting President India's relation with its neighbours and the various world developments. (November 1974)

India and Sudan sign 5-year economic pact ;

A five-year agreement embodying the framework, for economic, scientific and technical cooperation and a cultural agreement for a similar period providing for the exchange of specialists, scholars and artists between India and Sudan were signed in Delhi on November 28, 1974.

The signing ceremony took place in the presence of the Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi and the visiting Sudanese President, Mr. Gaffar Mohammed Nimeri just before the latter's departure from New Delhi on a tour of various places in India.

The economic agreement envisages feasibility studies being undertaken by India on the possibilities of establishing cement, textile and sugar industries in Sudan. On the basis of the reports of these studies, the two sides would determine the specific field of Indian co-operation and its extent.

The cultural agreement provides for the setting up of a joint committee which would hold periodical meeting to draw up detailed exchange programmes between the two countries.

The economic agreement was signed by the foreign minister of the two countries, while the cultural agreement was signed by the Education Minister, Mr. Nurul Hassan, on the Indian side and by Dr. Mansoor Khalid for Sudan. (November 1974)

India will not play S. Africa :

India will not play against South Africa in Davis Cup tennis final, it was officially announced. (October 1974)

Expulsion of South Africa from U.N. :

India, along with a majority of members of the U.N. supported the move for expulsion of South Africa from the U.N. membership, but it could not be expelled as three permanent members of the U.N. security council, the U.S.A., the U.K., and France, exercise

ed veto in the security council meeting, said Mr. Bipinpal Das, India's Deputy Minister of External Affairs, on November 22 in reply to a question in the parliament.

The 29th U.N. general assembly, Mr. Das added, adopted a resolution calling upon the Security council to review the relationship between the U.N. and South Africa in the light of constant violations by the latter of the provisions of the U.N. charter and of the universal declaration of human rights. When the matter came up for consideration in the Security council, a draft resolution was introduced by Kenya to this effect, which could not be adopted because of the negative votes in support. U.K. and the USA although it had obtained 10 votes in support.

The negative vote, he further said, was "dissappointing though not unexpected". However, in a subsequent move on November 12 he said, the general assembly upheld the ruling of its President by 91 votes in favour to 22 against with 19 abstentions suspending South Africa's participation in the current assembly session, Mr. Das said. (November 1974)

Nehru award for Nyerere :

Dr. Julius Nyerere President of Tanzania, has been awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International Understanding for 1973.

The award to President, Nyerere is the ninth in the series. The earlier recipients have been U Thant, Martin Luther King, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Yehudi Menuhin, Mother Teresa, President Kenneth Kaunda, President Tito and Andre Malraux.

The award carries with its prize money of rupees one hundred Thousand.

Welcome to Mr. Pathak in Dar-es-Salaam :

Addressing the India-Tanzania cultural society on January 17 at Dar-es-Salaam, Mr. G.S. Pathak, India's Vice-President, stressed the similarities in foreign policies of India and Tanzania and said that both were committed to the building of a society based on equality and freedom from exploitation in an international order of peaceful co-existence. The exchange of visits between the leaders of the two countries, he said, had laid the foundation of a long terms friendship and cooperation.

The Vice-President and Mrs. Pathak were accorded a warm and colourful welcome in the traditional African style when they arrived in Dar-es-Salaam on the last leg of their tour. After the airport reception, Mr. Pathak drove in State, accompanied by the second Vice-President and Prime Minister of Tanzania. Mr. Rashid Kawawa to state house, where he was received by Mr. Julius K. Nyerere. President of Tanzania. Mr. Pathak visited Tanzania for 10 days from 11 January.

Earlier Mr. Pathak spent three days in Zanzibar where he was the chief guest at the 10th revolutionary celebrations. During his informal talks with the ministers of east African community in Arusha, Mr. Pathak said India was interested in organisations like East African Community not for political reasons but for economic considerations. In the present-day world when developing countries were faced with economic problems, it was important for them to find ways and means and devise methods by which their economic growth could be accelerated, he said. (February 1974)

Nyerere has Talks with Indian Prime Minister :

The President of Tanzania, Dr. Julius Nyerere and the Indian Prime Minister, Mrs. Indira Gandhi had a brief meeting on March 31 at the Calcutta airport. Dr. Nyerere was on his way back home from Peking. The two leaders expressed identical views about the setting up of a naval base on Diego Garcia island by the United States and Britain. The Tanzanian President, said the setting up of the base will introduce "tension" in the Indian Ocean region.

Hotel-building contract with Zanzibar Govt. :

An Indian hotel owner has signed an agreement with the Zanzibar Government for building a 2,500-seat convention center and a luxurious resort hotel in Zanzibar and another such hotel in Pemba.

The convention centres will have three large committee rooms, each with a capacity for 200 people, and ten smaller ones. Other amenities will include television lounges, a restaurant, a super market, a theatre and a shopping centre. (March 1974)

Indo-Tanzanian cooperation:

Tanzanian National Development Cooperation General

Manager Mulokozi who arrived in India on March 19 visited several industrial centres with a view to familiarise himself with the country's industrial development and to identify area for collaboration.

The National Development Corporation of Tanzania has already entered into a five-year mutual cooperation agreement with the National Industrial Development Corporation of India. The NIDC has been assisting its counterpart in Tanzania to identify and set up industrial units in Tanzania.

Some of the areas reportedly under consideration for collaboration are Steel melting and billet casting Industry, farm implements, asbestos cement production and bicycles. There is also scope for collaboration in the manufacture of electric motors, typewriters, padlocks and machine tools. (March 1974)

Tanzania seeks Indian Knowhow :

Tanzanian Government has divided the country into eight regions and requested eight countries to assist in drawing up plans for the development of a region each. In this regard it has sought to entrust the development of the Hiringa area of the country to India's planning commission.

Tanzania is seeking services of ten Indian experts five technologists and five economists. (May 1974)

Indian Assistance to Tanzania :

The Indian Parliament was told that Tanzania has sought India's assistance in the technical, economic and scientific fields. India's Minister of State for External Affairs speaking on July 26 1974 said that an agreement on friendship, technical, economic and scientific cooperation with Tanzania was signed in 1966 under which India deputed over 500 experts to Tanzania in several disciplines, such as accountancy, engineering, transportation education and cement.

At Tanzania's request, he added, Indian experts had conducted a survey of water resources of the Singida region of Tanzania and drawn up reports on development of coal resources, scientific cooperation, agriculture, housing, lighthouses, retail shops, TV and broadcasting, smallscale industries, etc. The recommendations in these reports were broadly accepted by the Tanzanian government,

which also requested for a team to draw up an integrated plan for the Singida region. Agreements have been concluded between the national industrial development corporation, a public sector consultancy firm of India, and its counterpart in Tanzania for development of industrial joint ventures, sugar industry, small scale industrial estate and the Dodoma capital project in Tanzania.

Training facilities, he further added, were given in India to several Tanzanian nominees in technical and academic subjects. An Indian firm has been given a management contract for some government hotels in Zanzibar. (July 1974)

Indian offers aid to Tanzania

Indian has promised assistance to Tanzania in setting up seven industries.

Under an agreement signed by Mr. C.M. Mzindakaya, Junior Minister for Commerce and Industry of Tanzania, and Mr. Z.R. Ansari, Indian Deputy Minister for Industrial Development, India will provide training facilities for Tanzanian technicians in India, and short-term services of Indian consultants in specific fields. Also, India will help set up industrial estates.

Fifteen Indian experts are to be sent to Tanzania shortly.

The seven industries covered by the agreement are extraction of starch from Kasawa, bicycle ancillaries, oil extraction, handmade paper, clay pipe, tiles and bricks gem stone cutting and polishing and khandsari sugar manufacture. (September 1974)

Elephants gifted to Tanzania

Two baby elephants, a gift from the government of India to Tanzania, sailed from Bombay on October 8 by M.V. Mapinduzi, a Zanzibar government ship. (November 1974)

Uganda team for closer trade ties

A trade delegation from Uganda has shown interest in buying sugar machinery, buses, diesel sets, generators, turbines oil, engines, textile mills, drugs and pharmaceuticals.

The Ugandan team, headed by Mr. E.L. Athloy, Minister for Commerce, had a meeting with the Union Deputy Minister for Commerce, Mr. A.C. George, in Delhi on October 11, 1974 and

discussed the possibilities of improving trade and economic ties between the two countries.

It is after three years that a high-powered delegation from Uganda has visited India. The 35-man team consisting of different interests in trade and business had discussions with Indian trading concerns, including the state trading corporation. (October 1974)

Former Zaire Minister Visits

Mr. Litho Moboti, former Zaire Minister of Finance, Agriculture and Plannings arrived in Delhi for talks to improve economic relations between India and Zaire.

Mr. Moboti is at present the President and director-general of the Societe General d'Alimentation (SGA), a state enterprise importing, among other items, agricultural machinery, electrical equipment food products and medicines. He also visited Bombay for negotiations with Indian Industrialists. (February 1974)

India to help train Zaire Pilots

India will cooperate with Zaire in training pilots and ground personnel of Air Zaire, the National airline of the country.

An assurance to this effect was given by the Minister of State for Tourism and Civil Aviation, Dr. Sarojini Mahishi, to the Minister of Transport and Communication of the Republic of Zaire, Mr. Eketebi Moyidibi Mondjolomba, who called on her (June 1974).

Indian experts to help Zaire railways

A team of Indian experts will go to Zaire to study the possibility of helping that country in the development of its railway system.

This was indicated by the Minister for Commerce. Mr. D.P. Chattopadhyaya, when Mondjolomba, called on him.

Mr. Mondjolomba who was in India on a three-day visit to explore the possibilities of technical and commercial co-operation with India also met the External Affairs Minister, Mr. Swaran Singh (June 1974).

India bags \$ 11 m. Zaire bus order

A contract for the supply of 500 buses to Zaire was signed in Kinshasha on October 25.

This is the biggest single contract for buses India has entered into with any foreign country.

The contract was signed by the Zaire Minister for Transport Eketebi and Minister of Finance Baruti for Zaire and the managing director of the manufacturing Indian company.

The Zaire Minister of Transport expressed gratitude of his government for the many gestures of friendship shown by India ever since the independence of Zaire, in the latest gesture of the contract for the supply of buses and doctors. (October 1974)

Zaire President in Bombay

Gen. Mobutu Sese Seko, President of the Republic of Zaire accompanied by Mrs. Mobutu and a party of 80, on his way to North Korea arrived in Bombay from Nairobi. He was received at the Santa Cruz airport by the Governor of Maharashtra, Mr. Ali Yavar Jung. Gen. Mobutu stayed in Bombay for two days.

While the President rested, the Zaire Foreign Minister, Mr. Umba-di-Lutere, met the press. He told newsmen that Zaire had just concluded an agreement with India for 120 Indian doctors. These doctors will be paid by the Zaire Government. India has also agreed to train pilots and mechanics for Zaire's civil airline and air force. (December 1974)

Zambia India Friendship

The Secretary-General of Zambia's ruling united independence party (NIP). Mr. Grey Zulu, declared in Lusaka in October 1973, that his party and the government attached great importance to relations with India. Time and again India had demonstrated in a practical way, "a friend in need is a friend indeed", he said.

Speaking at a function sponsored by the Zambia-India friendship association at Lusaka, as part of Zambia's 9th independence anniversary celebrations, Mr. Zulu expressed his country's gratitude to India for her consistent support both before and after independence to Zambia.

Mr. Zulu who is second in rank to the President of the republic and head of state in the absence of the President, stated in that Zambia appreciated Indian assistance in terms of manpower requirements. The number of Indian teachers, doctors and professionals

were on the increase, in said. He also expressed the hope that till Zambians were trained, the Indian Government would continue to allow Indians to work in Zambia.

Mr. Zulu described the facilities provided to Zambian students and trainees in India as "meaningful" in helping Zambia gain self-reliance. Stating that Zambia and India had a complete identity of views in their foreign policies, Mr. Zulu said Zambia derived inspiration from Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. (February, 1974)

India takes part in Zambia Trade Fair

India won the 1st prize in tenth Zambian International Trade Fair held at Ndola (Zambia) from July 2 to 8 in 1974.

The earlier two participations helped India to forge new economic and commercial relations between the two countries yielding a sizable business specially in engineering products.

Various machinery and engineering goods radios, and transistors, transport equipment, agricultural machinery, sewing machines bicycles, hardware, hospital and surgical equipment, drugs and pharmaceuticals, leather manufactures, rubber products, sports goods, cotton fabrics and handlooms and handicrafts were on display. (July 1974)

African Goodwill for India

Indian Vice-President, Mr. B.D. Jatti, said on October 27 in New Delhi on his return from a seven-day tour of east African countries that there was a great deal of goodwill among African nations for India and her policy towards them. The Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi, was among those who received him at the airport.

At Lusaka, Mr. Jatti represented India at the 10th independence day celebration of Zambia. He met President Nyerere of Tanzania, President Mobutu of Zaire and the King of Lesotho, and had a separate meeting with Mr. Samora Machel, President of Mozambique liberation front (Frelimo). Before leaving Lusaka Mr. Jatti said in a message to President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia that "we carry with us memories of your friendly people, and your beautiful country presents a picture of colour, great vitality and dynamism of your composite and multiracial society". During

his brief halt at Dar-es-Salaam, Mr. Jatti was welcomed by Tanzanian Vice-President, Aboud Jumbe.

Earlier, speaking at a function organised by the Zambia-India-friendship Association to celebrate Zambia's independence anniversary on October 22 at Lusaka, Mr. Jatti said that Zambia and India are anxious and restless to give economic and social content to newly won freedom to overcome degradation of colonial era and to harness fruits of science and technology. He assured India's fullest possible cooperation in the task of economic and social development in the same spirit of comradeship as "we have supported all these years struggles from freedom and independence".

Referring to his talks with Zambian leaders, Mr. Jatti observed that the two countries followed ideals of society free of exploitation and international order based on freedom and peaceful coexistence. These common ideas have brought Zambia and India closer in a number of fields of national endeavour, and there has been identity of views on international affairs, economic collaboration and increase in trade and exchange of technical knowhow and experience. Guinea-Bissau, he said, has won its independence and is a member of the United Nations. Mozambique will soon be independent and the remaining Portuguese territories of Angola, Sao Tome and Principe will also join very soon the community of independent African states under conditions of freedom and honour.

Mr. Jatti was confident that "the day will soon dawn when the final curtain comes down on this most unfortunate episode of colonialism in human history and the whole of Africa basks in the sunshine of freedom". (November 1947)

Jatti's advice to Zambia Indians

The Vice-President of India, Shri B.D. Jatti, speaking to Indian settlers in Zambia called upon Indians settled in Zambia to identify themselves completely with its interest and objectives.

Shri Jatti who was addressing to Indian community at a special reception arranged in his honour, said "your enlightened and progressive conduct in the day-to-day life will not only help further project India in right perspective, but also strengthen the existing brotherly relations between Zambia and India.

Shri Jatti said, "Relations with Zambia are extremely brotherly

and helpful to mutual benefits. We have total similarity of approach in our policies at home and abroad". (November 1974)

Kaunda lauds India's role

"The defeat of imperialism in India is a contribution that can be hardly matched in many parts of the world today", said President Kaunda while accepting the credentials of the new Indian High Commissioner, Mr. K. Srinivasan in Lusaka on December 21.

The President further added, "The inspiration that movement gave to many parts of the world cannot be forgotten at all in the annals of history. Coming to more modern times, Zambia continues to benefit by India's presence on this earth.

"We cannot say more than this to express our gratitude that one country should be able to contribute to the growth of the international community and understanding to such an extent that they leave the world a better place than they certainly found it". (December 1974)

Pakeeza Sultan

Africa Through Indian Eyes

A Documentation List
(January-June 1974)

AFRICA THROUGH INDIAN EYES is a Documentation based on coverage of Africa in Indian newspapers and periodicals. It is arranged in a classified order. However, subject headings are broad and are in alphabetical sequence. Under each subject heading entries are listed alphabetically under the name of author or title and for each article a reference is made to the publication (name of publication is in italics) including its volume, number, date of issue and the page on which the article appears. The matter in brackets has been provided in order to make captions more clearly understood. Annotations have also been given to the articles and editorials wherever found necessary.

AFRICA GENERAL

AGRICULTURE

SAHELIAN DISASTER : (Unprecedented famine in Sahel area of North Africa) *Hindustan Times*, 31 March 1973; 5

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

HOWE (Russell Warren) : African Portents : Mounting Pressures on Settler Regimes (Politics of oil is the first priority of Africa this year) *Statesman*, 18 July 1974; 6

CONFERENCES

Islamic Summit

DECLARATION OF Lahore : (The Islamic Summit declaration about the Israeli withdrawal from Arab Territories captured in 1967 war, restoration of Arab control over Jerusalem and affirming full support to the Palestinians) *Indian Express*, 26 Feb. 1974; 4

- GAINS AT Lahore : (anticipated resolution on West Asia) *Times of India*, 26 Feb. 1974; 4
- GHULAM HYDIER : Islamic Summit (Islamic Summit in Pakistan) *New Age*, 22 (7), 17 Feb. 1974; 15
- ISLAM'S 37 PILLARS : (Islamic Summit in Lahore) *Democratic World*, 28 Feb. 1974; 2
- ISLAMIC MEET : (Fifth Islamic Foreign Ministers Conference) *Patriot*, 23 June 1974; 2
- ISLAMIC SUMMIT : (Second Islamic Summit held in Lahore) Pakistan Feb. 22-74 1974 to discuss Israel's occupation of Arab territories) *Weekly Round Table*, (108) 7 April 1974; 8
- ISLAMIC SUMMIT Declaration (text) : *Foreign Affairs Reports*, 23 51, May 1974; 89-71
- ISLAMIC SUMMIT Declaration : *Statesman*, 26 Feb. 1974; 6
- ISLAMIC SUMMIT May not serve Bhutto's ends : (the agenda of the conference is to be confined to the West Asian question) *Patriot*, 15 Feb. 1974; 2
- LABOUR SUMMIT and After : *Capital*, CLXX 11 (4302), 28 March 1974; 262-262
- MISGUIDED AND Sinister : (Islamic Summit) *Indian Express*, 15 May 1974; 4
- MUKERJEE (D) : Jolt for hardliners at Islamic meet, *Times of India*, 23 June 1974; 1
- MUKERJEE (Dilip) : The Islamic Summit : likely to pay off for Pakistan. *Times of India*, 16 Feb. 1974; 4
- MULLICK (R.P.) : Islamic Summit : Before and After *Frontier*, 6 (49), 23 March 1975: 4-5
- RASHIDI (Galal el) : No Religious Overtones (Islamic Summit Conference in Lahore) *Weekly Round Table*, (108) 7 April 1974; 9-13
- SATISH KUMAR : The Islamic Summit. (held on 22nd Feb. 1974) *Hindustan Times*, 14 Feb. 1974; 5
- SUMMIT HAZE : (The strongly-worded resolutions for West Asia) *Patriot*, 27 Feb. 1974; 2

THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT (37 Muslim countries' three-day conference at Lahore) *Organiser*, 2 March 1974; 3

VISWAM (S) : Islamic Nations Summit, *Statesman*, 25 March, 1974; 4

(A) Indian View

AFTER THE Islamic Summit : (What should be India's reaction to the Summit which concluded its deliberations in Islamabad *Janata* 29(5), 3 March 1974; 2

ISLAMIC SUMMIT : (Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi said that the Islamic Summit was an attempt to split the nonaligned camp) *Patriot*, 17 Feb. 1974; 1

PINDI WARNED against Islamic meet 'misuse': (External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh warned that the Summit had been convened to give support to the Arab cause in conflict with Israel. Any attempt to malign India or Bangladesh at the forum of Islamic Summit would be counter-productive) *Patriot*, 10 Feb. 1974; 1

Literary Conferences

ALCOCK (Peter C.M.) : Commonwealth Conference: An African occasion (the fourth conference of the Association of Commonwealth Literature and Languages studies, Kampala, 1973-74) *Literary Half-yearly*, (15) 1, January 1974; 135-140

Nonaligned Conferences

ALGIERS CALL for Restructuring: (Nonaligned nations meeting to restore International Economic system and to narrow the gap between the rich and poor nations) *New Age*, 31 March 1974; 2

ALGIERS CONFERENCE: (Nonaligned countries meet at Algiers to discuss Economic and Political problems jointly) *Link*, 16(3:7), 24 March 1974; 6-7

ALGIERS LESSON: (The Algiers meeting of the 17-member bureau of nonaligned countries) *Patriot*, 24 March 1974; 2

CALL FOR Fresh initiatives on Algiers decisions: (India and Yugoslavia have called for fresh conference by nonaligned countries) *Patriot*, 30 January 1974; 1

COMMUNIQUE: Nonaligned nations Bureau (Final document of the meeting held in Algiers from 19th to 21st March 1974) *Foreign Affairs Report*, 23 (5), May 1974: 92-99

DEFENCE: The Ocean Anxiety (An Indian point of view of the meeting of the Bureau of Nonaligned nations at Algiers) *Link*, 16(32), 17 March 1974; 23

INDIA TO Attend Nonaligned Bureau Meeting: (Mr. Swaran Singh's statement that India had decided to participate in the meeting of nonaligned countries) *Patriot*, 4 Feb. 1974: 1

INDIA TO PARTICIPATE in on Nonaligned Meeting: *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11(9), 15 Feb. 1974; 10

KARDELJ (Edward): Nonalignment and Socialism. *Indian Left Review*, 3(4) June 1974; 9-13

LAL (M.B.): The relevance of Nonalignment in world power politics. *Capital*, annual number 1973, 31 July 1974; 81-84

MENON (K.P.S.): Nonalignment, then and new (exposition of India's Foreign Policy), *Weekly Round Table*, (1), 3 January 1974; 23-27

NO GIFTS from Algiers: (The Nonaligned Bureau meeting at Algiers) *Hindustan Times*, 26 March 1974; 5

NONALIGNED BUREAU: India's view. *Indian & Foreign Review* 11(14) 1 May 1974; 7

NONALIGNED BUREAU Meeting in March 1974; (President Tito of Yugoslavia said in New Delhi that nonaligned meeting of 17 nations including India will discuss energy crisis and raw material problems) *Indian & Foreign Review* 11(9), 15 Feb. 1974:9

NONALIGNED FLAY U.S., U.K.; (17 nations nonaligned bureau denounced the decision to develop an Anglo-American base in the Indian Ocean) *Patriot*, 23 March 1974; 1

NONALIGNED UNITY: *Patriot*, 29 January 1974:2

NONALIGNMENT AND Bilateral Issues: *Link*, 16(26), 3 Feb. 1974; 6-7

NONALIGNMENT BUREAU Meeting: *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11(10), 1 March 1974; 7

P.M., Tito call to preserve unity of Non-aligned. *Patriot*, 28 January 1974; 1

PINDI WARNED against Islamic meet 'misuse': (External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh warned that the Summit had been convened to give support to the Arab cause in conflict with Israel. Any attempt to malign India or Bangladesh at the forum of Islamic Summit would be counter-productive) *Patriot*, 10 Feb. 1974; 1

RAMA (A.P.): (Nonalignment revisited, *Weekly Round Table*, (1), 3 Feb. 1974; 71-74

RIGHT PERSPECTIVE: (Nonaligned conference) *Indian Express*, 23 March 1974; 4

ROLE FOR nonaligned: *Indian Express*, 31 January 1974; 2

SARDESAI (S.G.): Achievements and Difficulties of Nonalignment. *Problems of Peace and Socialism*, 2(9), March 1974; 84-93

SETHI (J.D.): A system of Common markets for the Nonaligned. *Young India*, 4(13), 7 March 1974; 14-15

VIDURA: The Face of Non-alignment (India has defected from the nonaligned bloc by her ties with the Soviet even as Egypt did) *Organiser*, 9 Feb. 1974; 8

Organization of African Unity

HUNGU (JOHN I.): and DHAR (Jagannath): Eleven Years of O.A.U. (On 25 May 1963 the Heads of States and Governments had met at Addis Ababa and formed an organisation to overcome their differences) *Socialist India*, 9(1), 1 June 1974; 16c-16d

MOOLLA (M): South Africa Day June 26, *New Age*, 22(25), 23 June 1974; 9

(OAU) *Democratic World*, 27 June 1974; 10

ROW FEARED AT OAU Summit: *Economic Times*, 9 June 1974; 7

SIDDHANT (T.N.): May Day 1974. *New Age*, 22(17), 28 April 1974; 1

TIMMLER (Markus): Ten years after OAU Foundation, *Thought*, 26(9), 2 March 1974; 10-12

CURRENCY

STEPS TOWARDS monetary reform: (Financial leaders meeting in Washington to take decision on international currency reforms) *Capital*, 20th June 1974; 861-862

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

INVESTMENT CLIMATE in Africa: *Economic Trends*, 16 May 1974; 7-9

KALOTIKAR (B): African Contrasts, *Democratic World*, 9 May 1974; 6-8

TEWATIA (T.C.): Economic Independence of Developing Nations: the monetary crisis has shaken the economic stability of African and other developing countries) *Mainstream*, 12(44), 29 June 1974; 28-30

ELECTIONS

GUPTA (Anirudha): Elections under one-party system, African example. *Mainstream*, 12(27), 2 March 1974: 27-28

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

E.E.C.

UNITED AGAINST EEC: (The EEC has been unable to browbeat Africa into an unequal agreement) *Link*, 16(38), 28 April 1974; 29

India

HAR DEV SINGH: India and Africa (India's export trade with African countries) *Eastern Economist, Annual Number* 1974; 1316-1328

INTRODUCTION OF Non-traditional item in African Market: *Journal of Industry and Trade*, 24(2), Feb. 1974; 23

Japan

JAPAN REVIEWS African Trade Links. *Economic Times*, 11 June 1974 ; 8

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

China

BHATT (V.R.): Setback to China's Arms. *Hindustan Times*, 14 Feb. 1974 ; 5

NOZAKI (Shinroku) : China's Third World role. *Himmat*, 10(28), 10 May 1974 ; 10

France

SINGH (J.D.) : New Look in French Foreign Policy. *Times of India*. 16 January 1974 ; 4

India

AFRICA DAY Observed in Capital : (jointly organised meeting by the C.P.I., The Congress, All India Peace and Solidarity Organisation, AITUC, INTUC, Youth Federation and Youth Congress on May 25 on the occasion of Africa Day in New Delhi) *New Age*, 22 (22), 2 June 1974 ; 14

ASIAN—AFRICAN QUEST for Freedom : (Speech by Mrs. Gandhi in honour of Mr. Hussain of Iraq. She expressed that India belongs to the Asian-African Community of Nations which believe in freedom) *Indian and Foreign Review*, 11(13), 15 April 1974 ; 8

MOOLA (M) : South Africa Day June 26. *New Age* 22(25), 23 June 1974 ; 7

PRIME MINISTER Urges all Help to Freedom Struggle in Africa : (A text of the address delivered by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in New Delhi on May 25, on the occasion of Africa Day which coincided with the 11th anniversary of O.A.U.) *Socialist India*, 9(1), 1 June 1974 ; 169-166

SIDDHANT (T.N.) : May Day 1974. *New Age*, 22(17), 28 April 1974 ; 1

Poland

OLSZOWSKI (Stefan) : Peaceful coexistence—The guiding idea of Poland's International Policy. *Link*, 16(31), 10 March 1974 ; 25-27

Portugal

AFRICAN COLONIES of Portugal : *Call*, 28(10), June 1974 ; 7-9

AREA OF Freedom Widens in Africa. *Hindu*, 1 June 1974 ; 6

BARBARIC WAR : (War Against African people) *Patriot*, 25 April 1974 ; 3

BELLS TOLL for Portugal : (Revolt by army Young-Turks in

- Portugal indicate that Lisbon is facing its worst crisis) *Link*, 16(33), 24 March 1974 ; 31
- BLOW FOR Freedom in Portugal : *Socialist India*, 8(24), 11 May 1974 ; 6
- BURMAN (Rahul) : Israel and Africa (Isolation of Israel from Black Africa, the most important product of the October War) *Economic and Political Weekly*, 9(14), 6 April 1974 ; 548
- CHANGE IN Portugal (Policy of liberation in Portuguese African colonies) *Times of India*, 27 April ; 4
- DE SEQUEIRA (Erassno) : Political and Psychological Tool (Portugal's fight for the preservation of her colonies empire, against African Nationalists) *Weekly Round Table*, (115), 16 June 1974 ; 21-25
- FREEDOM IS a Bait : (Africa needs freedom from backwardness. Freedom from Portugal is only the first step in this direction) *Democratic World*, 20 June 1974 : 8-9
- GATHANI (Batuk) : Portugal and its African colonies. (*Hindu*) June 1974 ; 6
- GOPAL (Ajit S) : Liberation of the White Bastion (coup in Portugal) *Weekly Round Table*, (115), 16 June 1974 : 11-14
- GOPAL (AJIT S) : Turning point in Africa (Policy towards African Colonies) *Indian Express*, 11 May 1974 : 4
- GUPTA (Anirudha) : Africa's Gift to Europe (African freedom struggle in Portugal) *Weekly Round Table*, (115), 16 June 1974; 14-21
- HOWE (Russell Warren) : Settler front in Africa : Possibility of a Collapse. *Statesman*, 19 April 1974 ; 6
- JAURA (Ramesh) : Behind the coup in Portugal. *Young India*, 4(23), 16 May 1974; 18-19
- KAPUR (Ashoka) : China : Rhetoric and reality—II, *Indian Express*, 6 June 1974 ; 4
- LIBERALISM IN Lisbon : (During 13 years battle with African Nationalists—40 percent of the national budget—is spent on the war, yet Portugal is unlikely to retreat from Africa) *Democratic World*, 2 May 1974 ; 2

LISBON'S COMMITMENT : (Portugal Prime Minister's announcement for self-determination for the people of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique) *Indian Express*, 30 May 1974 ; 4

LISBON'S OFFER ; (Lisbon's offer to African leaders of Portuguese Colonies for immediate negotiations to settle the future of their colonies) *Times of India*, 20 May 1974 : 4

LISBON'S COMMITMENT : (Portugal Prime Minister's announcement for self-determination for the people of Angola, Guinea and Mozambique) *Indian Express*, 30 May 1974 : 4

MASOOD ALI KHAN : Has house of Freedom comes to Portugal (Spínola announced his intention to grant freedom to the African Colonies in Portugal as the army is fed up with fighting hapless battles against peoples liberation forces in a war which the Portuguese rulers cannot win) *New Age* 22(18), 5 May 1974 ; 13

MITRA (Sardar) : Portuguese CP Leader on New situation (In the sphere of Political Democracy thinks in Portugal house undergone a radical change in the last ten years) *New Age*, 22(17), 12 May 1974 ; 14

NAIR (V.M.) : White Settler may follow Rhodesia. *Statesman*, 1 April 1974 ; 4

NATO PROSPECTS : (Portugal maintained his hold over its colonies largely because of NATO bases in Cape Verde Islands, in Guinea Bissau and in Mozambique and Angola) *Link*, 16(39), 5 May 1974 ; 30-32

NEGOTIATIONS : (Portugal's offer to African national leaders of Portuguese Colonies for immediate negotiation to settle the future of their territories) *Patriot*, 27 May 1974 ; 2

NEW GOVT. in Portugal : (General Antonio De Spínola has opened a new chapter in the history of Portugal by leading a successful coup on April 25. As regards the African colonies of Portugal, grant of independence is the key issue) *New Age*, 22(20), 19 May 1974 ; 15

NO HALFWAY House of Freedom : (After bloodless coup, a change in colonial policy of Portugal is expected) *Young India* 4(27), 13 June 1974 ; 11

NO QUICK SOLUTIONS : (The coup in Portugal is a conclusive indication that the guerilla movements have got the upper hand in the fighting) *Economic and Political Weekly*, 9(17), 27 April 1974 ; 651

PORTUGAL : Workers Respond (strike in Portugal was organised to seek a radical change in the setup of the country by creating an economic chaos. The possibility of getting independence for African Liberation Movements is becoming more fruitful *New Age*, 9 June 1974 ; 14

PORTUGAL—A Victory for the Rightists : (Will there be any political solution to eliminate endless warfare going on at present in Portuguese Africa) *Himmat*, 10(22), 29 March 1974 ; 10

PORTUGAL BREAKS Away from a Grim Past : (Portugal could not win any of its three colonial wars in Africa by brute force) *Link*, 16(39), 5 May 1974 ; 28-30

PORTUGAL C.P. Explains stand : (Talks between the representatives of African Liberation Movement in Portugal and Portugal Government will start in London on May 25) *New Age*, 22(21) 26 May 1974 ; 15

PORTUGAL'S COLONIES : (Angola, Guinea and Mozambique) *Indian Express*, 26 June 1974 ; 4

PORTUGAL'S DEMOCRATIC Experiment : (The real test for the newly provisional Coalition Government in Portugal will be the future of Portuguese colonies in Africa) *Himmat*, 10 (30), 24 May 1974 ; 3

SAULDIE (Madan M) : African reaction to Lisbon coup. *Hindustan Times*, 7 May 1974 ; 5

SHANTI SADIQALI : Lisbon's Losing war. *Indian Express*, 7 April 1974 ; 4

SINGH (J.D.) : Portugal's New Military Rules set a good example (Policy Towards African Colonies) *Times of India*, 17 May 1974 ; 4

TOWARDS FREEDOM : *Hindustan Times*, 11 June 1974 ; 5

UNCERTAIN FUTURE : (Effect of coup on African colonies of Portugal) *Times of India*, 10 May 1974 ; 4

UNREALISTIC : (President's modified policy for the independence of Portuguese colonies in Africa) *Times of India*, 19 June 1974 ; 4

WHAT SPINOLA'S Coup means : (change in Portuguese Government Policy) *Himmat*, 10(27), 3 May 1974 ; 10

WIND OF Freedom over Portugal : (Portuguese government's decision to grant independence to the people of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde Islands) *Century*, 12(4), 1 June 1974 ; 7

United Kingdom

WILSON ON Tightrope : (After February 28, election, the new Labour Party under Harold Wilson appears to have started with all the intention of upholding the true British tradition. His policy of guarded optimism all over the African countries) *Link*, 16(31) 10 March 1974; 37-39

United Nations

NSEREKO (Daniel D) : The International Court, Impartiality and Judges ad-hoc (with reference to the discussions on African questions) *Indian Journal of International Law*, 13(27), April-June 1973 ; 207-230

United State

BLACK POWER in America (Special Report) : *Weekly Round Table*, (112), 19 May 1974 ; 22-27

VENKATARAMANI (M.S.) : The United States, the Colonial Issue, and the Atlantic Charter Hoax. *International Studies*, 13(1), January-March 1973 ; 1-28

GOVERNMENT POLITICS

MCLENNAN (Barbara N) : Armed forces and Political Power in Africa. *Africa Quarterly*, (13(2), July-Sept. 1973 ; 131-139

POTHOLM (Christian P) : The International transfer of Insurgency Techniques : Sub-Saharan Pathologies. *Africa Quarterly*, 13(2), July-September, 1973 ; 117-130

HISTORY

MAZRUI (ALI A) : Who are the Afro-Saxons. *Indian Journal of Politics*, 7(2), Dec. 1973 ; 158-164

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

VASILEVA (Jokka Hadzi) : Socialist Options in Africa. *Indian Left Review*, 3(1), March 1974 : 54-64

LIBERATION MOVEMENT

GAITONDE (V.A.) : Monetary Crisis hits Third World. *Financial Express*, 22 June 1974 ; 4

NARENDAR SINGH : Liberation Struggles in Africa. *Frontier*, 6(40), 12 January 1974 ; 7-9

NARENDRA SINGH : Liberation Struggle in Africa (Press-diary November-December 1973) *Frontier*, 6(46), 2 March 1974 ; 9-12

NARENDRA SINGH : Liberation Struggle in Africa. *Frontier*, 7(9) 22 June 1974 ; 3-6

RAMAMURTHI (T.G.) : Origin and Growth of African Nationalism. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11(13), 15 April 1974 ; 17-19

PRESS

BODENHAUSEN (G.H.C.) : Developing countries and International copyright. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11(6), 1 January 1974 ; 11

PROBLEM OF RACE

AFRICA : Death Throes of colonialism (Africa and Arab countries have a common enemy. Zionism is threatening the independence of Africa from the North just as the racist regimes of Verster and Smith are doing from the South) *Century*, 12 (788), 22 & 29 June 1974 ; 7-8

BLACK POWER in America (Special Report) : *Weekly Round Table*, (112), 19 May 1973 i 22-27

EDMUND (T) : Negro Protest Thought in America—from Washington to King—I. *Century*, 12(7 & 8), 22 & 29 June 1974 ; 9-10

SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY

VENU (S) : Engineering consultancy in developing countries. *Hindustan Times*, 14 April 1974 ; 1

SOCIOLOGY

SHAWKY (A) : Social problems in Africa. *Indian Journal of Politics*, 7(2) Dec. 1973 ; 150-157

ALGERIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

Germany

GERMAN & ALGERIA Oil Deal : *Economic Trends*, 3(9), 1 Feb. 1974 ; 16

United Nations

SEN (Sudhir) : U.N. Conference on Raw materials : A decisive Turning Point (The first delegate to speak at the special session of U.N. conference on Raw Materials was the President of Algeria, Houariy Boumedienne) *Capital*, 30 May 1974 ; 746

SOCIALISM

HODGKINSON (Edith) : The Key points of Algerian Socialism. *Socialist India*, 9 (1), 1 June 1974 ; 21

ANGOLA

LIBERATION MOVEMENT

A LIBERAL VENEER (Portuguese government has been taking a cautious step to give the authoritarian regime a liberal veneer. The opposition to the colonial war in Africa has become more widespread) *Times of India*, 14 March 1974 ; 4

ANGOLAN LEAD: (Freedom struggle in Angola) *Hindustan Times*, 19 June 1974 ; 5

CHAUDHURI (J.N.) : Portuguese war in Africa (The Pervasive civil war is the war metropolitan Portugal has been fighting in her African colonies of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique) *Indian Express*, 15 March 1974 ; 4

HELL-BENT to Hang on (Portugal in Africa) *Democratic World*, 14 March 1974 ; 6-7

NEW WINDS in Libson : (Change in Portugal's attitudes towards African colonies) *Hindustan Times*, 1 March 1974 ; 3

THE LAST Colonies : (The determination to hold on the African colonies, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, is bound to fail,

Africa, Britain and France had relinquished their colonies in Africa, it was logically and morally incumbent on Portugal to follow suit) *Indian Express*, 16 March 1974 ; 9

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT

ECONOMIC POLICY

SASTRY (K.K.) : Egypt swings to the right : New Economic Policies. *Times of India*, 22 March 1974 ; 4

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

India

INDO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS : *Indian & Foreign Review*, 1 April 1974 ; 8

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Cairo—January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 1 May 1974 ; B183-185

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions: (by the Second Secretary (Commercial) Embassy of India, Cairo—March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 26 June 1974 ; B586-B591

Iran

IRAN AND EGYPT : (Iran's aid to Egypt) *Patriot*, 29 May 1974 ; 2

MOAGLAND (Jim) : Iran gives aid to Egypt in a bid to better ties. *Indian Express*, 28 May 1974 ; 5

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

India

BAHADUR SINGH (IJ) : Sadat's visit to India. *Young India*, 4 (13), March 1974 ; 8

INDIA, EGYPT for further cooperation: (Talk between Mrs. Gandhi and President Sadat on Political, Economic and Commercial relations of two countries) *Patriot*, 25 Feb. 1974 ; 1

INDIRA-SADAT TALKS on Feb. 24 : (President Sadat's 24-hour visit to Delhi on 24 and 25 February) *Patriot*, 22 Feb. 1974 ; 3

NEHRU'S INFLUENCE on Egypt's leaders: (turning his recent tour of the 'Third World' President Sadat of Egypt confided his impressions of the leaders of the Third World to the editor of

Al-Ahram. Speaking on Nehru, he said Nehru, held a great fascination for Egyptians. He further called his long association with Mrs. Indira Gandhi and said that she inherited from her father his love for Egyptians and contributed a good deal to the strengthening of Indo-Egyptian ties) *Patriot*, 17 March 1974 ; 2

PRESIDENT SADAT—Symbol of Arab Liberation (President Sadat's visit to India) *Patriot*, 24 Feb. 1974 ; 2

ROY (Khagen) : How far Sadat can help India: Portents of Islamic Summit. *Organiser*, 30 March 1974 ; 5

SADAT IN INDIA : (President Sadat's brief visit to India, Feb. 1974, from 24-25) *Link*, 16 (29), 24 Feb. 1974 ; 29-30

SADAT'S PEACE Drive Brings Him to India : (President Sadat's visit to India) *Patriot*, 10 Feb. 1974 ; 2

SADAT'S TALKS with Mrs. Gandhi : (President Sadat and Mrs. Gandhi discussed international and bilateral matters at a meeting at Rashtrapati Bhavan) *Statesman*, 25 Feb. 1974 ; 1

THE PRESIDENT Pledges Support to Arabs (President Sadat speech at the banquet given in his honour in New Delhi) *Statesman*, 25 Feb. 1974 ; 6

Libya

CONTRADICTIONARY PRESSURES : (After the October war the gulf between Egypt and Libya widened and now it appears to have reached a dead end. Col. Gaddafi's policy towards Egypt) *Link*, 16(36), 14 April 1974 ; 25

PILOTS ON Loan : (Libya's relations with with Egypt and Pakistan) *Times of India*, 21 Feb. 1974 ; 4

United Kingdom

BARKAT AHMAD : Panjadeh incident and the occupation of Egypt. *India Quarterly*, 30(2), April-June 1974 ; 149-152

United States

ANWAR SADAT Turns admirer of Nixon : *New Age*, 22(15), 14 April 1974 ; 15

BHATIA (Krishna) : The US-Egypt Thought: (President Sadat's eagerness to establish close and cordial relations with Washington) *Hindustan Times*, 2 May 1974 ; 5

EGYPT AND U.S. : *Patriot*, 16 June 1974 ; 2

SASTRY (K.K.) : Mr. Nixon's visit to Cairo : A Fickle Relationship
Times India, 12 June 1974 ; 4

TURNING POINT : (President Nixon's visit to Egypt) *Hindustan Times*, 18 June 1974 ; 5

U.S.S.R.

EGYPT TURNS to West : (On April 18, President Sadat announced the decision of Egyptian Government to end its dependence on the Soviet-Union exclusively for arms supply) *Commerce*, 128 (3285), 27 April 1974 ; 381

MUKHERJEE (Sadhan) : Sadat's vituperation against Soviet Union.
New Age, 22 (18), 28 April 1974 ; 15

SASTRY (K.K.) : Soviet Egyptian Relations : Back in the Deep Freeze. *Times of India*, 17 April 1974 ; 4

SLAIEH (Ezzat N) : Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Treaty of 1971 : Some continuous Interpretations. *Indian Political Science Review*, 8(1), January 1974 ; 7-26

SOVIET DILEMMA : (arms supply by Soviet Union during West Asian War) *Times of India*, 23 April 1974 ; 4

WHY SADAT is angry with Moscow ? *Himmat*, 10(24), 12 April 1974 ; 8

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

ANTI-NASSER MOVES. *Link*, 16(36), 14 April 1974, 25

BROWN (Alan) : We are on the brink of a great future. (Egypt under the leadership of President Anwar Sadat) *Himmat*, 10(31), 31 May 1974 ; 10

TAPAN DAS : Which Way Sadat ? *Mainstream*, 12(35), 27 April 1974 ; 23-24

LITERATURE

QURAIISHI (Z.M.) : Political function of Egyptian of humour.
Indian Journal of Politics, 7(1), June 1973 ; 27-40

EAST AFRICA

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

India

OUTLOOK FOR Tea : (India to be the World's leading producer and exporter to tea also supply tea to East Africa) *Statesman*, 31 January 1974 ; 6

TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATION

GRUBBE (Peter) : Sino-American Competition in East Africa (The construction of railway by China and the construction of road by America has led both the countries into a competition) *Frontier*, 6(41), 19 January 1974; 8-10

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Problem of Asians

RAMCHANDANI (R.R.) : Indian Emigration to East African countries during 19th and early 20th centuries. *Journal of the University of Bombay*, Oct. 1972 ;

ETHIOPIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

India

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Addis Ababa—January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 17 April 1974 ; B77-78

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Embassy of India, Addis Ababa. Feb. 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 22 May 1974 ; B313

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Addis Ababa March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 29 May 1974 ; B361

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

Change of Government

BEHIND THE Events in Ethiopia (One of the oldest states of Africa —Ethiopia is on the threshold of big changes) *Peoples' Democracy*, 5 May 1974 ; 9

BISWAS (Nilanjana) : and **SAKARAI (Lawrence J)** Time of Reckoning (Ethiopia). *Economic and Political Weekly*, 9 (13), 30 March 1974 ; 511-513

BLOOD IN Addis : *Hindustan Times*, 26 November 1974 ; 5

- BREAK-UP of Antiquated Structure** (Struggle to change the power Structure in Ethiopia) *Young India*, 4(17), 4 April 1974 ; 13-14
- CHALLENGE IN Ethiopia.** *Indian Express*, 27 March 1974 ; 4
- CHANGING ETHIOPIA** (Demand for modernization in Ethiopia) *Indian Express*, 11 March 1974 ; 4
- EMPIRE OR ETHIOPIA :** (Political Convulsions in Ethiopia) *Democratic World*, 7 March 1974 ; 2
- END OF Ancient Regime?** (Ethiopia) *Economic and Political Weekly*, 9(12), 23 March 1974 ; 458-459
- ETHIOPIAN MUTINY :** *Times of India*, 2 March 1974 ; 4
- ETHIOPIAN MUTINY :** (Violence in Ethiopia) *Hindustan Times*, 28 Feb. 1974 ; 5
- ETHIOPIAN TURMOIL :** (Outbreak of violence in the Ethiopian capital of Addis Ababa). *Link*, 16(32), 17 March 1974 ;
- MEREDITH (Meredith) :** Ethiopia's long suit relation. *Statesman*, 16 March 1974 ; 4
- MUKHERJEE (Sadhan) :** Ethiopia : Strivings for a Democratic change. (Socio-Political convulsion in Ethiopia) *New Age*, 22(12), 24 March 1974 ; 15
- NEW WIND of Ethiopia :** (Revolt in Ethiopia) *Statesman*, 19 March 1974 ; 4
- REVOLT IN Ethiopia :** *Frontier*, 6(49), 23 March 1974 ; 2-3
- SAULDIE (Madan M) :** Government faces uphill task for reform in Ethiopia. *Hindustan Times*, 18 April 1974 ; 5
- SHANTI SADIQALI :** Ethiopia clash of Interests (Revolt in Ethiopia) *Indian Express*, 6 March 1974 ; 4
- UNREST IN Ethiopia :** (Rebel by the armed forces of Ethiopia) *Link*, 16(31), 10 March 1974 ; 43
- INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT**
- ETHIOPIA—Hard Road Ahead** (Prime Minister's assurance to be investigated himself by the recently appointed Enquiry into corruption) *Himmat*, 10 (24), 12 April 1974 ; 3
- ETHIOPIA TREAD** the road of reform (Military occupation of Ethiopia) *Himmat*, 10(33), 14 June 1974 ; 11 and 17

SOCIOLOGY

Famine

SAKARAI (Lawrence J) : F'mine Stalks Ethiopia : A repressive Regime. *Times of India*, 24 April 1974 ; 4

GHANA

LOW COCOA Crop worries Ghana. *Economic Times*, 11 June 1974 ; 3

ECONOMIC POLICY

GHANA'S ECONOMIC Policies. *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 10(1) January 1974 ; 27-28

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India in Ghana. Feb. 1974 Ghana and Libya) *Indian Trade Journal*, 24 April 1974 ; B117

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial) High Commission of India in Ghana, Accra. Ghana and Sierra Leone. March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 29 May 1974 ; B362

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

ISAACS (G.J.) : The Pre-coup years in Ghana, 1962-66. *Africa Quarterly*, 13(2) July-September 1973 ; 105-116

GUINEA (Republic)

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

India

GUINEA : (A delegation from the Republic of Guinea paid a goodwill visit to India from November 15 to 21, 1973) (A press note issued in New Delhi on November 22, 1973). *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19(11), Nov. 1973 ; 384-385

GUINEA BISSAU

LIBERATION MOVEMENTS

ALIBERAL VENEER : Portuguese government has been taking a cautious step to give the authoritarian regime a liberal veneer. The opposition to the colonial war in Africa has become more widespread) *Times of India*, 14 March 1974 ; 4

CHAUDHURI (J.N.) : Portuguese war in Africa (The Pervasive civil war is the war metropolitan Portugal has been fighting in her African colonies of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique) *Indian Express*, 15 March 1974 ; 4

GUINEA-BISSAU (Report sent by Dr. Dias Editor of the Portuguese Weekly who visited the territory of Guinea-Bissau) *Link*, 16(36), 14 April 1974 ; 27

HELL-BENT to Hang on (Portugal in Africa) *Democratic World*, 14 March 1974 ; 6-7

NEW WINDS in Lisbon : (Change in Portugal's attitude towards African colonies) *Hindustan Times*, 1 March 1974 ; 3

NO SURRENDER to Portugal : (The Prime Minister of Guinea-Bissau has turned down Portugal's cease-fire offer) *Link*, 16(49), 19 May 1974 ; 27-28

THE LAST Colonies : (The determination to hold on to the African colonies, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, is bound to fail. After Britain and France had relinquished their colonies in Africa, it was logically and morally incumbent on Portugal to follow suit) *Indian Express*, 16 March 1974 ; 9

INDIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Cultural)

INDIA, SENEGAL sign cultural pact. *Patriot*, 22 May 1974 ; 4

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

Africa

HARDEV SINGH : India and Africa (India's export trade with African countries) *Eastern Economist*, annual number 1974 ; 1316-1328

INTRODUCTION OF NON-Traditional Item in African Market. *Journal of Industry and Trade*, 24(2), Feb. 1974 ; 23

East Africa

OUTLOOK FOR Tea : (India to be the world's leading producer and exporter of tea also supplying tea to East Africa) *Statesman*, 31 January 1974 ; 6

Arab Republic of Egypt

- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial) Embassy of India, Cairo. January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 1 May 1974 ; B183-185
- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial) Embassy of India, Cairo, March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 26 June 1974 ; B386-591

Ethopia

- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Addis Ababa. January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 17 April 1974 ; B77-78
- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions ; (by the First Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Addis Ababa Feb. 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 22 May 1974 ; B313
- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Addis Ababa, March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 29 May 1974 ; B361

Ghana

- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India in Ghana—Feb. 1974, Ghana and Liberia) *India Trade Journal*, 24 April 1974 ; B117
- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions: (by the Second Secretary (Commercial) High Commission of India in Ghana, Accora. Ghana and Sierra Leone—March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 29 May 1974 ; B362

Kenya

- ECONOMIC RELATIONS : Between India and Kenya. *Economic Trends*, 3(12), 16 March 1974 ; 22-23

Liberia

- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India in Ghana—Feb. 1974—Ghana and Liberia) *Indian Trade Journal*, 24 April 1974 ; B117

Libya

- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli—January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 3 April 1974 ; B4-5
- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli—Feb. 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 1 May 1974 ; B173-179
- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli—March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 8-15 May 1974 ; B236-239
- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli—April 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 12 June 1974 ; B480-481

Mauritius

- BIG DEMAND for Indian Goods in Mauritius : *India & Foreign Review*, 1 April 1974 ; 8
- INDIA'S ASSURANCE to Mauritius : (assurance given by the Indian Govt. to Mauritius for technical assistance particularly for reorganisation of technical infra-structure for execution of projects) *Patriot*, 16 Feb. 1974 ; 5
- INDO-MAURITIUS TRADE Expansion. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11(14), 1 May 1974 ; 8
- INVESTMENT POSSIBILITIES in Mauritius. *Economic Trends*, 3(7) 1 January 1974 ; 27

Nigeria

- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : by the Second Secretary, High Commission of India, Lagos. Dec. 1973—January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 10 April 1974 ; B34-35
- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary, High Commission of India, (Commercial Section), Lagos, Nigeria—Feb. 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 1 May 1974, B179-181
- REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary, High Commission of India. Lagos—March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 5 June 1974 ; B427-429

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : by the First Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Lagos April 1984) *Indian Trade Journal*, 19 June 1974 ; B543-547

Senegal

COMMON INTEREST : (India and Senegal to expand their economic relations and enhance their mutual understanding in Political matters) *Patriot* 28 May 1974 ; 2

FIRST INDO-SENEGAL Trade Agreement : (In consequence of the visit of President of Senegal, The first trade agreement between the two countries was signed) *Commerce*. 128(3290), 1 June 1974 ; 176

NEW LINKS with West Africa : (Ten-day state visit of Mr. Leopold Senghor, President of Senegal) *Hindustan Times*, 29 May 1974 ; 5

Sierra Leone

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial) High Commission of India in Ghana, Accra and Sierra Leone March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 29 May 1974 ; B362

Somalia

SHANTI SADIQALI : Trade with Somalia. *Indian Express*, 17 January 1974 ; 4

Sudan

BASIC DRUGS and Intermediate manufacturer wins Sudanese Tender for Pharmaceuticals. *Journal of Industry and Trade*, 24(1), January 1974 ; 42-43

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial Embassy of India, Khartoum—January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 24 April 1974 ; B125-128

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary, Embassy of India, Khartoum, February 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 8-15 May 1974 ; B244-246

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the First Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Khartoum, March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 12 June 1974 ; B487-489

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Embassy of India, Khartoum – April 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 19 June 1974 ; B548-550

SHARMA (R.K.) : India Sudan Economic Relations. *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 10(2 & 3), March 1974 ; 26-28

Tanzania

TRADE AGREEMENT Between the Government of India and Government of United Republic of Tanzania (Text of the agreement signed on 12th Dec. 1972 and came into effect from 28th Feb. 1974 and will remain in force for a period of one year from the date of Ratification) *Indian Trade Journal*, 1 May 1974 ; B186-187

West Asia

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions : (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Accra, Ghana, Libya and Sierra Leone, January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 10 April 1974, B34

Zambia

SHARMA (R.K.) : INDO-Zambian Trade. *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 10(4), April 1974 ; 27-28

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

CHAKRABARTI (Radharaman) : Anti-Imperialism in India's Foreign Policy. *Socialist Perspectives*, 1(4), March 1974 ; 55-65

CHATTERJEE (Partha) : The External Policy of the Indian State. *Socialist Perspectives*, 1(4), March 1974 ; 35-54

MALLA (B.C.) : Foreign Policy Options. *Weekly Road Table*, (109) 14 April 1974 ; 3-7

POWER (Paul F) : On Ideologies in India's Foreign Policy. *Indian Political Science Review*, 8(1), January 1974 ; 1-6

SHRI D.P. SINGH'S Statement on Colonialism : (The statement was made by the Indian delegate, Shri D.P. Singh, at the General Assembly on November 20, 1973) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19(11), Nov. 1973 ; 399-401

SINGH (D.P.) : Passion for peace (The nonalignment a child of India's foreign policy) *Weekly Round Table* (1), 3 Feb. 1974 ; 78-81

MISHRA (Panchanan) : 27 years of India's Foreign Policy. *Young India*, 4(7-11), January 1974 ; 119-121

Africa

AFRICA DAY Observed in Capital : (jointly organised meeting by the CPI, The Congress, All India Peace and Solidarity Organisation, AITUC, INTUC, Youth Federation and Youth Congress on May 25 on the occasion of Africa Day in New Delhi) *New Age*, 22(22), 2 June 1974 ; 14

ASIAN-AFRICAN QUEST for Freedom : (speech by Mrs. Gandhi in honour of Mr. Hussain of Iraq. She expressed that India belongs to the Asian-African community of Nations which believe in freedom) *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11(13), 15 April 1974 ; 8

IN SOLIDARITY with the African Liberation Movements. *Amity*, 3(2), Feb. 1974 ; 17-18

MOOLLA (M) : South Africa Day June 26. *New Age* 22(25), 23 June 1974 ; 9

PRIME MINISTER Urges all Help to Freedom Struggle in Africa (A text of the address delivered by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in New Delhi on May 25 on the occasion of Africa Day which coincided with the 11th anniversary of O.A.U.) *Socialist India*, 9(1), 1 June 1974 ; 161-165

SIDDHANT (T.N.) May Day 1974. *New Age*, 22(17) 28 April 1974 ; 1

East Africa

RAMCHANDANI (R.R.) : Indian Emigration to East African countries during XIX and early XX centuries. *Journal of the University of Bombay*, Oct. 1972

Egypt

BAHADUR SINGH (I.J.) : Sadat's visit to India. *Young India*, 4(13) 7 March 1974 ; 8

INDIA, EGYPT for further cooperation : (Talk between Mrs. Gandhi and President Sadat on Political, Economic and Commercial relations of two countries) *Patriot*, 25 Feb. 1974 ; 1

INDO-EGYPTIAN RELATIONS ; *Indian & Foreign Review*, 1 April 1974 ; 8

INDIRA-SADAT TALKS on Feb. 24 : (President Sadat's 24-hour visit to Delhi on 24 and 25 February) *Patriot*, 22 Feb. 1974 ; 3

NEHRU'S INFLUENCE on Egypt's leaders: (During his recent tour of the Third World, President Sadat of Egypt—he confided his impressions of leaders of the Third World to the editor of Al-Ahram. Speaking on Nehru, he said Nehru held a great fascination for Egyptians. He further called his long association with Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister of India and said that she inherited from her father his love for Egyptians and contributed a good deal to the strengthening of Indian-Egyptian ties) *Patriot*, 17 March 1974 ; 2

PRESIDENT SADAT—Symbol of Arab Liberation (President Sadat's visit to India) *Patriot*, 24 Feb. 1974 ; 2

ROY (Khagen): How far Sadat can help India : Portents of Islamic Summit. *Organiser*, 30 March 1974 ; 5

SADAT IN India : (President Sadat's brief visit to India, Feb. 1974. from 24-25) *Link*, 16 (29), 24 Feb. 1974 ; 29-30

SADAT'S PEACE Drive Brings Him to India (President Sadat's visit to India) *Patriot*, 10 February 1974 ; 2

SADAT'S TALKS with Mrs. Gandhi discussed International and bilateral matters at a meeting at Rashtrapati Bhavan) *Statesman*, 25 February 1974 ; 1

THE PRESIDENT Pledges support to Arabs (President Sadat speech at the banquet given in his honour in New Delhi) *Statesman*, 25 February 1974 ; 6

Guinea : (Republic)

GUINEA : (A delegation from the Republic of Guinea paid a goodwill visit to India from November 15 to 21, 1963) (A press note issued in New Delhi on November 22, 1973) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (11), November 1973 ; 384-385

Nigeria

IN SOLIDARITY with the Arab People (resolution) *Amity*, 3(2), February 1974 ; 16

RAY (Amal) : Decision-making and Federalising Process in India and Nigeria. *India Quarterly*, 29 (4), October December 1973 ; 319-325

VARAHAMIHIRA : Nigerian Envoy. *Hindustan Times*, 9 January 1974 ; 5

WAR MATERIAL for Arabs (The Minister of State for Defence Productions statement in the Parliament that India supplied some items of defence stores to Arab countries during the the recent Arab-Israel conflict) *Organiser*, 5 January 1974 ; 12

Rhodesia

SHRI SAMAR SEN'S Statement on Southern Rhodesia (Text of the statement made at the meeting of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of resolution of K 253 (1968) concerning the question of S. Rhodesia, the Committee dealing with sanction held its first open meeting on November 9, 1973) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (11), 395-397

SHRI SAMAR SEN'S statement at Security Council during debate on Situation in Southern Rhodesia (Text of statement at Security Council on May 16, 1973 ; on the special report of the Sanction Committee on Southern Rhodesia) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (5), May 1973 : 201-204

South Africa

AIPSO to Observe S. Africa Freedom Day (All India Peace and Solidarity Organisation will observe South Africa Freedom Day on 26th June 1974) *Patriot*, 11 June 1974 ; 8

A SOUTH AFRICAN in Gandhi's Footsteps. *Himmat*, 10 (18) March 1974 ; 3

MOOLA (M) : An 'Indian' Mission Racist South Africa. *Patriot*, 30 April 1974 ; 2

South West Africa

SHRI BUTA SINGH'S Statement on Namibia (Text of the statement made in the UN Fourth Committee on the question of Namibia on November 5, 1973) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (11), November 1973 ; 393-395

Senegal

CLOSE TIES with Senegal (President Gori Welcomed President Seneghor and said that India had many things in common with Senegal) *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (16), 1 June 1947 ; 9

SENGHOR HAILS India's policy. *Patriot*, 27 May 1974 ; 1

SHANTI SADIQ ALI : Senegal and India. *Indian Express*, 12 1974 ; 4

WARM WELCOME for Senegal President (Visit of Mr. Leopold Sedar Senghor President of the Republic of Senegal on 1st May 1974) *India and Foreign Review*, 11 (16) 1 June 1974 ; 7

Sudan

SCOPE FOR Joint Ventures in Sudan. *Economic Trends*, 3 (9), 1 February 1974 ; 23

Tanzania

NEHRU AWARD for President Nyerere (the President of Tanzania has been awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru award for International Understanding for 1973) *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (10), 1 March 1974 ; 10

TANZANIA BACKS Anti Base campaign (P.M. Smt. Indira Gandhi discussed International situation and problems faced by the Tanzanian President Dr. Julius Nyerere at Dum Dum airport on March 31st on his way home from Pakistan *Socialist India*, 8 (19), 6 April 1974 ; 30

TANZANIA'S NYERERE (President Julius Nyerere has been awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru award for 1973) *Hindustan Times*, 20 February 1974 ; 5

West Africa

SHRI SAMAR SEN'S statement at Security Council on Situation in West Asia (Text of the statement) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (11), November 1973 ; 392

Zambia

PATIL (Bal) : Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda. A President with Passion for Humanism (President Kunda of Zambia who has been given the Nehru Award for International Understanding is the rarest among the African nationals. He had followed the Gandhian spirit in the Zambian literature) *Socialist India*, 8 (10), 2 February 1974 ; 19-21

ZAMBIA-INDIA Friendship (The Secretary General of Zambia's ruling party Mr. Grey Zulu declared in Lusaka that his party

and government attached great importance to relations with India) *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (8) 1 February 1974 ; 8

INDIAN OCEAN

- A BASIC FALLACY (Indian Ocean) *Times of India*, 24 February 1974 : 4
- AGGRESSIVE U.S. Naval Force (Indian Ocean) *Patriot*, 13 February 1974 ; 2
- ALGIERS LESSON (US and Britain military base in the Indian Ocean is a warning to all governments and peoples who are proud of their policy of nonalignment) *Patriot*, 24 March 1974 ; 2
- AN INDIAN OCEAN Base : *Statesman*, 4 February 1974 ; 6
- ANAND (J.P.) : American Bases in the Indian Ocean. *Young India*, 4 (22), 9 May 1974 ; 15-16
- ANAND (J.P.) : Another Base in Indian Ocean (The Reunion Island has a strategic significance and plays an important role in monitoring the South West region of the Indian Ocean) *Century*, 12 (1) 4, 11 May 1974 ; 10
- ANAND (J.P.) : Naval Arms Race (Diego Garcia), *Young India*, 4 (27), 13 June 1974 ; 10-11
- BASE FOR Aggression (Protest by the Indian Ocean littoral states over Diego Garcia base) *Patriot*, 22 March 1974 ; 2
- BEYOND DIEGO GARCIA. *Link*, 16 (34). 31 March 1974 ; 15
- BISWAS (Chitta) : Imperialists must be kept off Indian Ocean. *New Age*, 22 (6), 10 February 1974 ; 13
- CHAUDHURI (J.N.) : Power race in Indian Ocean. *Indian Express* 15 February 1974 ; 4
- CHINA'S 'IN PRINCIPLE' Support and Tirades. *Weekly Round Table* (114), 9 June 1974 ; 30-33
- CHOPRA (Maharaj K) : Dim Diplomacy over Diego Garcia. *Organiser*, 9 March 1974 ; 6
- CONCERN OVER Diego Garcia Base. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 1 April 1974 ; 7

- DANGER IN Diego Garcia, *Peoples Democracy*, 13 February 1974 ; 2
- DAS GUPTA (PRABHAT) : All about US Bases and Soviet 'Presence', (In the Indian Ocean) *New Age*, 22 (8) 22 February 1974; 12-13
- DIEGO GARCIA. *Organiser*, 6 April 1974 ; 11
- DIEGO GARCIA (Establishment of a strategic base on the Indian Ocean Island) *Indian Express*, 12 February 1974 ; 4
- DIEGO GARCIA : (In spite of the fact that UN had resolved that the Indian Ocean should remain a zone of peace and the Lusaka Conference of non-aligned countries in 1970 and the George Town meeting of Foreign Ministers of these countries in 1972 passed similar resolutions the US decision was taken to have a military base in Diego Garcia) *Frontier*, 6 (48), 16 March 1974; 2-3
- DIEGO GARCIA : Nuclear war threat. *Link*, 16 (39), 5 May 1974 ; 21-22
- DIEGO GARCIA Base : Indian Ocean. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (16), 15 June 1974 ; 9
- DIEGO GARCIA-Smokescreen for Reds. *March of the nation*, 27 April 1974 ; 8
- FREEDOM OF the Sea (It is Significant to lay stress on the concept of maintaining the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace) *Patriot*, 7 January 1974 ; 2
- GHELOT (N.S.) : Super powers in Indian Ocean. *Young India*, 4 (13), 7 March 1974 ; 4 and 19
- HENNESSY (Joss Leyn) : Indian Ocean Western Security & Sino-Soviet relations. *Eastern Economist*, 62 (22), 31 May 1974 ; 1075-1078
- IMPORTANCE OF Tiny Islands (Indian Ocean) *Statesman*, 19 February 1974 ; 4
- INDIA'S CONCERN at U.S. Naval Presence Indian Ocean. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 1 April 1974 ; 6
- JAIN (Girilal) : Furore over Diego Garcia : Need for Correct Perspective. *Times of India*, 20 February 1974 ; 4

- KARTAR SINGH U.S. Against Peace. (India Ocean) *Patriot*, 16 February 1974 ; 2
- KEEP OFF Indian Ocean. *New Age*, 22 (6), 10 February 1974 ; 2
- KOZLOVE (Svyatoslan) : Collective Security after Demilitarization (India Ocean) *Weekly Round Table*, (114), 9 June 1974 ; 25-35
- MAJOR THREAT, Challenge to India Ocean States. *Link*, 16 (27) 10 February 1974 ; 9-11
- MALDIVES AND Bulgaria Support Peace Zone Concept for Indian Ocean : Close Economic, Cultural and Scientific co-operation. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 1 April 1974 ; 5-6
- MUKHERJEE (Sadhan) : Indian Ocean must be free of Tension. *Amity*, 3 (3), March 1974 ; 4-6
- NANDA (S.M.) : Gun Ported at Littoral States. (Indian Ocean) *Weekly Round Table*, (114), 9 June 1974 ; 3-5
- NEW BASE for U.S. Aggression (Diego Garcia case) *Link*, 16 (33), 24 March 1974 ; 8
- NON-ALIGNED FLAY U.S., U.K. (17-Nation non-aligned Bureau denounced the decision to develop an Anglo-American base in the Indian Ocean) *Patriot*, 23 March 1974 ; 1
- ON ASIAN Security Pact (agreement between US and Britain to develop Diego Garcia Island a thousand miles from India and half-way between Africa and Australia in the India Ocean) *People's Democracy*, 17 March 1974 ; 9
- POULOSE (T.T.): Dangers of nuclear race in Indian Ocean. *Weekly Round Table*, (114), 9 June 1974; 23-25
- POULOSE (T.T.) : Indian Ocean Problems: *Foreign Affairs Reports*, 23 (14), April 1974; 59-79
- POULOSE (T.T.) : The Indian Ocean : A Zone of Peace. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (16), 1 June 1974; 17-18
- PORTENTS FOR Diego Garcia (The Chief of US naval Operations said that the base was needed to support friendly regimes in the region from interm supervision) *Capital*, 4 April 1974; 451-452
- PROPOSED BASE at Diego Garcia : India's Concern. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (10) 1 March 1974; 8

- RAMA RAO (R) : A strategy of the Indian Ocean. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (11), 15 March 1974; 16-18
- SARKAR (Subhash Chandra) : The Invasion of the Indian Ocean. *Modern Review*, (4) April 1974; 272-276
- SAWHNY (Brig R.) : Diego Garcia in strategic Perspective. *Yonng India*, 4 (17). 4 April 1974; 12-13
- SIRIVASTAVA (A.N.) : Diego Garcia (The agreement between the US and Britain to convert Diego Garcia into an American Military base) *Patriot*, 1 March 1974; 2
- STEPPING-STONES (Indian Ocean and Western interest) *Democratic World*, 14 March 1974; 1
- SUBRAHMANYAM (K) : Political and psychological Tool (Indian Ocean) *Weekly Round Table*, (114) 9 June 1974; 9-23
- THREAT TO Peace (The presence of US and Britain in the Ocean is a threat to peace) *Indian Express*, 24 January 1974; 4
- TIGHTROPE WALKING by Australia (The concept of Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace) *Weekly Round Table*, (114), 9 June 1974; 33-35
- U.S. BASES in Indian Ocean. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11, (14), 1 May 1974; 8
- U.S. Bid to Create Tension in Indian Ocean. *Patriot*, 19 February 1974; 8
- U.S. INTERESTS (In the Indian Ocean) *Patriot*, 6 March 1974; 2
- UNNA (Warren) U.S.A. to give no rent for Diego Garcia. *Statesman*, 7 February 1974; 1
- VIBHAKAR (Jagdish) : Indian Ocean : Zone of Peace. *Link* 12 (35), 27 April 1974; 25-26
- VIVIKANADAN (B) : Indian Ocean : Pragmatic Approach Needed. *Janata*, 29 (11), 14 April 1975; 13-14
- ZUNWAZT (Elmor) : Critical Importance to U.S. (Indian Ocean) *Weekly Round Table*, (144), 9 June 1974; 6-8

(A) African View

- ALAM (M. Manzoor) : Geographical importance of the Indian Ocean (Indian Ocean is surrounded by developing countries including South Africa, Mozambique, East and Central African

Countries like Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Malawi and Mrlegasy which provide essential raw materials mineral and agricultural to the developed countries of the west) *Indian Journal & Politics*, 7 (1) June 1973; 13-26

ANC STATEMENT on Diego Garcia (Mrs A. Msimang, Deputy Representative African National Congress (S. Africa) has stated that Anglo-American Policy to set up a naval base at Diego Garcia is an imperialist conspiracy aimed against the people of Asia and Africa). *Socialist India*, 8 (13), 23 February 1974; 14

TANZANIA CONCERNED Over Diego Garcia Base. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (14), 1 May 1974; 9

(B) Indian View

ANOTHER DEAL (US and Britain has captured Diego Garcia just like Portugal's colonialism in Africa) *Patriot*, 14 February 1974; 2

COMPEL USA to quit Indian Ocean (Communist Party of India's resolution which was adopted in its meeting in New Delhi from 23 to 26 March 1975) *New Age*, 22 (13) 31, March 1974; 15

CONCERN AT Base on Diego Garcia (India is deeply concerned with Indian Ocean affairs) *Patriot*, 19 February 1974; 1

DIEGO GARCIA (New Delhi's policy of opposing the establishment of foreign bases in the Indian Ocean) *Times of India*, 8 February 1974; 4

INDIAN OCEAN on fire ! (An Indian point of view) *Janata*, 29 (7), 17 March 1974; 2-3

LAL (R.M.) : US Presence in the Indian Ocean (The military base in Diego Garcia is a danger for India as well as Africa) *Himmat*, 10 (20), 15 March 1974; 6-7

: United Nations Report on Indian Ocean :

UN REPORT (Indian Ocean) *Link*, 16 (45), 16 June 1974; 23

KENYA ELECTIONS

SHANTI SADIQ ALI : Election prospects in Kenya. *Indian Express* 19 May 1974; 3

TAILORED TO Tribalism (Kenya) (Country's Second General Election) *Democratic World*, 6 June 1974; 8-9

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

ECONOMIC RELATIONS Between India and Kenya. *Economic Trends*, ¹ (12), 16 March 1974; 22-23

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

TAILORED TO Tribalism. *Democratic World*, 6 June 1974; 8-9

LIBERIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India in Ghana-February 1974-Ghana and Liberia) *Indian Trade Journal*, 25 April 1974; B-117

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

U.S.S.R.

MASOOD ALI KHAN : This year Premier Steeveses Ties with Moscow (Strengthening of the anti-imperialist front in the Middle East and assisting unity of the progressive forces in the Arab World is the result of the visit of Libyan Prime Minister to Moscow) *New Age*, 22 (21), 26 May 1974; 13

LIBYA

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

NAWAZ (M.K.) : Nationalization of Foreign Oil Companies-Libyan Decree of 1 September 1973. *Indian Journal of International Law*, 14 (1), January-March 1974; 70-80

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions 'by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli, January 1972) *Indian Trade Journal*, 3 April 1974; B 4-5

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli—February 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 1 May 1974; B 173-B 179

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli—March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 8 & 15 May 1974; B236-239

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (by the Ambassador, Embassy of India, Tripoli, April 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 12 June 1974; B480-B481

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

Arab Republic of Egypt

CONTRADICTIONARY PRESSURES (After the October war the gulf between Egypt and Libya widened and now it appears to have reached a dead end Col. Gaddafi's policy towards Egypt) *Link* 16 (36), 14 April 1974; 25

PILOTS ON Loan (Libya's relations with Egypt and Pakistan) *Times of India*, 21 February 1974; 4

Pakistan

GADDAFY VISIT (President of Libya's visit to Pakistan will result in increased co-operation between the two countries) *Patriot*, 1 March 1974; 2

LIBYAN AID to Pindi for 'Jehad' *Patriot*, 26 February 1974; 1

PILOTS ON Loan (Libya's relations with Egypt and Pakistan) *Times of India*, 21 February 1974; 4

SATISH KUMAR : The Libyan embrace (Libya's relations with Pakistan) *Hindustan Times*, 14 March 1974; 5

Tunisia

HIGH AND Dry (Merger Against signed with Libya) *Indian Express*, 18 January 1974; 4

MERGER MANIA (The imperialistic hand could be seen behind the merger of Tunisia and Libya) *Patriot*, 14 January 1974; 2

STRANGE BED FELLOWS (Merger of Libya and Tunisia to form an Islamic Republic) *Indian Express*, 15 January 1974; 4

TUNISIA (Tunisia's merger agreement with Libya) *Swarajya*, 18 (31), 2 February 1974; 18

GADDAFY IN Retreat (Col. Gaddafi had started backtracking on his earlier anti-Sadat and anti-Soviet) *Hindustan Times*, 9 May 1974; 5

GADDAFFY DOWNGRADED (Col. Gaddafi's absolution *Statesman*, 11 May 1974; 4

GOSH (Nirpendranath) : Gaddafi and Sub-Continent. *Janata*, 29 (20), 23 June 1974; 6

LIBYAN MELODRAMA : *Indian Express*, 9 April 1974; 4

LIBYAN MYSTERY (Col. Gaddafi acts as a titular head of the state) *Patriot*, 9 May 1974; 2

SASTRY (K.K.) : Col. Gaddafi's Chinese Puzzle : Mao-ising His Position. *Times of India*, 19 May 1974; 4

SASTRY (K.K.) : Libya's Subversion Dossier : An Entry From Egypt. *Times of India*, 8 May 1974; 5

PRESIDENT

GOSH (Nrependranath) : Gaddafi and the Sub-continent. *Janata*, 23 June 1974; 6

MAURITIUS

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

BIG DEMAND for (Indian goods in Mauritius. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 1 April 1974; 8

INDIA'S ASSURANCE to Mauritius (Assurance given by the Indian Government to Mauritius for technical assistance particularly for reorganization of technical infrastructure for execution of projects) *Patriot*, 16 February 1974; 5

INDO-MAURITIUS TRADE Expansion. *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11(14), 1 May 1974; 8

INVESTMENT POSSIBILITIES in Mauritius. *Economic Trends*, 3 (7), 1 January 1974; 27

MOZAMBIQUE

LIBERATION MOVEMENT

A LIBERATION VENEER (Portuguese govt. has been taking a cautious step to give the authoritarian regime a liberal veneer. The opposition to the Colonial War in Africa has become more widespread) *Times of India*, 14 March 1974; 4

CHAUDHURI (J.N.): Portuguese war in Africa (The Pervasive civil war is the war metropolitan Portugal has been fighting

- of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique) *Indian Express*, 15 March 1974; 4
- COUP IN Portugal (How liberation struggle is effected) *Frontier*, 7(2), 4 May 1974; 3
- HELL-BENT to Hang on (Portugal in Africa) *Democratic World*, 14 March 1974; 6-7
- MOZAMBIQUE (massacre of Africans in Mozambique) *National Herald*, 14 May 1974; 5
- MOZAMBIQUE: FRELIMO Sets up Children's villages (Mozambique liberation Front FRELIMO'S armed struggle against Portuguese) *New Age*, 24 March 1974; 15
- NEW WINDS in Lisbon. (Change in Portugals' attitude towards African Colonies) *Hindustan Times*, 1 March 1974; 3
- POMERAY (William J.): Liberated Areas Expanded in Mozambique *New Age* 22(5) 31 February 1974; 13
- PORTUGUAL: BASTION of dictatorship falls (The people in Mozambique and Angola are less enthusiastic in welcoming the military coup in Portugal the people of Portugal itself) *Commerce*, 128 (3286) 4 May 1974; 624-625
- THE FRELIMO should negotiate now (Frelimo has placed the demands for independence before the new regime of Lisbon) *Himmat*. 10(27), 3 May 1974; 3
- THE LAST Colonies (The determination to hold on the African Colonies, Mozambique, Angola and Guinea, is bound to fail. After Britain and France had relinquished their Colonies in Africa, it was logically and morally incumbent on Portugal to follow suit) *Indian Express*, 16 March 1974; 9

NIGERIA

CIVIL WAR

- NWOGUSU (F.I.): The Nigerian Civil War: A case study in law of war. *Indian Journal of Industrial Law*, 14(1), January-March 1974; 13-53

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

- SHANTI SADIQ ALI: Nigeria's Oil Boom. *Indian Express*, 16 February 1974; 4

UKPANA (Senas J): Professionalization of the Industrial Relations Function in Nigeria. *Indian Journal of Industrial Relations*, 8 (4), April 1973; 495-511

ECONOMIC POLICY

NIGERIAN ECONOMIC Prospects. (With the Progress of the Second National Development Plan 1970/74, Nigeria is emerging as a powerful force in Africa) *Indo-Africa, Trade Journal*, 10 (2&3) March 1, 1974; 24-25

OKEDIJI (Francis Olu): Socio-Economic and Demographic aspects of Nigeria's Second National Development Plan, 1970-74. *Africa Quarterly*, 13(2), July-September 1973; 140-151

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

India

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (by the Second Secretary, High Commission of India, Lagos- December 1973 January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 10 April 1974; B34-35

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (By the Second Secretary, High Commission of India, (Commercial Section), Lagos, Nigeria, February 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 1 May 1974; B179-181

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (by the First Secretary, High Commission of India, Lagos-March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 5 June 1974; B427-B429

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Condition (by the First Secretary (Commercial) High Commission of India, Lagos-April 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 19 June 1974; B543-B54J

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

India

RAY (Amal): Decision-making and Federalising Process in India and Nigeria. *India Quarterly*, 29(4), October-December 1973; 319-325

VARANAMIHIRA: Nigerian Envoy. *Hindustan Times*, 9 January 1974; 5

NIGERIA

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

COUP IN Nigeria. *Link*, 16(38), 8 April 1974; 29

NORTH AFRICA

COMMERCE & INDUSTRY

- ALGIERS MEETING (Mr. Swaran Singh's opinion that the Algiers meeting of 17-nation Bureau of Non-aligned Countries could not have settled the oil problem) *Commerce*, 128 (3281) 30 March 1974; 400-401
- ANDREASYAN (R): Oil and the Anti-Imperialist Struggle. *Indian Left Review*, 3(4), June 1974; 14-23
- BROOK (E.B): Oil as Catalyst in World Commerce. *Eastern Economist*, 62 (23), 7 June 1974; 1119-1120
- CHAKRAVARTTY (Summit): Crisis of Inflation. A Capitalist Crisis. *Patriot*, 12 June 1974; 2
- CHAKRAVORTY (Nitya): Oil Crisis: New Demensions. *New Age*, 22(2), 13 June 1974; 6
- CHOPRA (Maharaja K): Oil Power moves to the East. *Organiser*, 13, April 1974; 13
- COOPERATION SOLUTION to oil crisis : Sadat. *Patriot*, 26 February 1974; 1
- FAROOQI (M): Shift to Right in Egypt and its impact on West Asia (To lift the oil embargo against US is a temporary gain) *New Age*, 22(13), 31 March 1974; 14
- GADDAFI STRIKES Through Guerillas (Libya's oil policy) *Organiser*, 16 February 1974; 6
- LALA (R.M.): The Oil Crisis and the Third World. *Himmat*, 10 (18), 1 March 1974; 5-6
- MUKHERJEE (Dilip) : The Oil haves and have-nots: Scope for joining Hands. *Times of India*, 23 March 1974; 4
- OIL AND the Developing Countries. *Capital*, CLXXII (4297), 17 January 1974; 89
- OIL CRISIS: (Impact on food production in Asia, Africa and other parts of the World) *Capital*, CLXXII (4305), 21 March 1974; 387
- OIL ERODES Algiers Bonds, Atlanticism (Oil Crisis) *Indian Express*, 24 March 1974; 4

OIL FACILITY for Importers. *Indian Finance*, 25 May 1974: 357-358

OIL POLITICS. *Patriot*, 23 March 1974; 2

PADMANABHAN (R): Middle East Oil causes World Crisis and Chaos. *Modern Review*, (4), April 1974; 274-278.

PARASURAM (T.V.) Confrontation over oil among neutrals. *Indian Express*, 11 April 1974; 5-7

RAIS (Asutosh): Prolonging the Oil Crisis. *Democratic World*, 18 April 1974; 5-7

REDDY (G. Yallamande): Oil offensive: A New turn in World Capitalist Crisis. *Mainstream*, 12 (40 & 41), 8 June 1974 27-32

SASTRY (K.K.): Oil confusion in West Asia, contrary statements (The Tripoli Conference did not announce the lifting of oil embargo against US after all, the decision was made public in Vienna) *Times of India*, 28 March 1974; 4

THE ENERGY Challenge. *Hindustan Times*, 16 February 1974; 5

TOOFAN (Brijmohan): Oil Crisis: Its Dangerous consequences. *Young India*, 4(7-11), January 1974, 135-136

TOOFAN (Brij Mohan): Oil Crisis and Guilty Parties. *Janata*, 7 April 1974: 6-6

U.S. Concerned with Oil Embargo, not Peace (US Secretary of State Kissinger's Secret Diplomacy, what stands out is that US is seeking not a permanent and stable peace but a quick solution of the energy crisis) *Patriot*, 13 March 1974; 2

UNDECLARED WAR in Third World. *Thought*, 13 April 1974; 11-12

WHY GIVE UP this weapon (Egypt, Libya and other Arabs Countries have done no good to their cause by lifting the embargo on oil supplies to USA) *New Age*, 22(12), 24 March 1974; 2

WORLD ENERGY Crisis: Special Report by a correspondent *Weekly Round Table*, (106), 17 March 1974; 16-23

CONFERENCES

Arab Summit

MINI SUMMIT (Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Algeria held a

meeting. The foundation of this meeting was laid by the Algiers Summit of November 1973) *Link*, 16(29), 24 February 1974, 28

MUKERJEE (Dilip): Razak urges Islamic nations to unite. *Times of India*, 22 June 1974; 5

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

SHANTI SADIQ ALI : Afro-Arab Cooperation. *Indian Express*, 2 February 1974 ; 4

Arab-Israel Conflict

ADIL (Adam) : The West Asian War : Muslim point of view. *Quest*, (87), March-April 1974 ; 53-56.

ALARMING TURN (West Asian War) *Patriot*, 23 April 1964, 2

ARAB CONTRADICTIONS (Changes in Egyptian policy) *Link*, 16 (33), 24 March 1974, 30

ARABS IN Stronger Position : (Arab-Israel War) *Link*, 16 (21) 30 February 1974 ; 28

BETTING ON Egypt (The new phase of the October War) *Link*, 16 (39), 5 May 1974 ; 36-36

BREAKTHROUGH in the Middle East. *Himmat*, 10 (30), 24 May 1974 ; 3

CHAUDHURI (J.N.) : New Mood in Egypt. *Hindustan Times*, 12 April 1974 ; 4

CHAUDHURI (J.N.) The Golan Battle. *Indian Express*, 26 April 1974) ; 4

CHOPRA (Maharaja K.) : Why Syria continues to Fight Israel ? *Organiser*, 4 May 1974 ; 6

CHOPRA (Maharaja K.) : Will nuclear floodgates burst open in West Asia ? *Organiser*, 19 January 1974 ; 6

GORAY (N.G.) : Lessons from the West Asian War (Some points on the Arab Israel war submitted to the consultative Committee of Parliament attached to the Ministry of Defence at its meeting on November 14) *Janata*, 28 (45), 6 January 1974 ; 4

GOSHKO (John M) : Where Diplomacy is big Business ? *Indian Express*, 31 March 1974 ; 4

- HIGGINGS (Jim) : Background to the Middle East Crisis. *Call*, June 1974 ; 14-17
- HOPEFUL SIGNS (Prospects of a negotiated settlement) *Link*, 16 (40), 19 May 1974 ; 25
- KEIDAN (Aharon) : The West Asian War : Jewish Point of View. *Quest*; (87), March-April 1974 : 56-59
- MROUE (Kerim) : Use the Opportunities of the New Situation in the Middle East. *Problem of Peace and Socialism*, 2 (3) March 1974 ; 103-110.
- NARAYAN (B.K.) : Will Israel Survive ? *Century*, 12 (8), 15 June 1974 ; 8-10
- NEW HOPE in West Asia. *Hindustan Times*, 31 May 1974 ; 5
- NEXT STAGE in W. Asia. *Statesman*, 5 March 1974 ; 4
- OPTIMISM IN Cairo (West Asian War) *Link*, 16 (34), 31 March 1974 ; 32
- PARASURAM (T. V.) : Fresh dangers in West Asia. *Indian Express*, 21 April 1974 ; 4
- PRASURAM (T.V.) : Sadat revolution 'to influence Syria' *Indian Express*, 1 April 1974 ; 4
- QURAISHI (Zaheer Masood) : Conflict and Revolution in West Asia. *India Quarterly*, 29 (4) October-December 1974 ; 347-351
- SASTRY (K.K.) : Underground war in West Asia : New Cycle of Terror. *Times of India*, 27 April 1974 ; 4
- SOME HOPE (West Asian War) *Link*, 16 (44) 26 May 1974 ; 25
- STALEMATE AGAIN. *Indian Express*, 3 April 1974 ; 4
- STRENGTH AND Weaknesses (West Asian War) *Link*, 16 (26), 3 February 1974 ; 20-21.
- SYRIA's FIRMNESS (In spite of the pressure from Saudi Arabia and Egypt, Syria is determined not to accept a political solution which does not lead to the vacation of the territories occupied by Israel in 1967 war) *Link*, 16 (38) 28 April 1974 ; 24
- SYRIAN ANXIETY (Arab-Israeli war) *Link*, 16 (37) 21 April 1974 ; 31

- SUBBARAO (M.V.) : Diplomatic Background of the West Asian Crisis. *Modern Review*, January 1974 ; 15-19
- WEST ASIA : Disengagement or discord ? *Socialist India*, 8 (8), 19 January 1974 ; 3 and 32
- WEST ASIAN Portents (W. Asian war situation between the 1967 and 1973) *Indian Express*, 19 April 1974 ; 4
- WEST ASIAN WAR : Discussion by P. Ganesh and A. B. Shah replies. *Quest*, May-June 1974 ; 59-65
- (A) Cease-fire agreement
- AGWANI (M.S.) : Tricky situation for Arabs (agreement on separation of forces on the Suez front signed by Israel and Egypt on 18 January 1974) *Weekly Round Table*, (104), 24 February 1974 ; 11-13
- AN AGREEMENT in West Asia (An agreement between Egypt and Israel on January 18 on the issue of troop pullback from Suez) *New Age*, 22 (4a), 27 January 1974 ; 15
- BIG STEP Forward (Syrian-Israel disengagement agreement) *Indian Express*, 31 May 1974 ; 4
- DEEPENING CONFIDENCE (withdrawal of Israeli troops from the West bank of the Suez canal opens the most crucial phase in the negotiations for West Asian Peace Settlement) *Hindustan Times*, 30 January 1974 ; 5
- HOPEFUL (Disengagement of forces between Syria and Israel), *Patriot*, 1 March 1974 ; 2
- INTERLUDE BEFORE PEACE (The Egypt-Israel agreement on disengagement in Suez is a historic advance on the road to peace in West Asia) *Hindustan Times*, 19 January 1974 ; 5
- NIXON VISIT (West Asia is witnessing dramatic changes with the implementation of the disengagement agreement between Syria and Israel on the Golan Heights followed by the 10-day visit of President Nixon to the region) *Link*, 16 (46), 23 June 1974 ; 29
- PALIT (D.K.) : Egyptian Army's New Elan (Author's observation visiting the Suez Canal front) *Hindustan Times*, 8 January 1974 ; 5

THE ARAB-ISRAELI Pullout agreement (mutual pullout agreement between Cairo and Tel Aviv) (*Thought*, 26 (4), 26 January 1974 ; 5

WEST ASIA Hurdles (Despite the disengagement agreement between Egypt and Israel it is difficult to predict the cause of events in West Asia) *Indian Express*, 5 February 1974 ; 4

WHO WILL Benefit ? The opening of Suez Canal. *Thought*, 26 (6), 9 February 1974 ; 6

(B) Peace Negotiations

(A Firm Peace in West Asia) *Link*, 16 (46), 23 June 1974 ; 5

DURABLE PEACE in West Asia : Background. *Weekly Round Table*, (104), 24 February 1974 ; 2

FOR OVERALL W. Asia Settlement (For stable and just peace in West Asia, there is no alternative to an overall political settlement : There cannot be a return in whatever form, to the situation that existed before October 1973) *Patriot*, 11 February 1974 ; 2

KAMATH (M.V.) : Kissinger leaves for West Asia on new mission (US Secretary of State persuading Israel and Syria for a compromise) *Times of India*, 29 April 1974 ; 1

KAUL (Sumer) : Good Climate but uncertain weather (peace in W. Asia) *Weekly Round Table*, (104), 24 February 1974 ; 7-10

MARKING TIME in West Asia (peace-making in West Asia would be other than a lengthy business) *Statesman*, 3 January 1974 ; 4

MIDDLE EAST. The making of peace. *Himmat*, 10 (25), 19 April 1974 ; 10

MIDDLE EAST-The real peacemaking Begins now. *Himmat*, 10 (33) 14 June 1974 ; 3

MOVE FOR PEACE (West Asian peace move) *Link*, 16 (28), 17 February 1974 ; 32

ONE STEP Towards Peace (US permanent representative once again put the issue of overall settlement of Middle East problem in UN Security Council) *New Age*, 22 (23), 9 June 1974 ; 14

PARASURAM (T.V.) : Kissinger : W. Asia problems, not over (US efforts for Syrian Israel disengagement) *Indian Express*, 2 June 1974 ; 4

PEACE IS Not a treaty but a relationship : Says Israeli diplomat. *Himmat*, 10 (31), 31 May 1974 ; 11 and 17

PEACE IN West Asia. *Link*, 16 (33), 24 March 1974 ; 3

PROSPECTS OF Peace : Peace prospects in West Asia have brightened because of three major developments in the region. First Egyptian and Israel military negotiation secondly slight change in the Syrian attitude towards Geneva Peace Conference and thirdly is the decision of PLO Central Committee to step up political action at all lands) *Link*, 16 (22), 6 January 1974 ; 30

SNAGAL (O.P.) : West Asia : How Far is a Settlement ? *Indian Left Review*, 3 (4), June 1974 ; 5-7

SASTRY (K.K.) : Kissinger's major bid in Golan peace. *Times of India*, 3 May 1974 ; 5

SAWHNÝ (Brin R.) : A watershed in Thinking (durable peace in West Asia) *Weekly Round Table*, (104), 24 February 1974 ; 3-6

SHUTTLE DIPLOMACY (Dr. Kissinger's visit for a peace settlement between Arab and Israel) *Patriot*, 18 May 1974 ; 3

SLOW MOTION on Suez (peace talk at Geneva) *Indian Express*, 12 January 1974 ; 4

TERRITORY FOR Peace (Arab-Israel War) *Democratic World*, 6 June 1974 ; 2

WEST ASIA (Dr. Kissinger's visit to W. Asia is not very hopeful) *National Herald*, 13 May 1974 ; 5

(C) World Opinion

China

TIWARI (B.K.) China : Basic W. Asia issues unsolved (China to be unhappy over Syrian-Israel disengagement signed in Geneva) *Indian Express*, 4

Egypt

MISRA (Panchanan) : Egypt and West Asia Crisis. *Young India*, 4 (23) 116 May 1974 ; 10

SADAT SHIFT (Nasser's policy in West Asian War) *Patriot*, 20 April 1974; 2

SASTRY (K.K.) More Attacks on Nasser Era. A spate of charges (Egypt in West Asian War) *Times of India*, 7 May 1974; 4

France

FRENCH MOVES in West Asia. *Organiser*, 23 February 1974; 7

India

ARAB EXAMPLE for India. *Organiser*, 27 April 1974; 3

United States

CRUCIAL VISIT (Dr. Kissinger visit to West Asia) *Hindustan Times*, 1 May 1974; 5

JAIN (Giri Lal) : Mr. Nixon's West Asia Trip : Posers for the Soviet Union. *Times of India*, 19 June 1974; 4

JAIN (Giri Lal) : U.S. Role in West Asia : Limits to Pressure on Israel. *Times of India*, 16 January 1974; 4

MR. NIXON'S Trip (Nixon's policy in West Asian War) *Times of India*, 4

UNNA (Warran) : U.S. West Asia Policy Reorientation. *Statesman*, 27 April 1974; 4

U.S.S.R.

MASOOD ALL KHAN : Renewed Soviet Support to Arab Struggle. *New Age*, 22 (16) 21 April 1974; 4

ONE SADAT Lie Nailed. *New Age*, 22 (16) 21 April 1974; 15

SOVIET CONDITIONS for Israel : Syrian Disengagement. *Thought*, 18 May 1974; 11

Palestine Problem

ASHHAB (Naim) : Palestinian Struggle and Jordan's Hostility *Patriot*, 24 April 1974; 2

ASHHAB (Naim) : The Palestinian Aspect of the Middle East Crisis. *Problem of Peace and Socialism*, 2 (4) April 1974; 99-107

DAJANI (Ali) : Where do the Palestinians stand now ? *Himmat*, 10 (35), 28 June 1974; 9

FAROOQI (M) : New Stage in Struggle of Palestine Arabs. *New Age*, 22 (3), 20 June 1974; 15

PALESTINIAN PROSPECTS (The disengagement agreement signed between Syria and Israel at Geneva on May 13, has become a matter of public controversy, specially among the Palestinian *Link*, 16 (44), 9 June 1974; 26-27

PROBLEM OF Palestine (The Palestinian's National Right is the second major item on Arab agenda for the Geneva Conference) *Statesman*, 23 march 1974; 4

(A) World Opinion

India

BARAKAT AHMED : India and Palestine 1896-1947 : The genesis of a Foreign Policy. *India Quarterly* 29 (4) October-December 1973; 300-307

IN SOLIDARITY with the Arab People (Resolution) *Amity*, 3 (2), February 1974; 6

WAR MATERIAL for Arabs (The Minister of State for Defence Production's statement in the Parliament that India supplied some items of defence stores to Arab Countries during the recent Arab-Israel conflict) *Organiser*, 5 January 1974; 12

RHODESIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

India

SHRI SAMAR SEN'S statement on Southern Rhodesia (Text of the statement made at the meeting of the Security Council Committee established in pursuance of Resolution K 253 (1968) concerning the question of Southern Rhodesia. The Committee dealing with sanctions held its first meeting on November 9, 1973) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (11), 395-397

SHRI SAMAR SEN'S statement at Security Council during debate on situation in Southern Rhodesia (Text of the statement at the Security Council on May 16, 1973, on the special report of the sanctions Committee on Southern Rhodesia), *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (5), May 1973; 201-204

United Kingdom

MISDIRECTED (African's anger against Britain's weak-kneed policy towards Salisbury) *Indian Express*, 9 February 1974; 4

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

GOPAL (Ajit S) : Rhodesia's Changing Scene. *Indian Express*, 5 February 1974; 4

PROBLEM OF RACE

HARRISON (Michael) : Rhodesia under assault. *Himmat*, 10 (25) 19 April 1974; 11 and 17

SHANTI SADIQ ALI : Rhodesian Prospects. *Indian Express*, 30 March 1974; 7

SENEGAL

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Cultural)

India

INDIA, SENEGAL sign Cultural Pact. *Patriot*, 25 May 1974; 4

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

COMMON INTEREST (India and Senegal to expand their economic relations and exchange their mutual understanding in political matters) *Patriot*, 28 May 1974; 2

FIRST INDO-SENEGAL Trade Agreement (In consequence of the visit of President of Senegal, the first Trade agreement between the two countries was signed) *Commerce*, 128 (3290), 1 June 1974; 776

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

India

CLOSE TIES with Senegal (President Giri welcomed President Senegal and said that India had many things in common with Senegal) *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (16), 1 June 1974; 9

NEW LINKS with West Africa (Ten-day state visit of Mr. Leopold Senghor. President of Senegal) *Hindustan Times*, 29 May 1974; 5

SENGHOR HAILS India's N-policy. *Patriot*, 27 May 1974; 1

SHANTI SADIQALI : Senegal and India. *Indian Express*, 12 May 1974; 4

TIES WITH Senegal (President Leopold Senghor's visit to India) *Link*, 16 (14), 26 May 1974; 11

Pakeeza Sultan

WARM WELCOME for Senegal President (Visit of Mr. Leopold Sedar Senghor, President of the Republic of Senegal on 18 May 1974) *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (16) 1 June 1974; 9

Korea

THE RICH Content of an Abiding Friendship between the DPRK and Republic of Senegal. *Mainstream*, 12 (42), 15 June 1974; 33-35

Pakistan

BHAUMIK (Kirit) : Senghor, Mujib reaffirms faith in nonalignment. *Times of India*, 30 May 1974; 8

PRESIDENT

JAG MOHAN : Senegal's Poet President Leopold Sedar Senghor. *Socialist India*, 8 (28 & 26) 25 May 1974; 27-28

PADGAONKAR (Dileep) : President Senghor of Senegal-A Pragmatic Poet. *Times of India*, 18 May 1974; 4

SIERRA LEONE

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (by the Second Secretary (Commercial) High Commission of India in Ghana, Accra and Sierra Leone March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 29 May 1974; B362

SOMALIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

SHANTI SADIR ALI : Trade with Somalia. *Indian Express*, 19 January 1974; 4

SOUTH AFRICA

APARTHEID

BANTUSTAN APARTHEID (South Africa's policy of segregation of blacks in separate areas is a challenge to United Nations) *Hindu*, 3 June 1974; 4

FERNANDES (Edward) : Young Whites demand end to apartheid.

Indian Express, 9 April 1974; 4

RAMSDALE (Sonny) : 'Sell-out to Apartheid' by British TUC Team, *Patriot*, 20 April 1974; 2

KAUSHIK (P.D.) and RAMSINGH (Mansha) : UN General Assembly and racial discrimination. *Indian Journal of Politics*, 7 (1) June 1973; 56-62

SOUTH AFRICA : Non-Violent change coming through the Home Lands : An interview with Chief Gasha Butelezi, Chief Minister of Kwezulu. *Himmat*, 10 (30), 24 May 1974; 12-13

SOUTH AFRICA : Racists fear and Intrigues. *Socialist World*, 1 January 1974;

SOUTH AFRICA'S Concentration Camps (South African racist Government's policy of so-called resettlement) *People Democracy*, 23 June 1974; 9 & 11

TROUBLE AHEAD for Mr. Smith (The leaders of white minority regimes in South Africa and other parts of Africa have been taking counsel on how to cope with the gale of change that has started blowing across Southern Africa) *Hindu*, 7 June 1974; 6

UPROOTING OF Black People : In Apartheid Country. *Patriot*, 8 June 1974; 2

ECONOMIC POLICY

RUFFIN (Evelyn T) : America's Blacks and Southern Africa. *Himmat*, 10 (19), 8 March 1974; 12-13

U.S., U.K. Banks Behind Apartheid. *Patriot*, 7 January 1974; 2

HOW WESTERN BANKS Finance South Africa : The Frankfurt Documents. *Mainstream*, 12(26), 23 February 1974; 23-25

ELECTIONS

ESSACK (Karim) : Election Rites (South African General elections) *Economic and Political Weekly*, 9 (20), 18 May 1974; 787-788

HANNON (Peter) : South Africa goes to the polls. *Himmat*, 10 (24), 12 April 1974; 9

VICTORY WITHOUT Hope (General election in South Africa) *Hindustan Times*, 25 May 1974; 5

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

India

AIPSO to Observe S. Africa Freedom Day (All India Peace and Solidarity Organization will observe S. Africa Freedom Day on 26th June 1974) *Patriot*, 11 June 1974 ; 8

A SOUTH AFRICAN in Gandhi Footsteps. *Himmat*, 10 (18), 1 March 1974 ; 3

IN SOLIDARITY with the African Liberation Movements. *Amity*, 3 (2), February 1974 ; 17-18

MOLLA (M) : An 'Indian' Mission Racist South Africa. *Patriot*, 30 April 1974 ; 2

Portugal

RAY (Baren) : Portugal and Prospects in South Africa. *Mainstream*, 12 (44), 29 June 1974 ; 8-9

United Kingdom

RACISTS IN Jitters (British sale of arms to South Africa) *Times of India*, 8 May 1974 ; 4

U.K. & Africa (Reimposition of arms embargo on racist South Africa) *Patriot*, 22 February 1974 ; 2

United Nations

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (official document) *Indian Journal of International Law*, 14 (1), January-March 1974 ; 104-109

KAUSHIK (P.D.) : and RAM SINGH (Mansha) : U.N. General Assembly and racial discrimination. *Indian Journal of Politics*, 7 (1), June 1973 ; 56-62

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

NEW NOTE struck in South African racial situation : Multiracial conference in Pretoria. *Himmat*, 10 (29), 17 May 1974 ; 11 and 15

POMEROY (William J) : NATO South African Alliance Against Portuguese Colonial (South Africa is trying to induct the help of NATO to ensure that they remain protected against the move of liberation) *New Age*, 22 (24), 16 June 1974 ; 12

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

DADOO (Y.M.) : South Africa : Time of Challenge (Reproduced from the African Communist No. 56, 1974) is the report presented by Mr. Dadoo, Chairman of the South African Communist Party. The Report is presented against a background of international development) *Mainstream*, 12 (29), 16 March 1974 ; 15-26

LABOUR

POKROVSKY (A) : African wage slaves in South African Mines. *Patriot*, 7 March 1974 ; 2

SOUTH WEST ASIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

India

SHRI BUTA SINGH'S statement on Namibia (Text of the statement made in the UN Fourth Committee on the question of Namibia on November 5, 1973) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (11), November 1973 ; 393-395

SOUTHERN AFRICA

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

RAI (Anand Mohan) : Southern Africa holds the Aces. *Times of India*, 20 January 1974 ; 4

SUDAN

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

India

BASIC DRUGS and Intermediates manufacturer wins Sudanese Tender for Pharmaceuticals. *Journal of Industry and Trade*, 24 (1), January 1974 ; 42-43

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions by the First Secretary, Commercial), Embassy of India, Khartoum, January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 24 April 1974 ; B125-B128

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (by the First Secretary (Embassy of India, Khartoum, February 1974a) *Indian Trade Journal*, 15 March 1974 ; B244-B246

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions by the First

Secretary (Commercial), Embassy of India, Khartoum, March 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 12 June 1974 ; B487-B489

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (by the First Secretary (Commercial, Embassy of India, Khartoum, April 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 19 June 1974 ; B548-B550

SCOPE FOR Joint Ventures in Sudan. *Economic Trends*, 3 (9) 1 February 1974 ; 23

SHARMA (R.K.) : India-Sudan Economic Relations. *Indo-African Trade Journal*, 10 (2 & 3), March 1974 ; 26-28

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

United Kingdom

BARAKAT AHMED : Panjdeh incident and the occupation of Egypt. *India Quarterly*, 30 (2), April-June 1974 ; 149-152

INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

SHANTI SADIQ ALI : The Changing Sudan. *Indian Express*, 23 June 1974 ; 4

TANZANIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

India

TRADE AGREEMENT Between the Government of India, and Government of United Republic of Tanzania (Text of the agreement signed on 12th December 1972 and came into effect from 28th February 1974 and will remain in force for a period of one year from the date of Ratification) *Indian Trade Journal*, 1 May 1974 ; B186-B187

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

China

CHINA DENIES Base in Tanzania Report against U.N. map (China and Tanzania have protested against UN report which includes a map showing a Chinese naval base in Tanzania) *Patriot*, 19 May 1974 ; 3

India

NEHRU AWARD for President Nyerere (The President of Tanzania has been awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru award for Internatio-

nal Understanding for 1973) *Indian & Foreign Review*; 11 (10), 1 March 1974 ; 10

TANZANIA BACKS Anti-Base campaign (P.M. Smt. Indira Gandhi discussed international situation and problems faced by the nonaligned countries with the Tanzanian President Dr. Julius Nyerere at Dum Dum airport on March 31st on his way home from Pakistan) *Socialist India*, 8 (19), 6 April 1974 ; 30

TANZANIA'S NYERERE (President Julius Nyerere has been awarded the Jawaharlal Nehru award for 1973) *Hindustan Times* 20 February 1974 ; 5

TUNISIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Political)

Libya

HIGH AND DRY (Merger Agreement signed with Libya) *Indian Express*, 18 January 1974 ; 4

MERGER MANIA (The imperialistic hand could be seen behind the merger of Tunisia and Libya) *Patriot*, 14 January 1974 ; 2

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS (Merger of Libya and Tunisia to form an Islamic Republic) *Indian Express*, 15 January 1974 ; 4

TUNISIA (Tunisia's merger agreement with Libya) *Swarajya*, 18 (31), 12 February 1974 ; 18

UGANDA

GOVERNMENT & POLITICS

IDI AMIN Survives (Idi Amin's policy of Africanization shows that Uganda will get a new lease of power) *Link*, 16 (34), 31 March 1974 ; 33

ODWORI-MBOKO (Mally) and ROGERS (Rolfi) : Bureaucracy and Modernization in Uganda. *International Journal of Contemporary Society*, 10 (2 & 3) April-July 1973 ; 89-108

UGANDA UNREST. *Times of India*, 28 March 1974 ; 4

Change of Governments

IDI SURVIVES a Coup (a coup attempt against Uganda's President) *Times of India*, 26 March 1974 ; 5

RIPE FOR a coup (Political situation in Uganda) *Democratic World*, 28 March 1974 ; 2

SRINIVASAN (Padma) : Uganda's Malaise—An attempt at coup Analysis. *Africa Quarterly* 13 (2), July-September 1973 ; 86-104

UGANDA REVOLT (A coup attempt against Uganda President General Idi Amin) *Indian Express*, 26 March 1974 ; 4

Problems of Asians

WOOL DRIDGE (Frank) and SHARMA (Vishnu) : Expropriation of the Property of the Ugandan Asians. *Indian Journal of International Law*, 14 (1), January-March 1974 ; 54-69

WEST AFRICA

FOREIGN RELATIONS (Economic)

India

REPORT ON Economic and Commercial Conditions (by the Second Secretary (Commercial), High Commission of India, Accra, Ghana, Libya and Sierra Leone January 1974) *Indian Trade Journal*, 10 April 1974 ; B34

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

India

SHRI SAMAR SEN'S statement at Security Council on situation in West Asia (Text of the Statement) *Foreign Affairs Record*, 19 (11), November 1973; 392

PAN-AFRICANISM

DeLANCEY (Mark W.) : Early attempts at West African Unity Ghana, Guinea and Mali, *Indian Journal of Politics*, 7 (1) June 1973; 47-55

ZAMBIA

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Economic)

India

SHARMA (R.K.) : Indo-Zambia Trade. *Indo-African Trade*, 10 (4), April 1974; 27-28

FOREIGN RELATIONS—(Political)

India

PATIL (Bal) : Dr. Kenneth D. Kaunda : A President with Passion for Humanism (President Kaunda of Zambia who has been given the Nehru Award for International Understanding is the

rarest among the African Nationals. He has followed the Gandhian spirit in the (Zambian Liberation) *Socialist India*, 8 (10), February 1974; 19-21

ZAMBIA & INDIA Friendship (The Secretary General of Zambia's ruling party Mr. Grey Zulu declared in Lusaka that his party and government attached great importance to relations with India) *Indian & Foreign Review*, 11 (8), 1 February 1974; 8

Japan

SHANTI SADIQ ALI : Zambia turns to Japan. *Indian Express*, 5 January 1974; 4

Publications Indexed

| <i>Sl. No.</i> | <i>TITLE</i> | | <i>PLACE</i> |
|--------------------|--------------------------------------|-----|--------------|
| 1. | Amity | (M) | New Delhi |
| 2. | Arbitration Quarterly | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 3. | Asia Bulletin | (Q) | Bombay |
| 4. | Bhagirath | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 5. | Blitz | (W) | Bombay |
| 6. | Bulletin | (M) | Madras |
| 7. | Call | (M) | Delhi |
| 8. | Capital | (W) | Calcutta |
| 9. | Century | (W) | New Delhi |
| 10. | Commerce | (W) | Bombay |
| 11. | Communicator | (F) | New Delhi |
| 12. | Contemporary | (M) | New Delhi |
| 13. | Cooperator | (M) | New Delhi |
| 14. | Cultural Forum | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 15. | Cultural News from India | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 16. | Democratic World | (W) | New Delhi |
| 17. | Eastern Economist | (W) | New Delhi |
| 18. | Eastern Journal of International Law | (Q) | Madras |
| 19. | Economic Affairs | (M) | Calcutta |
| 20. | Economic Studies | (M) | Calcutta |
| 21. | Economic Survey | | New Delhi |
| 22. | Economic Times | (D) | Bombay |
| 23. | Economic Trends | (F) | New Delhi |
| 24. | Economic and Political Weekly | (W) | Bombay |
| 25. | Ever Widening-Horizon | | New Delhi |

| <i>Sl. No.</i> | <i>TITLE</i> | | <i>PLACE</i> |
|--------------------|--|-------|--------------|
| 26. | Financial Express | (D) | Bombay |
| 27. | Focus on Peace Proposals | (S-A) | New Delhi |
| 28. | Foreign Affairs Bulletin | (W) | New Delhi |
| 29. | Foreign Affairs Record | (M) | New Delhi |
| 30. | Foreign Trade Bulletin | (M) | New Delhi |
| 31. | Foreign Trade Review | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 32. | Forum | (M) | Bombay |
| 33. | Freedom First | (M) | Bombay |
| 34. | Frontier | (W) | Calcutta |
| 35. | Gandhi Marg | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 36. | Gandhi Sangrahalaya | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 37. | Himmat | (W) | Bombay |
| 38. | Hindu | (D) | Madras |
| 39. | Hindustan Times | (D) | New Delhi |
| 40. | Indian Quarterly | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 41. | Indian Archives | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 42. | Indian Economic Review | (S-A) | Delhi |
| 43. | Indian Economic & Social History Review | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 44. | Indian Express | (D) | New Delhi |
| 45. | Indian Finance | (W) | Calcutta |
| 46. | Indian Horizon | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 47. | Indian Journal of Commerce | (Q) | Patna |
| 48. | Indian Journal of Industrial Relations | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 49. | Indian Journal of International Law | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 50. | Indian Journal of Politics | (S-A) | Aligarh |
| 51. | Indian Journal of Public Administra- tion | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 52. | Indian Journal of Social Work | (Q) | Bombay |
| 53. | Indian Labour Journal | (M) | New Delhi |
| 54. | Indian Left Review | (M) | New Delhi |
| 55. | Indian Political Science Review | (H-Y) | Delhi |
| 56. | Indian Recorder & Digest | (M) | New Delhi |
| 57. | Indian Trade Journal | (W) | Calcutta |
| 58. | Indian & Foreign Review | (F) | New Delhi |
| 59. | Indo-African Trade Journal | (M) | New Delhi |

Publications Indexed

| <i>Sl. No.</i> | <i>TITLE</i> | | <i>PLACE</i> |
|--------------------|---|-------|--------------|
| 60. | Indo-British Review | (Q) | Madras |
| 61. | Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis Journal | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 62. | International Journal of Contemporary Sociology | (Q) | Gaziabad |
| 63. | International Studies | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 64. | Islam and the Modern Age | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 65. | Islamic Culture | (Q) | Hyderabad |
| 66. | Janata | (W) | Bombay |
| 67. | Journal of Asiatic Society | (Y) | Calcutta |
| 68. | Journal of Gandhian Studies | (Q) | Allahabad |
| 69. | Journal of Industry and Trade | (M) | New Delhi |
| 70. | Journal of Oriental Research | (Q) | Madras |
| 71. | Journal of Parliamentary Information | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 72. | Journal of the Consitutional & Parliamentary Studies | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 73. | Journal of the Gujrat Research Society | (Q) | Bombay |
| 74. | Journal of the Indian Law Institute | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 75. | Journal of the Lal Bahadur Shastri Academy of Administration | (Q) | Mussoorie |
| 76. | Journal of the National Academy of Administration | (Q) | Mussoorie |
| 77. | Journal of the Oriental Studies | (Q) | Baroda |
| 78. | Journal of the University of Bombay | (Y) | Bombay |
| 79. | Link | (W) | New Delhi |
| 80. | Literary Criteria | (Q) | Bombay |
| 81. | Literary Half Yearly | (H-Y) | Mysore |
| 82. | Mainstream | (W) | New Delhi |
| 83. | March of the Nation | (W) | New Delhi |
| 84. | Modern Review | (M) | Calcutta |
| 85. | National Herald | (D) | New Delhi |
| 86. | New Age | (W) | New Delhi |
| 87. | New Frontiers in Education | (Q) | Delhi |
| 88. | Niti | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 89. | Patriot | (D) | New Delhi |
| 90. | People's Democracy | (W) | Calcutta |

Publications Indexed

| <i>Sl. No.</i> | <i>TITLE</i> | | <i>PLACE</i> |
|--------------------|--|-----|--------------|
| 91. | Problems of Peace and Socialism | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 92. | Quarterly Review of Historical Studies | (Q) | Calcutta |
| 93. | Quest | (Q) | Bombay |
| 94. | Seminar | (M) | New Delhi |
| 95. | Social Action | (Q) | New Delhi |
| 96. | Social Scientist | (M) | Trivandrum |
| 97. | Socialist Digest | (Q) | Bombay |
| 98. | Socialist India | (W) | New Delhi |
| 99. | Socialist Perspective | (Q) | Calcutta |
| 100. | States | (F) | New Delhi |
| 101. | Statesman | (D) | Calcutta |
| 102. | Swarajya | (W) | Madras |
| 103. | Thought | (W) | Delhi |
| 104. | Times of India | (D) | New Delhi |
| 105. | Weekly Round Table | (W) | New Delhi |
| 106. | Yojana | (F) | New Delhi |
| 107. | Young India | (W) | New Delhi |

Documentation List

C O N T E N T S

| | | |
|---------------------------|-----|---------|
| 1. Africa General | ... | 92-104 |
| 2. Algeria | ... | 104 |
| 3. Angola | ... | 104-105 |
| 4. Arab Republic of Egypt | ... | 105-107 |
| 5. East Africa | ... | 107-108 |
| 6. Ethiopia | ... | 108-110 |
| 7. Ghana | ... | 110 |
| 8. Guinea (Republic) | ... | 110 |
| 9. Guinea Bissau | ... | 110-111 |
| 10. India | ... | 111-120 |
| 11. Indian Ocean | ... | 120-124 |
| 12. Kenya | ... | 124-125 |
| 13. Liberia | ... | 125 |
| 14. Libya | ... | 125-127 |
| 15. Mauritius | ... | 127 |
| 16. Mozambique | ... | 127-128 |
| 17. Nigeria | ... | 128-129 |
| 18. Niger | ... | 129 |
| 19. North Africa | ... | 130-138 |
| 20. Rhodesia | ... | 138-139 |
| 21. Senegal | ... | 139-140 |
| 22. Sierra Leone | ... | 140 |
| 23. Somalia | ... | 140 |

Contents

| | | |
|---------------------------------|-----|---------|
| 24. South Africa | ... | 140-143 |
| 25. South West Africa (Namibia) | ... | 143 |
| 26. Southern Africa | ... | 143 |
| 27. Sudan | ... | 143-144 |
| 28. Tanzania | ... | 144-145 |
| 29. Tunisia | ... | 145 |
| 30. Uganda | ... | 145-146 |
| 31. West Africa | ... | 146 |
| 32. Zambia | ... | 146-147 |


**Africa Quarterly
is Available in
MICROFORM
from....**

Xerox University Microfilms
300 North Zeeb Road,
Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106
(313) 761-4700

PLEASE WRITE FOR
COMPLETE INFORMATION

"Articles appearing in this journal
are indexed by ABC POL SCI :
Advance Bibliography of Contents:
Political Science and Government".

**Riviera Campus, 2040 Alameda,
Padre Serra, Santa Barbara,
California 93103-USA**



87 Mr. 1978

Statement about ownership and other particulars about newspaper (*Africa Quarterly*) to be published in the first issue every year after last day of February.

FORM IV
(See Rule 8)

Place of Publication : Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Azad Bhavan, I.P. Estate, New Delhi-1 ; *Periodicity of its publication* : Quarterly in English ; *Printer's Name* : S. Kochar (Mrs.), Citizen of India ; *Address* : Secretary, Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Azad Bhavan, I. P. Estate, New Delhi-1 ; *Publisher's Name* : S. Kochar (Mrs.), Citizen of India ; *Address* : Secretary, Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Azad Bhavan, I.P. Estate, New Delhi-1 ; *Editor's Name* : Dr. Vijaya Gupta, Citizen of India ; *Address* : India Council for Cultural Relations, Azad Bhavan, I.P. Estate, New Delhi-1 ; *Names and addresses of individuals who own the newspaper and partners or share holders holding more than one percent of the total capital* : Indian Council for Cultural Relations, Azad Bhavan, I.P. Estate, New Delhi-1.

I, S. Kochar (Mrs.) hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Sd/-

S. Kochar (Mrs.)

Signature of Publisher

Dated : 28-2-1975

